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The thesis explores the relationship between Audit Committees and External 
Auditors’ fees of a sample of FTSE 350 companies in the UK for the period of 2005-
2006. This is achieved by providing answers to three main research questions. First, 
what are the determinants of Audit Committee activity? Second, what is the 
relationship between Audit Committee activity and external auditors’ fees? Third, 
what is the relationship between audit and non-audit fees and how does the Audit 
Committee affect these?  
 
Starting out with an Agency Theoretical background, the study found evidence 
consistent with the views that a higher proportion of Independent Non-Executive 
Directors on the board enhances Audit Committees’ activity, but the presence of 
financial expertise on the committee was not found to be statistically significant in 
explaining its activity. The thesis also documented evidence that shows that Audit 
Committee activity is inversely related to managerial ownership of shares in 
companies.   
 
In line with the economic theory of auditing, the researcher used fees paid to the 
external auditor to proxy for the level of economic bonding between auditors and 
their clients. Higher fees are interpreted to indicate compromised independence. 
Five alternative measures of economic bonding were used. The researcher found a 
stable and statistically significant positive relationship between measures of 
IV 
 
economic bonding and Audit Committee activity. This finding is consistent with the 
view that Audit Committees buy more services from the auditors in order to enhance 
auditing and reporting quality.   
 
Strong positive relationships between audit and non-audit services and vice versa 
were found using a single equation fees model but these relationships were not 
consistent when the researcher controlled for endogeneity between audit and non 
audit fees using Simultaneous Equation Models (SEM). Audit Committee activity was 
not statistically important in these relationships. This evidence taken together 
supports the proposition that economies of scope exist in the joint provision of both 
audit and non-auditing services to the same client. Finally the thesis also documents 
evidence that suggests that knowledge spill-over flows from non-audit services to 
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The information gap created as a result of the separation of corporate ownership 
from management necessitated the demand for forms of control and monitoring both 
internally and externally (Weir et al, 2002; Young, 2000; Walsh and Seward, 1990),  
internally through the board of directors and externally through the report of the 
external auditors as well as through market for control. Agency Theory has been 
unequivocal on the array of conflicts of interest that tend to manifest themselves in 
situations where ownership is separated from management (Berle and Means, 1932) 
including diversification decisions, investment decisions, remuneration decisions and 
management behaviour during takeover and anti-takeover situations  etc (Denis et 
al, 2002). The objective function is how to minimize agency cost and consequently 
maximize the return to residual claimants (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
 
However, the waves of corporate misbehaviours such as management excessive 
consumption of perquisites, creative accounting, falsification of accounting records, 
reward for poor performances through performance related bonuses which 
encouraged „short termism‟, „golden parachute‟ and abuse of performance incentive 
schemes  etc. that have been witnessed in recent times are huge and perhaps 
unprecedented. Confidence in the market system was badly affected and key 
players in the market had to respond quickly and with an approach that would 
indicate competence and a broad understanding of the causes as well as an apt 
appreciation of what needed to be done to fix the system. This was so that 
confidence would be restored in the efficiency of the market system.  
 
A cursory glance at Corporate Governance guidelines produced in the wake of these 
recent corporate collapses suggests a significant anticipated role for the Audit 
Committee. Although Audit Committees had been in existence at least in the UK 
since the 1970s, they had not been nearly as prominent (Collier, 1993) and had not 
enjoyed as much legitimacy as is the case now (Rezaee, 2009). According to the 
Cadbury Report (1992) Audit Committees would be important governance 
mechanisms that would protect the interests of the shareholders and ensure 
transparent reporting and improve audit quality.  Despite this confidence, doubts 
[3] 
 
have been expressed about the ability of the Audit Committee to perform these 
anticipated roles (Menon and Williams, 1994; Sommer, 1991; Spira, 2003).  
 
It is now time to start to assess the performance of the committee in the discharge of 
these responsibilities. And the necessary first step along this path is to know what 
factors actually account for committee performance. This thesis focuses on the roles 
of the Audit Committee in enhancing auditors‟ independence in the context of 
Corporate Governance and the auditing profession. The thesis is divided into three 
main themes.  In the first part, the thesis focuses on the determinants of Audit 
Committee activity and diligence. The frequency of the committee‟s meetings as well 
as a composite definition (termed diligence) that includes meeting frequency, 
committee expertise and structure were used to proxy for committee activity and 
diligence (Collier and Gregory, 1999; Song and Windram, 2004). The relationship 
between these proxy variables and other explanatory variables is examined.   
 
Furthermore, on the theme of the Audit Committee and its activity, it is imperative to 
consider precisely how the Audit Committee impacts upon external auditors and on 
their independence. There were concerns about the independence of the auditor in 
the fall out from various corporate collapses, particularly the role of auditors in these. 
It has been suggested that the existence of the Audit Committee would act as a 
buffer between the auditors and the executive directors, and thereby improve their 
independence (Cadbury, 1992; Smith, 2003). This is more so in that their 
remuneration, appointment, and the type and scope of services that may be bought 
from the external auditors, which had previously been decided by the management 
are now within the remit of the Audit Committee.  In the second part of the thesis, the 
researcher examines the relationship between the Audit Committee and the external 
auditor with respect to the level of economic bonding between the external auditor 
and their audit clients and the impact of the Audit Committee upon this. Perceived 
auditor independence is the dependent variable and was measured by looking at the 
external auditor‟s fees. Alternative definitions of the perception of auditor 
independence such as the Total Relative Income of the auditor and Total fees paid 
to the auditor were examined. A number of governance and other control variables 




The third part of the thesis contributes to the debate on the joint provision of audit 
and non-audit services by auditors to their audit clients and the impact of Audit 
Committee on these. The arguments in support of joint provision suggest that there 
may be economies of scope and knowledge spill-over from one service to the other. 
On the other hand, it is argued that the joint provision of audit and non-audit services 
by auditors to their audit clients may threaten auditor independence (Beattie et al 
2004). This is because auditors may end up auditing their own work, or become too 
familiar with their clients‟ systems to the extent of being involved in their 
management and the level of economic bonding may become so high as to 
compromise independence. In this section of the thesis, the researcher empirically 
examined the relationship between audit and non-audit fees. Model issues 
concerning this relationship were considered, analysed and evaluated. 
 
 
1.1 JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE STUDY   
The issue of corporate governance is now common place and has featured regularly 
in discourses both in the print and electronic media.  Considerable academic 
attentions have also been rightly focused on various aspects of the issue including 
for instance, executive compensation (Harvey and Shrieves, 2001), regulation 
(Keenan, 2004), corporate control (La Porta et al, 2000) Institutional ownership 
(Mitra et al, 2007), among others. Numerous corporate scandals of the late 20th and 
early 21st centuries such as BCCI, polypeck, ENRON Lehman Brothers etc have 
played significant part in the spotlight enjoyed by the topic and it seems that there 
are many more questions emerging than answers for the known lapses in the control 
systems that may have facilitated these corporate misbehaviours. As will be shown 
in subsequent chapters in the thesis, it seems that academic responses to these 
issues are belated and narrow. This is because academic researches seem to be 
playing catch-up and this is perhaps reminiscent of the age long arguments of the 
type of relationship that should ideally subsist between academics (researchers) and 
practitioners. Should researches and scholarly efforts be motivated and led by reality 
as conceived by practitioners, or by researchers‟ appreciation of situations and their 
environments and perhaps by intuitions and the desire to find answers to current and 
future questions. Considering that at times the imaginary questions provide the basis 
for new solutions to both existing and future problems. The case of Sir Isaac Newton 
[5] 
 
and the discovery of the laws of motion and gravity and the eventual discovery of the 
numerous laws of Physics are relevant.  If it is the case that academics and indeed 
researchers have important roles to play in shaping society and enhancing its 
institutions, and in finding solutions to its numerous problems, then enquiries into 
corporate governance will continue to be justified not only on the strength of its 
importance to the society, considering that every corporations is a compendium of 
human beings, but also by virtue of finding solutions to a human problem or rather a 
societal problem that is obviously affecting many people across the spectrum of the 
society including  pensioners, employees and general public. Thus the issues of 
corporate governance and auditor independence have much resonance to the 
society and clearly appear to be crucial to the sustenance of the market confidence, 
judging from the run up on Northern Rock in the UK in 2007, and the furore that 
currently trails the banking crises. Generally, academic efforts that seek to clarify or 
at least improve our (society, including academics) understanding of the issues 
regarding how corporation are governed to ensure the protection of shareholders‟ 
wealth and increase societal benefits is justified. This is because such an effort is 
similar to providing a public good with attached public benefit.  
 
Specifically in terms of academic contributions of the main questions of this thesis, a 
review of previous academic efforts in chapter three of the thesis led to identification 
of a number of gaps in the literature that this thesis seeks to fill. In the case of the 
UK, which is the focus of this thesis, academic concerns on Audit committee and its 
activity, as well as the relationship between Audit committee activity and Auditors‟ 
Independence has been under researched (see Cadbury, 1992; Spira, 2003; Spira 
and Page, 2005). Those relationships are assumed rather than empirically 
established. Two previous UK based studies that are similar in terms of the issues 
addressed in this thesis  are Collier and Gregory (1996) and Collier and Gregory 
(1996), both of which were undertaken prior to the series of corporate governance 
changes of the early 21st century following the corporate misbehaviours of these 
periods. There were important changes that are capable of affecting the outcome of 
their studies in today‟s corporate environment. For example, these studies did not 
accommodate the far reaching suggestions contained in the Smith reports on Audit 
committees, the regulatory changes brought about by the Enron incidence in US, the 
intense debate on auditors‟ joint provision of audit and non-audit services to their 
[6] 
 
client, a fallout from Enron and Arthur Andersen‟s alleged complications in the whole 
episode which centred on conflict of interest and professional liability. Furthermore, 
majority of previous studies on AC activity and its impact on Auditor Independence 
are mainly from the US. Although there are similarities between the US and UK 
markets, there are also important differences especially in terms of regulatory 
framework and experiences (see Aguilera et al, 2006) which suggest that results 
from US studies may not be totally applicable to a different setting such as the UK. 
For example, while corporate governance guidelines in the US (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
2002) has the backing of law and its implementation is compulsory, corporate 
governance code in the UK are principle based and more flexible as companies have 
to comply or explain non-compliance.   
 
Finally, the approach used in this study is different from previous ones. For example, 
in addition to the frequency of meeting as a measure of Audit Committee‟s activity, 
the study also developed a composite measure of AC activity (diligence). This 
comprised the number of meetings held by the committee in a year, the presence of 
an expert on the Audit Committee, and whether there is a term of reference or not.  
This is an approach that has not been used in previous studies and reflects the 
provisions of the main corporate governance codes, such as the Combined code, 
SOX, the Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC) reports with respect to the effectiveness of 
the Audit Committees. In terms of the perception of Auditor independence, the study 
used measures of economic bonding between the auditor and their client as a proxy 
for this. This includes, total fees, Total relative income of the auditors, and audit and 
non-audit fees paid by clients to their auditors. While previous studies appear to be 
focusing on perception of dependence through earning managements and events 
study relating to security market reaction to threat of auditor independence, no study 
has recently examined perception of auditors‟ independence with respect to Audit 
committees‟ activity in the UK. In the next section the researcher states the problem 
statements addressed in the thesis.  
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENTS 
What are the determinants of Audit Committee activities in the UK? How does Audit 
Committee activity impact on perception of Auditor Independence? How do Audit 




These problem statements are the basis for the following research objectives.  
  
1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
At the end of this study, the following objectives would have been achieved: 
1) Establish the type of relationship that currently exists between the Audit 
Committee as a tool of Corporate Governance and auditor independence 
2) Review the developments in the roles and responsibilities of the audit 
committee as a Corporate Governance mechanism 
3) Examine the determinants of Audit Committee activity and diligence  
4) Analyse the impact of an effective Audit Committee on auditor independence 
5) Establish  the relationship between audit and non-audit fees 
These research objectives will be expressed as hypotheses which will be tested with 
secondary data collected and analyzed appropriately. 
 
1.4 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY TO KNOWLEDGE 
The study resulted in an enhanced understanding of the concept of Corporate 
Governance and auditor independence and the various ways in which it could be 
threatened, especially as it affects confidence in the market system in which the 
auditor plays a very crucial role. The study developed an integrated approach to the 
definition of Corporate Governance suggesting that a broad perspective which will be 
eminently useful to both academics and professionals. Secondly, the study 
expounds the importance of the Audit Committee as a Corporate Governance 
mechanism, showing its developments over many decades and exploring the 
changes in its understanding and perceptions. The study documents important 
finding on relevance of independent non-executive directors in ensuring effective 
oversight on management. The study also enhanced the understanding of the impact 
of the Audit Committee on auditor independence and improved our understanding of 
the relationship between audit and non-audit fees. The study highlights the 
importance of appropriate theoretical underpinning in empirical research and 
reinforced Agency theoretical framework for the analyses. However, it showed the 
dynamics of the relationship between Audit Committee activity and auditing functions 
on one hand and the impacts of changing regulations and business environment on 






In addressing the concerns enumerated in the study objectives the researcher 
adopts a positivist epistemological construct and uses a deductive research 
approach and quantitative research strategy relying on secondary data. Specifically, 
the annual reports of companies, both in hard copy and on-line versions as well as 
information from the FAME database were used extensively. Information about audit 
and non-audit fees were sourced from Accountancy Age Magazine for the relevant 
periods and confirmed with those from the FAME database. The study focused on 
the UK top 350 companies listed on the London Stock Exchange from which a 
sample was selected for the study.  
 
The stated objectives were analysed into three main research questions. Each of the 
three research questions were deconstructed into testable hypotheses expressed in 
their null form. In all, fifteen main hypotheses were tested, five hypotheses for the 
first research theme, six for the second research theme and four for the third 
research theme. The study focused on 2005/2006 year end. In order to conduct the 
testing, the researcher specified a number of models that captured the nature of the 
relationship that characterized the investigation. Ten models were specified and 
twelve regressions were run. Robustness checks and sensitivity analyses were 
conducted to boost the validity of the study.   
 
The third main research question examined four hypotheses. This is to emphasise 
the importance this study attaches to the relationship between audit and non-audit 
fees and how this interact with the Audit Committee activities.  This investigation was 
conducted in the light of information concerning the size of audit fee in relation to 
non-audit fees earned by Arthur Andersen from ENRON and the growing importance 
of non-audit fees to accountancy practices. There is the „slight‟ or „real‟ (depending 
on which side of the debate that one takes) possibility that auditors‟ independence 
may be threatened by the continued provision of non-audit services to their audit 
clients. This apprehension seems to be shared by the BIG 4 audit firms given their 
recent move systematically to separate their consultancy services from their core 
audit services.  The results from this part of the thesis focused on the relationship 
[9] 
 
between audit and non-audit services, but this section also reports other important 
results.  
 
The data collected were prepared (which involved classification, rearrangement, and 
transformation) to make them ready for statistical and econometric processing.  The 
data analyses involved the use of descriptive statistics as well as more sophisticated 
econometric investigations and reports. The first sets of five hypotheses as well as 
the set of six hypotheses from the second main research questions were tested 
using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) multiple regression methods. The third set of 
four hypotheses was tested using OLS and a Simultaneous Equation Model (SEM).  
 
1.6 PROCEDURES UNDERTAKEN FOR THE RESEARCH  
Data were collected from the sources identified above, these were then categorised 
analysed and sorted in such a way as to fulfil the study objectives. Preliminary 
statistical procedures to establish relevant data normality were undertaken. Some of 
the variables were normalised using logarithm transformation. Ordinary least square 
procedures were then adopted for the analyses. In the case of the third research 
question, a simultaneous equation model was used. Post- estimation checks were 
performed to identify and correct for heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity in the 
model.  Analyses were done in view of the previous studies.  
 
 
1.7 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The main objective of the thesis was to contribute to the debate on Corporate 
Governance, especially the Audit Committee‟s activity and its effect on auditor 
independence. Some of the study limitations are discussed below: 
 
Sensitivity of the topic  
The topic itself imposes a number of limitations to its investigation, essentially 
because of the sensitivity of the issues involved. Internal administration and working 
of an organization may provide it with competitive advantage and to discuss issues 
on these or related themes freely in an interview or through questionnaires requires 
significant caution so as not to compromise an organization‟s existence and 
performance. The sensitivity attached to Corporate Governance and performance 
[10] 
 
impeded access that would have enabled the researcher to conduct a qualitative 
study, such as interviews with board level personnel in the organizations or through 
using a focus group approach. Substantial efforts were made both at the outset of 
the research, throughout the study and even right at the end to attempt the 
improvement of the findings by using multiple sources of data in line with 
suggestions by Curran and Blackburn (2001) but these were largely unsuccessful, 
due mainly to lack of access and time constraints (Saunders et al, 2007, Bryman and 
Bell, 2007). It should be noted that the desire to add a qualitative dimension to the 
study was purely to broaden perspectives. This wish did not arise because the 
quantitative approach was inadequate to answer the research questions. Indeed 
most Corporate Governance studies have been conducted using quantitative 
approaches (Dedman, 2004; Spira, 2003).  Corporate governance studies tend to 
use an Agency theoretical frame, with research objectives expressed in testable 
hypotheses and using publicly available information and in some instances a survey 
method is used to collect data (Saunders et al, 2007). A shift from a “conventional 
wisdom” approach would have been worthwhile, though not necessarily better.  
However, researchers have to balance the reality of their research with the ideal. 
The overriding concern was which research method or methods would help the 
researcher to achieve his research objectives (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003 in 
Saunders et al, 2007). 
 
The use of secondary data  
The use of secondary data provided an opportunity to search for a more genuine and 
intrinsic relationship between the variables. This afforded the researcher the benefits 
of a greater focus on analyzing the available data more closely in a way that would 
enhance the achievement of the study objectives. However, selecting the right 
combination of variables to proxy for unobservable phenomena is always a problem 
in empirical quantitative research. For example, the choice of the proxy to measure 
committee activity and diligence may be considered to be weak or insufficiently 
broad; equally, the measure of economic bonding between the client and the auditor 
may also be criticized. It is therefore important to mention upfront that these 
measures are the best available observable proxies of the variables. However, in 
most quantitative investigations, the effects and methods of handling measurement 
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error in the dependent variables have been well documented and efficient (Maddala, 
2001).  
 
Time and resources  
Lastly, the constraint of resources in terms of time cannot be overemphasized. 
Business and management research is always time challenged. This study was 
definitely affected by the passage of time and its consequences. The study started in 
April 2005, when the global economy was just settling down from news of the 
successive collapses of various corporate giants. This chain of events started first 
with the high profile collapse of ENRON in December 2001 and this was quickly 
followed in June 2002 by WorldCom and then others.  
 
Further, the debate surrounding harmonisation of accounting standards which had 
been going on for some time came to a seemingly significant climax in June 2000. 
This is because, on this date, the Commission of the European Communities issued 
a communiqué to the Council and European Parliament to the effect that all listed 
companies would be required to prepare their consolidated accounts in line with 
International Accounting Standard (IAS) from 2005 onwards (Elliot and Elliot, 2005). 
These events may have been responsible for the tendency to present a global 
response to the global corporate crises of the early 21st century, starting precisely 
from 2001, since there is the consideration that the researcher is operating in a 
global economy and harmonisation as well as integration of accounting and auditing 
practises were at the top of the agenda for most accountancy professionals and their 
professional bodies.  
 
However, by 2007, it was the UK mortgage giant, Northern Rock that led the second 
wave of 21st Century corporate mishaps. Northern Rock‟s problems were traced 
back to the Subprime Mortgage market in the US. The rumbles continued and by 
2008 the effects had become clear and the full effects of the “Credit Crunch” had 
emerged. A number of high profile corporations were either bailed out by their 
national governments, collapsed, or were bought out by other companies. These 
events constitute a significant threat to the study in a number of ways. For instance, 
the changing landscapes surrounding corporate activity during the periods of the 
study have necessitated changes in the methodology, the focus and scope of the 
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analyses as well as in the interpretation of the results from the study. However, the 
study has been designed to accommodate these limitations so that the study 
objectives can be achieved. 
 
1.8 THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS   
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows: in the next chapter 2, the 
researcher provides a theoretical and historical perspective upon the central themes 
of the thesis. The leading theoretical constructs that have prominence in the thesis 
are explained and then the history of Corporate Governance in the UK is traced to 
the pre and post Cadbury Committee Report periods.   
 
In chapter 3, the researcher produces a review of the literature relevant to the main 
themes of the thesis. This involved a review of definitions of Audit Committee and 
auditor independence, identification of the various shades of opinion on the major 
concerns of the thesis which centre round Corporate Governance, the Audit 
Committee and auditor independence. In chapter 4, the researcher presents the 
theoretical underpinnings for the study and also developed the study hypotheses. 
Chapter 5 sets out the research methodology issues and provides justifications for 
the chosen research strategy. A consideration of alternative methods that could have 
been used was also undertaken and the epistemological framework adopted in the 
thesis provided. In chapter 6 the researcher presents the first empirical study of the 
thesis. This focuses on the determinants of Audit Committee activities. Chapter 7 
reports the second empirical study of the thesis, this focuses on the relationship 
between Audit Committee activity and auditor independence while chapter 8 reports 
the findings from the third empirical study that examines the relationship between 
audit and non-audit fees when interacted with Audit Committee activity.  Finally in 
chapter 9, the main findings of the research are summarised, future directions for 
research are identified and recommendations made for policy purposes after taking 









Background to the Study 
Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to provide a background to the study by examining 
the definitions of Corporate Governance, its control mechanisms, both internal and 
external and then providing a historical perspective of the development of Corporate 
Governance in the UK. These are structured into three sections respectively. The 
discussions in this part of the thesis are to enable the researcher to provide a 
broader perspective of the various debates that affect this investigation and bring out 
key points in these debates which will be the bases on which further discussions and 
analyses in the thesis are built. A diagrammatic illustration of the issues discussed is 







Figure 1: Study Background 
 
2.1  Corporate Governance: Towards a Definition 
Perhaps the logical point from which to start the discussion on Corporate 
Governance is to present an understanding of the antecedents of the corporation as 
the researcher knows it today. This can be traced as far back as the Middle Ages 
(between the 5th and 15th Centuries), the period of the Renaissance (between the 
late 15th Century and early 18th Century) and the Great Industrial Revolution (in the 
late 18th Century and early 19th Century).  Modern firms are historically a product of a 
small quasi-governmental arrangement often chartered by the „Crown‟ to undertake 
a specific trading purpose.  In other words the modern firm evolved from a financing 
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arrangement, whereby a group of people with similar interests „acting as one body‟, 
embarked on a substantial trade expedition which could not be sponsored by a 
single individual due to the huge capital investment required.  Some of these trade 
missions included the Dutch East India Company, the British East Indian Company 
and the Hudson‟s Bay Company (Morck, 2006).   
 
However, part of that process of evolution, precisely the period which spans the 13th 
to the later part of the 19th century witnessed landmark developments that continue 
to have significant impacts on our perceptions and understandings about and the 
operation of the modern corporation. For instance, the modern stock market could be 
traced back to the resistance against the attempt by the shareholders to liquidate the 
Dutch East India Company on the grounds that it was formed for a limited time 
period and, since it had achieved its set objectives, it had outlived its usefulness and 
should therefore be liquidated. The appointed “board of governors” resisted this 
move and successfully challenged it in court. Those investors who were keen on 
selling their shares in the company were given the right to do so. This thus became 
the antecedent of the modern day stock market in which shares can be bought and 
sold. Furthermore, the ability of shareholders to sell their holdings in the company 
rather than liquidating it ensured perpetuity for the firm. This is because, not only 
were the shareholders able to sell their holdings in the enterprise, there were many 
more people interested in contributing to new trade expeditions who thus bought into 
these corporations and indeed into many other forms of trade and business 
endeavour. Some of these commercial endeavours were unsuccessful, for example 
the South Sea Company, speculation in whose stocks caused the famous Bubble in 
1720 (Crowther, 2007). However, the sponsors and shareholders in these 
companies were made liable to the extent of the total losses. This was seen to be 
unfair and this perception may have contributed to the series of events that 
eventually gave rise to the Limited Liability Act of 1855 which provided that 
shareholders in such companies should be liable for the debts of the company only 
to the extent of their initial investments (Hickson and Turner, 2005).  
 
However, while these important developments were unfolding, it was becoming ever 
more important to understand the structure and operation of the firm. It was therefore 
not surprising that the work by Berle and Means (1932) enjoyed huge acceptance. 
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Their work provided substantial insight into the interactions within organisations. 
They suggested that there is a separation between the owners of businesses and 
their management and that this separation requires that there should be a formal 
contract and bond between the two parties. Their explanations further suggested that 
this separation is in part due to the expansion in corporations‟ size and, as 
businesses become bigger, owners are less likely to be involved in the day to day 
running of the „new‟ organisation. Their observations should have drawn attention to 
the issues of governance in organisations, but it was left to the works of Coase 
(1936), Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama (1980) on the possibility of conflicts 
of interest between the shareholders and management representing the Principals 
and the Agents respectively that launched discussions on Corporate Governance.  
Even then the term was not used in analyses as such. It was not until 1983 that it 
featured as the title of a paper in Perspectives on Management (Earl, 1983). In 1984, 
the term appeared as the title of a report to the American Law Institute and in the 
same year as a book title in the UK with the caption “Corporate Governance – 
Practices, Procedures and Powers in British Companies and Their Boards of 
Directors” by R .I. Tricker.  
 
However, discussions of Corporate Governance have gained in popularity due to the 
increase in high profile corporate collapses which have brought it into the spotlight. 
In other words, the conflicts of interests in organisations, management recklessness 
and greed, corporate dishonesty and ethical breakdowns, weak internal control and 
poor risk assessments are some of the factors that have caused corporate failures 
and have been the herald of Corporate Governance discourse. Despite the recent 
fluent and widespread use of the term it has no generally accepted definition 
(Razaee, 2009), due, perhaps, to the fact that the term cuts across disciplines. It is 
widely used both professionally and in its academic sense. It is a term that is now 
commonly used in Management, Law and Behavioural Sciences just as it is now 
used fluently in Humanities.  It lends itself well to the private and business world just 
as it is relevant to issues regarding public affairs and the business of governments. 
Other terms that are being used with Corporate Governance include „transparent 
reporting‟, „corporate accountability‟ and „corporate honesty‟ among many others. 
However, just as it is  with many other concepts (e.g. accounting efficiency, 
effectiveness, communication) and especially with a term that is capable of many 
[17] 
 
uses and applications, it is increasingly difficult to present a generally accepted 
definition of Corporate Governance. It means different things to different people 
depending on discipline and context. The difficulty in agreeing on the meaning and 
scope of the concept may be summarized in the following quotation: 
“Some commentators take too narrow a view, and say it (Corporate Governance) 
is the fancy term for the way in which directors and auditors handle their 
responsibilities towards shareholders. Others use the expression as if it were 
synonymous with shareholder democracy. Corporate governance is a topic 
recently conceived, as yet ill-defined, and consequently blurred at the 
edges…Corporate Governance as a subject, as an objective, or as a regime to 
be followed for the good of shareholders, employees, customers, bankers and 
indeed for the reputation and standing of our nation and its economy” (Maw et al. 
1994, p1).  
This quotation illustrates the extent of the differences that exist in perceptions of 
Corporate Governance. It also illustrates the diversity of its applications. For 
instance, it argues that Corporate Governance transcends the limited scope of just 
firm applicability to include perceptions of Corporate Governance at a national or 
country level. It also shows that the term is relatively new and therefore not very well 
understood.  
 
However, attempts have been made to provide a definition and determine the scope 
of the term.  According to Cadbury (1992) Corporate Governance refers to a whole 
system of controls, financial and otherwise, which ensure that a firm is directed in the 
right way and towards the right direction.  The Cadbury Committee‟s definition 
focused on the ways in which organisations are controlled and managed so as to 
achieve their main objectives. It also suggested that Corporate Governance is 
concerned with holding the balance between economic and social goals and 
between individual and communal goals. The Corporate Governance framework is 
there to encourage the efficient use of resources and equally to require 
accountability for the stewardship of those resources. The aim is to align as nearly 
as possible the interests of individuals, corporations and society (Global Corporate 
Governance Forum, World Bank, 2000). This definition is distinctive as it asserts the 
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multi-faceted role of businesses. It implies that businesses should not just be seen 
as a vehicle for the achievement of the shareholders‟ wealth maximisation 
objectives, but rather businesses should be seen as an integral part of the 
community with its own share of societal duties and responsibilities. Therefore, 
managements have a duty of care to society as well as to their shareholders. 
Although the definition is detailed it fails to adequately recognise the importance of 
Corporate Governance‟s role at the macro-level of society. A comprehensive view of 
Corporate Governance that underscores its importance on its micro as well as its 
macro impact is required. This is even more the case in situations where good 
Corporate Governance can attract foreign direct investment into the economy.  
 
Monks and Minow (1995) defined Corporate Governance in terms of interactions 
between various players in the corporate environment and the processes used in 
achieving consensus in the allocation of corporate resources and in the 
determination of corporate direction to ensure improved performance. Since 
organisations‟ resources are limited and have alternative uses, their allocation 
deserves considerable attention in order to optimise returns from such usage. This 
definition can be said to link Corporate Governance with the strategic position of 
organisations and perhaps sees Corporate Governance as the preserve of strategic 
level management. It defines Corporate Governance in the light of the firm alone 
rather than in terms of the various stakeholders and definitely not in the realisation of 
the interdependence between the firm and its environment especially the society in 
which it operates.  
 
However, Yadong‟s (2004, p2) definition addressed the concerns of stakeholders. It 
sees Corporate Governance “as the relationship between the corporation and the 
stakeholders that determines and controls the strategic direction and performance of 
the corporation. It is the system by which corporations are directed and controlled”. 
He further suggested that “this structure specifies the distribution of rights and 
responsibilities among various corporate participants including board members, 
executives, shareholders and other stakeholders; it spells out the rules and 
procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs”. It “...also provides the 
structure through which the company sets objectives, the strategy for attaining those 
objectives and the guidelines for monitoring performance.” This comprehensive 
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definition has important implications not just for the nature of interaction between 
corporate structures but also for interactions between the individuals within the 
structures. In other words, what sort of relationships exist between the board and the 
shareholders on one hand, but also how the relationship between individual 
members of the management is regulated and how this impacts upon their 
interactions with members of other structures. What rules, rights and obligations 
each structure has to grapple with and what affects each individual member in the 
structure all seem to have become the subject of Corporate Governance. However, it 
is important to understand Yadong‟s (2004) definition in the context of governance 
issues that confront multi-national enterprises (MNEs). Such issues include 
interdependence between the parent and subsidiary companies, the problems with 
resource allocation and monitoring for performance. One possible criticism of this 
definition is in its inability to specify the potential roles of stakeholders in the 
governance system. Although it mentioned the setting of rules and procedures for 
making decisions on corporate affairs, it is not explicit on the involvement of the 
stakeholders in governance and modalities for the allocation of corporate resources. 
Furthermore, the definition is silent on the roles of regulation and regulatory authority 
in Corporate Governance. Achieving effective Corporate Governance may be 
impossible in a weak or inefficient regulatory environment (La Port et al, 2002).  
 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development‟s (OECD) (1996) 
approach to defining Corporate Governance is principle based. It provided five 
principle bases to Corporate Governance assessments which focus on (1) The right 
of shareholders and key ownership functions (2) The equitable treatment of 
shareholders (3) The role of stakeholders in Corporate Governance (4) Disclosure 
and transparency and (5) The responsibilities of the Board. It also produces a regular 
report on governance in member countries. Individual nations are assessed on the 
basis of the five OECD principles and significant improvements and developments 
are reported. This approach by the OECD favours macro-economic perceptions of 
Corporate Governance issues. It essentially sees Corporate Governance beyond the 
purviews of just the firm but also includes its impacts on the national economy and 
the likely implications of its adoption or rejection for economic growth. This macro-
perception seems to be lacking in previous definitions of Corporate Governance.  
Unlike Yadong (2004), the OECD‟s definition appreciates the importance of a 
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regulatory and legal framework that can guarantee shareholders‟ rights and that can 
ensure equitable treatment of shareholders whether they are in the minority or 
majority. 
2.1.1 Corporate Governance and Shareholders’ Returns 
So far the definitions mentioned above more or less represent the stakeholders‟ 
perceptions of the corporation and Corporate Governance. However, there are 
alternative views of the organisation and certainly of Corporate Governance. For 
example, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) give a definition which sees Corporate 
Governance as the way in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure 
adequate returns on their investments. This is similar to the definition suggested by 
Mathiesen (2002) who defined Corporate Governance as a field in economics that 
examines the use incentives to motivate and secure management   performance and 
efficiency in the organization. This could be through the use of contracts and 
organizational designs and legislations. Another definition that sees Corporate 
Governance from the perspective of enhancing shareholders‟ wealth is provided by 
Tipuric et al (2007) who suggested that Corporate Governance comprises of a 
system of effective monitoring by the supplier of crucial inputs to ensure handsome 
returns on their investments in corporations.  
 
One common theme in these definitions is the central position of the shareholder and 
the overriding objective of shareholders‟ wealth optimization. The relevant question 
here is how to manage the organization to achieve shareholders‟ objective of profit 
maximization. Although the debate (i.e. about what constitutes and what should 
constitute the main objectives of the corporation) is enduring and inconclusive, these 
definitions suggest that the primary objective of the firm is to produce sufficient return 
to investors, to persuade them to continue to hold their investment in the 
organization. Otherwise, shareholders will look for alternatives that can provide the 
expected rate of return from the level of investment.  In other words, shareholders 
may „flex‟ their power in the face of poor performance by switching their investment 
to a higher return firm (Cuthbertson and Nitzsche, 2004) and may even instigate a 






2.1.2 Corporate Governance and Business Culture  
Keasey and Wright (1993) defined Corporate Governance to include the entire 
paraphernalia of an organisation‟s culture, ethos, beliefs, shared values, systems 
and structures that support the successful achievement of corporate objectives.  
These abstract phenomena play a powerful role in piloting organisational success. 
They tend to provide enormous depth from which organisations are able to draw 
strengths and also provide a strong basis on which to build competitive advantage 
(Johnson and Scholes, 2002).  
 
However, organisations have norms and build culture over time as part of their 
strategic stance, so this also impacts upon their perceptions and outlook on issues. 
Keasey and Wright‟s (1993) suggestion that an organisation‟s posture on Corporate 
Governance depends to a great extent on its culture, ethos, beliefs etc is not 
implying that Corporate Governance precedes culture but that each organisation‟s 
culture and strategic behaviours are dynamic and changes in relation to the 
changing needs and expediencies of society. Organisations need to portray good 
Corporate Governance postures as these may project a positive image and may 
impact upon corporate performance (Davidson III et al 2004).  
 
It may also be possible to use good Corporate Governance behaviour as a corporate 
risk management tool. To the extent that good corporate cultures and ethos are 
ingrained in an organisation and its functionaries, it is likely that corporate 
dishonesty, underhand activity, reputational damage, fines and penalties may be 
avoided. This definition may also imply that there is an inherent business benefit in 
being good and that society and other stakeholders may be keen to reward 
organisations that act properly as well as sanctioning improper behaviours by 
organisations and their functionaries (Moir, 2001). It may be far too costly for 
organisations to be indifferent to public perceptions of their reputation and their 
attitude to Corporate Governance.  
 
Management‟s attitude and perceptions of governance will probably be reflected in 
the role of Corporate Governance in an organisation‟s strategic planning process, in 
the considerations of other stakeholders‟ interests, the extent of transparency and 
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accountability, utilisation of resources and their disclosures and the extent of 
communication with shareholders, so that all these factors will be affected by the 
governance environment. It may then be possible to judge an organisation‟s 
Corporate Governance stance from a consideration of its culture, ethos, beliefs and 
strategy.  It may be intuitive to expect that organisations with a strong and 
aggressive management culture with domineering executives may pose a threat to 
good Corporate Governance practices. On the other hand it may be that firms that 
embrace Corporate Governance best practices have a culture that places great 
emphasis on reputation and corporate honesty (Agrawwal and Mandelker, 1990).   
  
2.1.3 Corporate Governance and Power  
Another way of describing Corporate Governance is to examine the repository of 
power in an organisation. Corporate Governance in many ways touches on the 
interplay of power, influence and authority in the organisation. Where does power 
reside in the organisation and who controls the use of organisational wealth to 
achieve set objectives and to determine the distribution of resources in the 
organisation? The ability to influence organisational decisions, chart its direction in 
the short and long term, coordinate the mobilisation and application of its funds, 
determine the nature, scope and method of its interactions within and with other 
organisations all signify the repository of organisational power and authority. This will 
ultimately have a significant bearing on an organisation‟s structure and governance 
(Pfeffer, 1981; Tjosvold, 1989). For instance, studies have suggested that „director 
duality‟, a situation where the role of the chief executive and the chair of the board 
are combined, is capable of compromising Corporate Governance best practice 
because it may make the chief executive very powerful and dominant to the 
disadvantage of other stakeholders in the corporation (Collier and Gregory, 1999). 
This may facilitate management override of internal controls and increase corporate 
risk exposures (Donaldson and Davis, 1991).  
 
Most recently, in March 2008, the management of  Marks and Spencer (M & S) 
announced the decision to combine the role of the chief executive and chairman in 
Stuart Rose until 2011 (Davey and Laurance, 2008). This caused a number of 
protest votes by some shareholders on the grounds that it would make the CEO too 
powerful and may compromise internal control and also because it is not a good 
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Corporate Governance practice or signal. Management on the other hand argued 
that such a structure is necessary to enable the CEO to wield sufficient power to 
initiate any necessary strategic changes due to the company struggling with 
challenging circumstances with falling profits, falling like for like sales and stiff 
competition from other high street stores which can afford to sell at lower margins 
coupled with the credit crunch, which means that shoppers are looking for bargains 
and lower prices. In addition, it was suggested that it was difficult to find a successor 
for the CEO and a way to retain him within the company was to combine the two 
positions. This aptly underscores the likely arguments on the balance of power in the 
organisation, i.e. between projecting a good corporate image or the achievement of 
core shareholders‟ objectives. The reaction from institutional investors to this 
development was that of outrage and disbelief. This is reflected in the newspaper 
headline which reads “M&S under fire: how the city turned against Stuart Rose 
“(Times on line, 2008: 1). Some of the major shareholders including Legal & 
General, M & S‟s second-largest shareholder, issued a statement voicing their 
displeasure at such a decision. Legal & General describe it as „unwelcome‟, they 
also added that it raised serious Corporate Governance concerns (Davey and 
Laurance, 2008). However, at the end of the day, management had their way; the 
roles of the CEO and chairmanship of the board of directors were combined in one 
person. This scenario summarises an attitude of institutional investors to governance 
in their investee companies. Institutional investors now hold managements to 
account more than ever before, although, management still continue to get their 
ways. 
 
Still on the theme of Corporate Governance and power, while it may not be 
contestable that equity holders own the business, what is contestable is the amount 
of real influence or power they possess or can exert on the organisation. The 
transformation of businesses from small sole proprietorships to gigantic corporations 
with numerous shareholders exacerbates owners‟ difficulties in generating 
consensus on governance and this seems to have practically eroded equity‟s power. 
This may be due to the problem of „free riding‟ as no single individual shareholder 
will be willing to take the initiative and bear the costs of intervening. Such an attitude 
may be premised on the expectation that other shareholders will intervene but 
nobody eventually does (Berle and Means, 1932; Fama and Jensen, 1983).  Monk 
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(2001) while commenting on the subject of shareholders‟ power and the dispersed 
nature of corporate ownership reiterated that:  
 
“the tendency during this period (in the twentieth century) has been the 
dilution of the controlling blocks of shares to the present situation of 
institutional and widely dispersed ownership – ownership without power” 
(cited in Mallin, 2004, p12).  
 
The significance of this assertion is in highlighting the fact that dispersed share 
ownership weakens shareholders‟ power. Theoretically, shareholders are the owners 
of the business and should be the repository of corporate power and authority, 
meaning that they should be able to determine the extent, scope and nature of 
Corporate Governance practices in their organisation. This is, however, different 
from the reality of shareholders‟ involvement, influence or what is specifically 
referred to as shareholder activism. The likely causes and consequences of equity‟s 
inability and reluctance to intervene in management have been documented in 
researches (Black, 1990; Coffee, 1991; Charkman, 1994).  
 
Although the dispersal of share ownership may have weakened individual 
shareholders‟ power as they hold a very minute fraction of the total shares in the 
company, the rise in institutional investors might be seen as a solution. Institutional 
investors manage individual shareholders‟ funds as well as pension funds on their 
behalf and this might be expected to enhance shareholders‟ powers to monitor and 
intervene in governance through substantial and collective holdings (Cadbury, 1992).  
This should give shareholders more „voice‟ in organisations and where their 
expectations are not met shareholders should  have the ability to „exit‟ the firm 
through their fund managers, but Pound (1988) showed that this may not be the 
case. He presented three hypotheses which indicated the nature of the relationship 
that may exist between a company and its institutional investors and which may 
affect their behaviour towards them.  These are the „efficient monitoring hypothesis‟, 
the „conflict of interest hypothesis‟ and the „strategic alignment hypothesis‟.   
 
Under the „efficient monitoring hypothesis‟, he suggested that institutional investors 
are more likely to intervene because they are efficient at doing so compared to small 
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or individual shareholders. He argued that the marginal benefits of such intervention 
are greater than their marginal cost. On the other hand, the „conflict of interest 
hypothesis‟ suggests that institutional investors will be reluctant to intervene to curb 
management discretion due to current or potential business relationships they have 
with the firm, fearing that intervention may strain these relationships, so they avoid 
the conflict of interest, and lastly the „strategic alignment hypothesis‟ refers to the 
situation where, rather than intervene to curb management discretion, institutional 
investors may consider it beneficial to actually promote areas of mutual benefits and 
negotiate co-operation and agreement on those issues rather than stir up 
disagreements with management.  
 
Discussions about shareholder activism are very broad and present many interesting 
areas of debate. Essentially, while it may be persuasive to suggest that shareholders 
need to be more active, especially with the waves of corporate misbehaviour stirred 
up by management, to mitigate management excesses, the likely attitude to 
intervention has been discussed along two main lines, the active and the passive 
shareholder tendencies. Both of these attitudes may be affected by how the 
shareholders or their representatives perceive and are prepared to use their powers.  
 
Cadbury (1992) confirms the high expectations of the willingness of institutional 
investors to intervene when it states that: 
 
“because of their collective stake, we look forward to the institutional 
shareholders in particular, with the backing of the Institutional Shareholders‟ 
Committee, to use their influence as owners to ensure that the companies in 
which they have invested comply with the code” 
 
thereby invoking shareholders‟ active tendencies. This has also been implied by 
studies such as Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Jarrel and Poulsen (1987) and Brickley, 
Lease and Smith (1988). On the other hand, Sykes (1994) suggested that it is 
possible for institutional investors to act as „absentee owners‟, referring to a situation 




Further, on the theme of the impact of power in the definition of Corporate 
Governance, Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) considered the contribution of power in the 
discourse of Audit Committee effectiveness. They referred to the typology of power 
provided by French and Raven (1959), which encompasses legitimate, sanctuary, 
information, expert, referent and will powers. They inferred these types of power on 
Corporate Governance structures such as the Audit Committee (Audit Committee) 
For instance, Kalbers and Forgarty (1993) suggested that the Audit Committee have 
“legitimate” power, since they derive their authority from the shareholders through 
the board of directors. The committee is also deemed to have a “sanctuary” power 
since it is able through its activities to bestow reward and punish erring officers of the 
corporation. It has informational power, because members have knowledge of 
important pieces of information which others not in their position cannot access. This 
confers “informational” power on the committee. Furthermore, the committee will 
often comprise of individuals who are experts and who have potential to influence 
others, since they possess both “expert” and “referent” power. And lastly, as part of 
its oversight function, the committee has to approve some reports and thus this 
requires the use of its “will” power. The importance of power in organizations has 
also been amplified by earlier studies such as Berle (1931) and Dodd (1932). 
 
2.1.4 Discussion and Summary on Definitions of Corporate Governance:  
In summary, it is difficult to pin down a definition of Corporate Governance. Current 
attempts at a definition have been based on two major paradigms. Firstly, a 
framework which sees Corporate Governance as an economic construct that should 
benefit only the firm and its shareholders, in line with Milton Freidman‟s (1957) 
assertion that the major objective of the firm is to maximize the shareholder‟s wealth. 
The other perspective sees Corporate Governance in terms of its benefits to the firm 
and its stakeholders and this suits the stakeholder model of corporations (Freeman, 
1984).  
 
Authors and researchers who believe that shareholders‟ value maximization is the 
ultimate aim of the firm tend to see Corporate Governance strictly  from the purview 
of return on investment and the „ bottom line‟ arguments as opposed to  the idea of a 
„triple bottom line‟ of economic, social and environmental considerations (Elkington, 
2004). Investments in Corporate Governance mechanisms seem to be based on 
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cost-benefit analyses (Moerland, 1995). Therefore all procedures, policies and 
structures that will enhance the efficient and effective utilisation of corporate 
resources and protect the interests of the shareholders will qualify as a central theme 
of Corporate Governance. This attitude represents the contractarian hypotheses 
(Bradley, Schipani, Sundaram and Walsh, 1999)  
 
On the other hand the „fairness‟ or „equity‟ arguments which are also implicit in the 
stakeholder approach to Corporate Governance contend that corporations need to 
deal with all its stakeholders with equity and fairness. However, the problem is 
finding the best formula or mechanism to allocate resources to all stakeholders that 
will be seen to be fair and equitable by all. Stakeholder theorists would probably 
suggest stakeholders „mapping‟ as a way of indentifying the interplay of power and 
influence of stakeholders and by extension a tool for addressing stakeholders‟ 
interests (Mitchell et al, 1997; Ullmann, 1985). In addition, Jensen (2001) offered a 
solution to this problem, by suggesting that a kind of „pareto optimality‟ (the "best that 
could be achieved without disadvantaging at least one group." (Gawthrop, 1970, 
p32) point can be reached by firms through maximising shareholders‟ returns and 
without leaving any stakeholder unattended. It may be assumed that proponents of 
the stakeholder perspective of Corporate Governance expect a higher moral level 
from businesses. Often they envisage a broader level of objectives for business that 
encompass efficient utilisation of corporate resources and protection of the interests 
of all stakeholders of the enterprise (Smith et al, 2005). This is the communitarian 
view of the firm (Bradley et al, 1999). Therefore, in arriving at a definition of 
Corporate Governance, it is essential to recognise these two sharp divides and forge 
a feasible and acceptable common ground on a suitable  definition  that  addresses 




Figure 2:   Domains of Definitions of Corporate Governance 
 
Although there is no universally accepted definition of Corporate Governance 
(Solomon and Solomon, 1999), for the purpose of this thesis, two working definitions 
of Corporate Governance will be used in formulating an integrated definition that will 
serve as the frame of reference throughout the thesis. Firstly, Cadbury‟s (1992) 
definition stated earlier in the chapter (section 2.1) and, secondly, the definition 
suggested recently by Rezaee (2009).  
 
“the process affected by a set of legislative, regulatory, legal market 
mechanisms,    listing standards, best practices and efforts of all Corporate 
Governance participants, including the company‟s directors, officers, auditors, 
legal counsel and financial advisors, which creates a system of checks and 
balances with the goal of creating and enhancing enduring and sustainable 
shareholder value, while protecting the interest of other stakeholders” 
(Rezaee, 2009,p30) 
 
From these two definitions and others that have been reviewed earlier, this study 
suggests an integrated definition of Corporate Governance which is represented 





 “The process and system through which an organization achieves reasonable 
balance in its allocation of resources between all its stakeholders”. 
 
This study thus sees Corporate Governance as embodying two essential 
dimensions, which are the process Corporate Governance dimension and the 
system Corporate Governance dimension.  
 
This study views Corporate Governance as a process in three main ways:  
 An evolutionary process: since Corporate Governance practices develop over 
time.  
 A controlling process: since it allows the determination of corporate objectives 
and strategies for their achievement which entail a series of controlling 
activities.  
 A communicating process: since Corporate Governance involves interaction 
between people within and outside the organisation.  
 
The study considers Corporate Governance to be a system in three ways: 
 an economic system: that enhances firms‟ performance and creates value.  
 a social system: that facilitates social interactions that appreciate the link 
between business and the society in which business operates.  
 an ethical system: that ensures that firms operate in a fashion that is 
consistent with corporate ethical values and expectations.  
 
Corporate governance also centres on the allocation of resources. However, these 
have to be allocated in such a manner that the allocation reflects stakeholders‟ 
power and influence. Thus, the real essence of Corporate Governance is achieving 
reasonable balance in the allocation of organisation resources among all 








Table 1: Dimensions of Corporate Governance Definition 
The Corporate Governance 
Process:  
 Evolutionary  
 Control  
 Communication  
The Corporate Governance System: 
 Economic  
 Social  
 Ethical  
The Resource: 
 Efficiency in allocation  





 Balance resource allocation 
with measure of power and 
influence   
 And consideration of corporate 
goals 
 
2.1.5 Justifications for Corporate Governance in Organisations 
The previous section was used to identify various definitions of Corporate 
Governance and to decide on the most suitable working definition for this thesis. In 
this section the researcher examines the business justifications for Corporate 
Governance in organisations. It asks the following questions:  
 Is there a business case for adopting Corporate Governance?  
 What are the other benefits an organisation stands to gain by instituting 
Corporate Governance best practice?   
These questions are very much related to the important debate concerning the main 
purpose and objectives of an organisation which followed on from the last section on 
the Contractarian vs. the Communitarian arguments. The Contractarian sees the firm 
as consisting of a complex structure of contracts among various constituents in the 
organisation, each bonded by the terms of the contract that applies. But there is the 
realisation that the contracts are probably never going to be perfect and also that 
there are costs incurred in writing and maintaining the contract which affect the firm‟s 
cost structures (Coase, 1936). The main objective of the organisation in this sense 
can be inferred to be how to perfect or at least reduce the imperfection in the 
contracts and consequently the costs associated with writing and maintaining those 
contracts (Williamson, 1984). On the other hand the Communitarians see the 
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enterprise as an integral component of the community and suggest that the main 
purpose of the enterprise is for the benefit of all the stakeholders (Bradley et al, 
1999)   
 
These views are also basic to the debate between a monotonic and pluralist outlook 
of the corporation which is essentially the debate between the shareholder and 
stakeholder focus of the firm. The earliest modern discourse on these issues can be 
traced back to the works by Berle (1931) and Dodd (1932).The monotonists follow 
the argument that the sole remit of the firm is profit maximisation and therefore so 
long as Corporate Governance enhances shareholders‟ wealth maximisation 
objectives then there is a justification for its adoption in organisations. However, if 
the cost of control is greater than the benefit of control, according to these 
shareholder centred arguments, Corporate Governance adds no further value. On 
the other hand the pluralist will probably still look at the benefits not just to the 
shareholders but also to other stakeholders (the employees, the bondholders and 
society as a whole). Thus good governance practice may enhance corporate 
monitoring and reduce conflicts of interest between the Principal and Agent 
(Eichenseher and Shields, 1985; Pincus et al, 1989). Though findings are 
inconclusive, Agrawal and Mandelker (1990) argued that organisations with good 
governance experience better performance. Davidson III et al (2004) found positive 
market reactions to the appointment of independent directors on the board as 
reflected in the stock price rise.  
 
Equally, in line with Signalling Theory (Spence, 1973), organisations may adopt good 
governance mechanisms for appearance and to signal best practice to the market 
(Menon and Williams 1994). This is not to suggest that Corporate Governance does 
not have its own intrinsic benefit for the organisation, rather it is to indicate that it is 
also beneficial to project the right image and to indicate compliance with good 
Corporate Governance requirements where these are either required by statute or 
imposed by corporate imperatives. Corporate isomorphism or mimicry (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983; cf. Frank, 1985; Nelson and Winter, 1982) may also be a reason 
for adopting Corporate Governance. This implies that organisations imitate each 




It may be argued that the ultimate reason why corporations embrace Corporate 
Governance is the business argument. This suggests that Corporate Governance 
impacts upon firm performance (Baysinger and Butler, 1985) and reduces firm risk 
exposures both internally (as employees may have imbibed good corporate 
behaviours, so the firm will avoid underhand practices and reduce the risk of 
employees‟ misbehaviour, dishonesty etc.) and externally as companies may avoid 
sanctions for not complying with regulations. They may also enjoy reductions in cost 
of capital (Stulz, 2005; Gebhardt et al, 2001; Sengupta, 1999), since lenders may 
judge the risk profile of complying firms as lower than otherwise (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) and such firms will enjoy a good reputation and image for adhering 
to corporate best behaviours which may impact upon performance either by way of 
increases in share prices or patronage in the market (Ayuso and Argandona, 2007).  
 
 
2.2 The Control Mechanisms 
Subsisting conflicts of interest between owners and management provide incentives 
for investment in forms of controls to reduce information asymmetry (Fama and 
Jensen, 1976). It is expected that the presence of control mechanisms should 
constrain management and bind them to pursue the profit maximisation objective of 
the shareholders which is seen as the the only objective among classical economists 
(Friedman, 1957). Equally, such control mechanisms should also enhance reporting 
quality as organisations become more transparent and accountable and thereby 
improve the markets confidence in the information provided by the firm (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Although the primary beneficiaries of investment in control 
mechanisms are the shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1976), it has been shown that 
other stakeholders in the corporate environment such as bondholders and even the 
management benefit from such diversion of resources into control mechanisms 
(Fama, 1980). This is due to a number of reasons.   
 
Firstly, because investment in good corporate control mechanisms signals good 
practice and the managerial labour market may react to such decisions positively,  
this may improve each individual manager‟s market worth in terms of compensation, 
remuneration and future opportunities (Fama, 1980). Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) 
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documented a positive relationship between a firm‟s poor performance and the 
likelihood of top management turnover.  
 
Secondly, investments in control mechanisms may also provide some form of job 
security for management as the cost of fraud or negative press due to poor 
governance may adversely affect their human capital worth (Shivdasani, 1993), while 
good Corporate Governance practice improves their marketability and enhances 
their human capital, social worth and future opportunities. This may translate into 
appointments to serve on other boards and enhance their reputation. Gilson (1989) 
found that top executives resigning from firms that experienced financial distress 
hold one-third fewer appointments on the board in other firms in their future careers. 
Kaplan and Reishus (1995) found differences in the number of subsequent board 
appointments of managers who have served on a dividend reducing board compared 
to a non-dividend reducing board. They found that top management in dividend 
reducing boards have 50% fewer subsequent appointments serving on other boards 
compared to their counterparts from non-dividend reducing boards. These findings 
suggest that serving on the board of an underperforming firm has negative 
repercussions and that directors suffer reputational losses as a result.  
 
Control mechanisms can either be internal or external (Walsh and Seward, 1990). 
Internal control mechanisms include the roles of institutional investors, the board of 
directors and its sub–board committees (which include the audit, remuneration and 
nomination committees), managerial ownership (otherwise called insider–ownership) 
structure and firm capital structure. On the other hand the external control 
mechanisms include legislative and regulatory frameworks such as the capital 
market regulations, the external auditor, market for corporate control and the 
managerial labour market.  
 
The discussion of control mechanisms is important in the context of a broader 
understanding of Corporate Governance and in being able to understand the position 
of the Audit Committee and the external auditors in the overall Corporate 





2.2.1 External Control Mechanisms. 
2.2.1  The Regulatory Framework for Corporate Governance in the UK  
The UK has one of the most developed and advanced capital markets in the world.  
The Corporate Governance regulatory framework in the UK has its roots in a series 
of high profile “ad-hoc” committee reports, some of which were responses to 
corporate failures either internally in the UK (e.g. Polly Peck, Maxwell and BCCI) or a 
reaction to similar failures in other parts of the globe. The Cadbury Report of 1992 on 
the financial aspects of Corporate Governance provided the fundamental 
background to Corporate Governance in the UK. This was followed by The 
Greenbury Report (1995), the Hampel Report (1998), the Higgs Report (2003) and 
the Smith Report (2003) while in 2003 the London Stock Exchange adopted the 
Combined Code as part of its listing requirements.  
 
Empirical studies have been conducted to examine the impact of various Corporate 
Governance reports on Corporate Governance in the UK. Clarke (1998) reported on 
the impact of three UK Corporate Governance committees (the Cadbury Report 
(1992), the Greenbury Report (1995) and the Hampel Report (1998) on the role and 
importance of non-executive directors. He concluded that more importance has now 
been attached to the role of the non-executives and that “independent non-executive 
directors will have increasing influence upon company direction”.  His conclusion 
was based on the report of a survey conducted by MORI on “The Role of the Non-
Executive Directors” on behalf of GHN Executive Coaching. Goddard and Masters 
(2000) suggested that adherence to the Cadbury Committee recommendations on 
Audit Committees had had no effect whatsoever on audit fees as at 1995. Dahya et 
al (2002) examined the relationship between CEO turnover and firm performance 
before and after the Cadbury Report and reported a stronger post Cadbury Code 
negative relationship between CEO turnover and firm performance with the adoption 
of the Code. Collier and Gregory (1996) reported significant increases in the 
formation of Audit Committees post Cadbury Report than in any other period in the 
UK.  
 
2.2.2 Market for Corporate Control (M & A) in the UK 
Another important external control mechanism is the market for corporate control. In 
some situations of underperformance coupled with conflicts of interest between 
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shareholder and management, one option available to the shareholders is to support 
a takeover bid (Kennedy and Limmack, 1996; Sudarsanam et al, 1996). Such a 
move would be seen as disciplinary on the management for continuous poor 
performance or non compliance with the shareholders‟ profit maximisation objective. 
Although the market for corporate control in the UK and US is comparable in terms 
of their sophistication, there seem to be more instances of hostile takeovers in the 
US than in the UK (Armor and Skeel, 2007).  However, hostile takeovers are rare in 
Continental Europe perhaps due to the shareholding structure which favours 
concentrated ownership and also because the numbers of listed companies on most 
of these exchanges are small in contrast to the situation in the UK and the US where 
shareholdings are widely dispersed with many listed companies on the exchanges 
(Frank and Mayer, 1994). The debate surrounding the potency of takeovers‟ 
disciplinary role in UK Corporate Governance has been inconclusive. Some studies 
indicate that UK takeovers play some disciplinary role for a number of reasons 
(Parkinson and Dobbins, 1993; Kennedy and Limmack, 1996; Dickerson et al, 1998; 
Nuttall, 1999; Powell and Stark, 2003).  
 
Firstly, because shareholders enjoy abnormal returns after the takeover bid which 
may also indicate improvements in performance and also because there is a 
correlation between successful takeovers and CEO turnovers. Others (Frank and 
Meyer, 1996; Sudarsanam et al, 1996) have argued that takeovers in the UK market 
do not play a managerial disciplinary role. They suggest that a takeover bid is not the 
same as an actual takeover. A bid may be instigated to communicate a grievance 
and not necessarily to change managerial leadership and an actual takeover will 
have more far reaching effects on the firm and its stakeholders than a mere bid. 
Secondly, the cost of prosecuting a takeover or a bid is usually high and so the net 
benefit to the bidding organisation needs to be greater than its associated cost 
before the bid can make economic sense. The discussions on the disciplining role of 
the market for corporate control can be appreciated in the context of shareholders 
activisms and in signalling shareholders‟ preferences to the management.  
 
2.2.3 The Managerial Labour Market  
The managerial labour market under Corporate Governance examines the 
relationship between Corporate Governance structure and employment, retention, 
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dismissal and remuneration of managerial level labour. The importance of 
management in corporations was underscored by Berle and Means (1932) as well as 
by Agency Theory first suggested by Coase in 1937 and subsequently by other 
academics. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggested that management have a stake 
in good firm performance and also share in the losses associated with poor 
performance. Their share of the loss may have both short and long term effects. In 
the short-term because of the immediate effect on earnings if these are related to 
performance and in the long term because of the effect on their future streams of 
income through working as an executive or through other board appointments in 
other organisations.  
 
The main thrust of Corporate Governance provision in this respect is how to ensure 
an alignment of interests between principals and agents (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). This is to forestall the emergence of hyper-powerful executives who may be 
able to extract abnormal rents from the firm, but also to ensure adequate incentives 
to improve performance. This, in essence, is the balancing act between „the carrot 
and the stick‟ so that the researcher does not have the case of „strong management-
weak owners‟ and at the same time the researcher does not end up  distracting the 
executives from their main preoccupation of managing the firm (Roe, 2002; Bebuck 
and Fried, 2004; Renneboog and Trojanowski, 2005). Earlier, the researcher 
referred to studies that confirmed  a positive relationship between poor performance 
and executive turnover (Fama, 1983; Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985; Denis and 
Denis, 1995; Franks et al, 2001) and also noted that directors serving on boards of 
poorly performing firms experience reductions in the number of subsequent similar 
appointments (Gilson,1989; Kaplan and Rieshus, 1990) which indicate that the 
managerial labour market and market for corporate control have some disciplinary 
effect on management. 
 
Internal Control Mechanisms   
2.2.4 Institutional Investors  
One crucial internal control mechanism is the firm‟s ownership structure. Ownership 
concentration is defined by the number of large-block shareholders as well as by the 
proportion of shares they own. In the UK, while individual equity ownership has fallen 
from 54% in 1963 to less than 18% in 1993 and 14% in 2002, institutional ownership 
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has been on the increase, rising to approximately 62% in 1993 (Short and Keasey, 
1999). This rise has been attributed to the growth in pension and insurance funds 
which have enjoyed increases in value as a result of the rise in private retirement 
savings from private pension schemes and long term insurance policies. For 
instance, equity ownership by insurance companies increased from 10% in 1963 to 
20% by 2002. Similarly, equity ownership by pension fund companies increased from 
6% in 1963 to 16% in 2002. Interestingly there have also been increases in overseas 
shareholdings in UK listed companies. This jumped from 7% in 1963 to a staggering 
32% in 2002; most of the increases arose from increases in the holdings of 
institutional investors (Mallin, 2004). UK institutional investors hold their interests in 
the equity of companies on behalf of individuals so that these individuals have an 
indirect ownership of equity in these companies.   
 
However, given the size and nature of institutions‟ share ownership it would be 
expected that institutional investors will play more of an active role in Corporate 
Governance in UK listed companies in line with the expectations of the Cadbury 
Report. Although the ABI and NAPF do urge institutional investors to query points in 
the accounts as well as vote against management at AGMs and against bonus 
schemes as these are perceived to damage pension scheme members‟ wealth, 
these protests do not seem to go far enough to effect changes in governance. At 
present, institutional investors as well as individual shareholders do not see 
themselves as more than just shareholders, owning a tradeable stock without any 
intrinsic value (Charkman, 1990). However, the truth is that institutional investors 
own shares on behalf of fund owners and are responsible to them. They probably 
would want them to play a more active role in the management of their fund. Block 
holders should take a more proactive role, a longer term strategic review of their 
holding and should be able to intervene in the management of the corporation to 
effect the necessary control mechanisms in the optimal interest of shareholders. 
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argued that institutional shareholders, by virtue of their 
large stockholdings, would have incentives to monitor corporate performance since 
they have greater benefits through this monitoring and enjoy greater voting power 
that makes it easier to take corrective action when it is deemed necessary. 
Consistent with this “active monitoring hypothesis,” Jarrell and Poulsen (1987) and 
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Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988) documented the fact that institutional shareholders 
are more likely to vote against harmful amendments that reduce shareholder wealth, 
while Agrawal and Mandelker (1990) found a positive relationship between 
institutional ownership and the shareholder wealth effects of various anti-takeover 
charter amendments. McConnell and Servaes (1990) found a positive relationship 
between institutional ownership and productivity, as measured by Tobin‟s Q.  
 
However, others have argued that institutional investors have limited incentives to 
monitor management actions. This could be because of free-riding among 
institutional investors making it difficult for them to take collective action (Black, 
1990; Admati, Pfleiderer and Zechner, 1994). Furthermore, institutional investors 
may have incentives to sell their stock in the face of poor performance rather than to 
initiate corrective action (Coffee, 1991) in support of the “absentee owners‟” notion 
(Sykes, 1994). Karpoff, Malatesta and Walking (1996) failed to confirm the positive 
effect of institutional activism on shareholder value.  
 
Institutional ownership could therefore beneficially influence Corporate Governance 
and firm performance if the active monitoring hypothesis holds true or have no effect 
if institutional shareholders are inactive. In the UK Faccio and Lasfer (2000) studied 
the impact of institutional investors in monitoring management. Their work compared 
the monitoring activity undertaken by pension funds owning more than 3% of issued 
share capital in organisations to a matched sample of those having less than a 3% 
stake and investigated their compliance with the Cadbury Code. They were unable to 
report any positive relationship between compliance with the Code and institutional 
ownership. They also failed to find any relationship between ownership concentration 
and firm performance. 
  
However, as mentioned earlier, institutional investors are now playing more active 
roles in governance in listed companies through such organisations as the 
Association of British Insurer (ABI) and National Association of Pension Funds 
(NAPF). For instance, these organisations produced guidelines on directors‟ 
remuneration and severance payments with a view to ensuring that incidences do 





2.2.5  Managerial Ownership  
In addition to the two internal control mechanisms discussed above, academic 
literature has also identified insider ownership as part of the internal governance 
mechanism otherwise referred to as Managerial Ownership (Barnhart and 
Rosenstein, 1998). From an agency theoretical position, the researcher knows that 
moral hazards could lead to management shirking due to conflicts of interest with 
other stakeholders. One solution to this conflict of interest is to increase managerial 
ownership (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Increasing management share ownership 
in the business has the effect of increasing their risk exposure in the same way as 
for other residual claimants, depending on their percentage shareholding, its value 
and their voting rights (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1987).  
 
As managerial ownership increases their interest coincides more closely with that of 
outside shareholders and hence conflicts of interest between them are moderated, 
reducing the agency cost of operation since shareholders now need to spend less on 
monitoring and control costs. While these arguments seem plausible, other studies 
have shown that managerial ownership could be counterproductive and may in fact 
lead to increases in agency costs (McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Short and Keasey, 
1999). It has also been suggested that there is a tendency for increased managerial 
ownership to give rise to executive dominance which facilitates expropriations of 
corporate wealth by way of excessive pay and investment in projects that give 
negative NPVs (Fama and Jensen, 1983). It also makes it easier for management to 
embark on empire building and self-entrenchment (Stulz, 1988). 
 
Furthermore, there are arguments that suggest that managerial ownership is not only 
an internal control mechanism but could also enhance firm performance, although 
the arguments are inconclusive. Using Tobin‟s Q ratio as the dependent variable to 
proxy for firm performance and the fraction of shares owned by corporate insiders as 
the independent variable, both Hermalin and Weisbach (1987) and Morck et al 
(1988) estimated a piece-wise linear regression on the effect of managerial 
ownership on firm performance. They found that the relationship between the two 
variables is not always linear. In some ranges of insider ownership (between 0-5% 
ownership), the Q ratio was found to be positively related to insider ownership and in 
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some other ranges (between 5-25%) a negative relationship was observed and at 
insider ownership levels beyond 25% a further positive relationship was 
documented. McConnell and Servaes (1990) have also shown that the Q ratio is 
nonlinearly related to the degree of insider ownership. These results underscore the 
importance of managerial ownership as a control mechanism. This is because it may 
be argued that increases in performance associated with increases in managerial 
ownership came about due to interest congruence between the two and the 
consequent constraining of agency costs. On the other hand, excessive increases in 
managerial ownership may become counterproductive and may facilitate managerial 
expropriation which may explain the inverse relationship between the two variables 
as reported in these studies.   
 
In the UK, Short and Keasey (1999) confirmed the findings in the US but observed 
that the positive relationship between performance and insider ownership is within 
the range 0-13% or 15% depending on the definition of performance used. Further, 
they observed the negative relationship to be between 13% and 42% above which 
the positive relationship is documented once again.  
  
Pfeffer (1972) documented the fact that the percentage of insider directors is higher 
on the boards of declining firms. Baysinger and Butler (1985) established a 
relationship between the degree of financial health of a firm and the board 
composition when they categorised directors into „insider, gray and independent 
outsider‟. Their results showed that firms with a lower proportion of insider directors 
achieved higher returns on investment. Also firms with above average performance 
were shown to have a higher percentage of outside directors than firms with lower 
than average performance. Judge and Zeithami (1992) found that high insider 
ownership and representation on the board is associated with lower involvement in 
strategic decision making. The implication is that as a CEO becomes dominant it 
facilitates expropriation and can also lead to managerial collusion and transfer of 
shareholders‟ wealth (Fama, 1980). Dechow et al (1996) note that fraud was more 
likely in a firm where inside directors had a substantial share ownership. All these 
results underscore the fact that although managerial ownership is important as it 
may complement other control mechanisms, there are also negative possibilities 
arising from such structures.  
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2.2.6 Debt Financing  
Another way of constraining management from excessive perquisites is to institute 
additional monitoring through a firm‟s capital structure (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Additional borrowing in relation to equity with attendant debt covenants imposes high 
expectations on management and necessarily requires a level of performance that 
ultimately makes consumption of perquisites impossible (Jensen, 1986). An inability 
to meet required credit obligations has the effect of increasing the cost of operations 
in the form of additional penalties for default, makes it difficult to negotiate further 
debt or future borrowings and may affect the human capital worth of managers in 
such firms (Stulz, 1990; Frank et al, 2001). The threat of bankruptcy arising from 
payment default can lead to reputation crisis, dismissal and affect the going concern 
of an organisation (Farinha, 2003). 
 
Although debt may act as a control mechanism with the anticipated benefit of 
reducing the agency costs of operation, because management faces a tight cash 
flow situation given that there are debt covenants and obligations to meet, this 
invariably means that management need to earn sufficient income to pay both the 
principal borrowed and the associated interest. Jensen and Meckling (1976) indicate 
the possibilities of organisations incurring debt agency costs due to conflicts of 
interest between shareholders and debt-holders, which may appear in three forms. 
Firstly, the opportunity wealth loss due to the effect of debt on a firm‟s investment, 
secondly, the debt agency cost of monitoring and bonding incurred by both creditors 
and the firm and, lastly, the debt agency cost of bankruptcy and reorganisation. 
Intuitively, debt-holders will be expected to shift their debt agency cost to firms in the 
form of increased cost of debt which invariably increases a firm‟s operating costs. 
This implies that the effectiveness of debt financing as a control mechanism may 
depend on the current level of leverage in a firm, the cost of debt, the size of the 
organisation and the firm‟s growth potential. The evidence is altogether inconclusive 
regarding the potency of debt as an effective control mechanism. While Harris and 
Raviv (1991), Meggiston (1997), Garvey and Hanka (1999) and Safieddine and 
Titman (1999) all support the view that debt financing plays a controlling role in the 
attempt to align interests in the organisation, others such as Stulz (1990) and 




2.2.7  Board of Directors and Non-Executive Directors 
The BOD is statutorily appointed by the shareholders to represent and protect their 
interests and represent the highest decision making body for the firm. It is 
responsible for the strategic stance of the organisation. It is expected to set the 
broad objectives, vision and mission of the organisation and ensure their 
achievement. This is realised through providing oversight on the management.  
Fama and Jensen (1983) suggested that the BOD ratify management decisions and 
monitor their performance and that they also undertake decision management and 
decision control functions.  
 
The Cadbury Committee Report of 1992 suggested a possible structure for the 
board, indicating that the board should consist of a substantial number of outside 
independent non-executive directors. The BOD should at least be balanced and act 
as a representative of the interests of the shareholders. The Higgs Report (2003) 
focused on the role and importance of non-executive directors on the board. 
Specifically, the board is to operate through a number of sub-committees including 
the remuneration, the nomination and the Audit Committees. These committees are 
to comprise mainly of non-executive directors who are independent of the 
management. The importance of the outside non-executives is in their ability to 
contribute to a perfect contract between the contracting parties. Fama and Jensen 
(1983) argued that the outside directors have sufficient incentive to be able to 
perform these functions for two main reasons. First, they have the required skill and 
expertise and will suffer economic and reputational loss if they are found to be 
incompetent in these responsibilities and, secondly, because they are external to the 
enterprise they are expected to be dispassionate and view managerial decisions in 
unbiased but constructive ways.  
 
Many changes have occurred in terms of board composition in UK listed companies 
post the Cadbury Report. Dahya et al (2002) in a study that involves a sample of 460 
UK publicly quoted companies documented the increase in non-executive directors 
on UK boards suggesting that they rose from 35.3% pre Cadbury to 46% post the 
Cadbury Report. Similar findings were documented by Song and Windram (2004) 
and they found that the nature and scope of the responsibilities of the non-
executives and especially those serving on Audit Committees have changed 
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significantly from oversight on just reporting to more risk management and internal 
control functions. Dahya et al (2002) also reported that over 80% of UK boards have 
separated the role of CEO and Chairman. Faccio and Lasfer (1999) reported that the 
median board size of UK companies is 7 while Renneboog and Trojanwoski (2005) 
reported a median board size of 9. 
 
A number of studies have examined the impact of outside directors in providing 
oversight functions on the management. For instance, Weisbach (1988) indicates a 
positive relationship between the CEO turnover of poorly performing firms and the 
number of outside directors. A similar result was reported by Rosenstein and Wyatt 
(1990) who found a positive relationship between abnormal increases in firm value 
and the appointment of outside directors. Cotter et al (1997) examined the role 
ofoutside directors in Mergers and Acquisitions (M & A) and found that they were 
able to enhance shareholders‟ wealth by resisting executive directors‟ blocking 
strategies in a takeover bid. In the UK Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) could not report 
any significant relationship between firm performance and board structure. However, 
both Dahya et al (2002) and Renneboog and Trojanwoski (2005) reported on the 
sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance and board characteristics that are in 
compliance with Cadbury recommendations. Ronneboog and Trojanwoski (2005) 
note the finding that larger boards facilitate the replacement of CEOs and also that 
boards with a larger percentage of outside independent directors replace 
underperforming CEOs more frequently. On the subject of executive dominance, 
they reported that combining the role of the CEO and board chairmanship reduces 
the likelihood of CEO replacement, but this is because such CEOs may become too 
powerful and can decide their own benchmark and performance measures. Dedman 
(2003) as part of a wider report documented evidence of the effect of compliance 
with the Cadbury Code on enhancement of board oversight functions with respect to 
the manipulation of accounting figures and the discipline of top executives. She 
reported a negative relationship between non-routine CEO departures to both share 








2.3 History of Corporate Governance in the UK  
In section 2.1 the study suggested that the antecedents of the modern firm can be 
traced to events that surrounded the organised trade expedition and the royal charter 
companies of the periods between the 13th and early 19th centuries and through the 
periods of colonialism. Subsequent events ultimately led to the evolution of the 
modern corporation with some of the earlier structures retained including, for 
instance, the stock exchange, limited liability status of the firm and its separate legal 
personality (Glautier and Underdown, 1995 in Crowther 2004). Cheffins (2001) 
compared the development of the „Berle and Means corporation‟ in the UK with the 
US and suggested that although the UK was the only country to have followed the 
US model of the firm characterised by a highly dispersed ownership and „corporate 
capitalism‟, the achievement of this status is recent, and goes back no further than 
the late 1980s (Roe, 1994). Prior to this time corporations in the UK were 
characterised by a high proportion of family owned public corporations tagged „family 
capitalism‟ (Chandler, 1990 in Cheffins, 2001). Three main factors were suggested 
for the transformation in the corporate outlook of firms in the UK. These are the 
impact of company law, financial services regulations and political ideology 
(Cheffins, 2001).   
 
In the following sections the study traces the major developments in the UK 
corporate environment that shaped the Corporate Governance structure in this 
country. This review is divided into three main periods: the pre-Cadbury Committee, 
the Cadbury Committee and post-Cadbury Committee Corporate Governance. 
These are now discussed in turn. Figure 3 below depicts the major committee 
reports that have had a significant impact on the development of Corporate 




Figure 3: Development of Corporate Governance in the UK  
 
2.3.1 Pre-Cadbury Committee 
If we adopt the assertion made in Cheffin (2001), that the „Berle and Means‟ 
Corporation (or indeed the „modern firm‟) only became a noticeable feature of British 
corporate life around the mid 1980s, it may therefore be reasonable to start a review 
of Corporate Governance development from about this time. It is a known fact that 
the US led the way in corporate transformation at least in the sense of dispersed 
ownership of equity. Consequently it was no surprise that Berle and Means (1932) 
developed their seminal work on the separation of ownership from management. 
Equally important and timely was the work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) on 
Principal and Agent relations. Although these relationships had already been 
observed by Adam Smith (1776) in the Wealth of Nations as early as the 18th century 
in his famous quote (“The directors of companies, being managers of other people's 
money than their own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch over it with 
the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently 
watch over their own”),  these two impressive academic efforts have had a significant 
impact on the conception of how the firm operates and they have become extremely 
invaluable in many areas of corporate finance and Corporate Governance.  




Corporate Governance in the 1970s 
It is a difficult task to try to piece together the series of events that characterised 
Corporate Governance development in the UK in the 1970s independently of the 
events shaping up in the US and Europe. However, while Audit Committees had 
become a feature of corporate life in the US in the late 1970s, such bodies were still 
under intense scrutiny in the UK. Further, in the very early 1970s there were 
researchers in the US extolling the virtues of the Audit Committee (Auerbach, 1973; 
Mautz and Neumann, 1970 and 1977), and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission unsuccessfully called for their establishment in listed companies in the 
US in 1972. Just about this time and as if in  response to the move in the US, the 
European Economic Commission issued the 5th Directive (1972) which sought to 
harmonise company law practises in members states. Importantly, the Directive 
suggested that member states should adopt the German model of a two tier board 
system in place of the unitary board system which, of course, is dominant in the US 
and in the UK. This Directive was not well received in the UK and especially by 
company directors who considered the unitary board system efficient and viable.  
 
Furthermore, they also criticised the Directive because it suggested a co-
determination arrangement on the supervisory board. This refers to a situation where 
the supervisory board is comprised of an equal number of representatives from the 
shareholders and employees of the firm. This kind of partnership arrangement 
between labour (employees) and capital (shareholders) was seen to be dangerous. 
Not only was it likely to create a power struggle in the board room, it was also 
thought to have the potential to derail management focus (Schmitthoff, 1976). The 
UK responded to this Directive in 1977 through the report of the committee of inquiry 
on Industrial Democracy (1977) headed by Lord Bullock. The report of the committee 
favoured the employees and was almost synonymous with recommendations of the 
European Economic Commission 5th Directive. As was to be expected, the report 
was not popular with company directors and the change in government from Labour 
to Conservative in 1979 favoured management and the issue was relegated to the 
background as it was not consistent with the industrial capitalism agenda of the 




Whilst these events were taking place, there was also a number of corporate 
misbehaviours by certain company directors who had been reckless with pension 
funds and were behaving in ways that were inconsistent with their responsibilities as 
directors. There were allegations of directors overriding internal controls ( Pergamon 
Press 1971), improper and insider dealing (Lonrho Limited 1976, related to 
acquisition deals), fraud (London and County Securities 1976) and poor risk 
management (Rolls Royce 1973). Thus in 1977, Sir Brandon Rhys-Williams 
sponsored a Private Members Bill in Parliament that aimed to achieve two 
objectives. First, he was hoping to generate and make a case for the importance of 
the roles of non-executive directors on the boards of listed companies and, secondly, 
to call for the establishment of Audit Committees in UK companies. Unfortunately the 
Bill was defeated (Tricker, 2000). 
 
The first academic research into Corporate Governance in the UK by Tricker was 
published in 1978. He studied the British board structure, membership and process, 
and concluded that it was important first to introduce independent directorships on 
boards before advocating the establishment of Audit Committees as part of the 
Corporate Governance structures in British companies (Tricker, 2000). This may be 
rationalised especially against the backdrop of the defeat of the bill proposing the 
establishment of Audit Committees in UK companies noted above. Another 
significant Corporate Governance event in the 70s was the move towards a 
stakeholder perception of the company and the need for corporations to be 
accountable to their stakeholders. This was reflected in the UK in The Corporate 
Report (1975) which essentially was the output from a study sponsored by The 
Accounting Standards Steering Committee and which suggested that information in 
the financial statements should reflect the needs of all stakeholders in the 
corporation (Bartlett and Chandler, 1997; Berry and Waring, 1995). The historical 
narratives of the 1970s enumerated above acted as watersheds for a series of 
important Corporate Governance events that would landscape the 1980s.   
 
Corporate Governance in the 1980s  
In many respects the 1980s can be described as the decade of the „firm‟ or „market 
forces‟ (Riddell, 1993:9). During the last years of the 1970s, there was an increasing 
focus on the importance of other stakeholders in the corporate environment, 
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especially a call for more employee participation in corporations (Boyle, 1978). But 
this stakeholder paradigm soon withered away following the election of Margaret 
Thatcher in 1979 and her economic policies which were extremely pro-market in that 
they preferred private enterprise to state control (Tricker, 2000) and which were seen 
to favour shareholders and the capital markets. It was therefore not surprising that 
the government privatised a substantial number of previously state owned 
enterprises. This encouraged private ownership of corporations in the UK and 
contributed in no small way to the transformation that was taking place in the UK 
economy. Although initially the Thatcher economic policies were slow to take effect 
and living standards were adversely affected, by the middle of the decade, the 
economy had started to pick up. Inflation and interest rates were falling. There was a 
substantial house price boom and people generally had a sense of being prosperous 
(Riddell, 1993: 9-10). 
 
The corporate transformation that was going on in the UK in the 1980s in the form of 
„industrial capitalism‟ gave rise to a new type of industry and sector. Workers in the 
financial sectors began to earn huge salaries and the city gave rise to a new class of 
wealthy individuals who grew fat on the back of financial market deregulation 
(Oakland, 1998:189-213). However, there were perceived board level excesses: with 
the removal of various restraints and the dominance of the market knows best 
philosophy chief executives were becoming overbearing and too powerful in 
organisations. The view was that the ends justified the means. It was therefore 
possible for a dominant chief executive to expropriate a company‟s wealth and run 
the enterprise to the detriment of the shareholders. These attitudes climaxed in some 
high profile cases globally, including the Guinness case, Polly Peck and the collapse 
of Robert Maxwell‟s businesses in the UK at the start of the 1990s.  
 
It was apparent that there was an urgent need for some form of checks and balances 
on the excesses of corporate chief executives and boards of directors. However, 
despite the growing importance of the topic of Corporate Governance at this time of 
directors‟ excess and underhand behaviour,and the growing dissatisfaction of 
institutional investors, academics in the UK only began to address these issues in 




2.3.2 The Cadbury Committee Reports and other Reports in the 1990s 
It was important that the problems arising from excessive power in directors‟ hands 
were nipped in the bud to avoid any escalation and total loss of confidence in the 
market system. Furthermore, the collapse of BCCI and Maxwell among others in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s were an ominous signal of a bad corporate culture (The 
Cadbury Report, 1992). Very early in the new decade, the newly formed Financial 
Reporting Council, the London Stock Exchange and the accountancy profession 
established the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance in 
May 1991. This was later to be known as the Cadbury Committee named after the 
chairman of that committee, Sir Adrian Cadbury. The committee submitted its report 
in December 1992. Below are the main points and recommendations of the 
committee‟s report. 
 
The Cadbury Committee Report (1992) 
As part of its preface the committee chairman wrote. “.....it is, however, the 
continuing concern about standards of financial reporting and accountability, 
heightened by BCCI, Maxwell and the controversy over directors‟ pay, which has 
kept Corporate Governance in the public eye” (The Cadbury Report, 1992: page 8). 
This quote summarises the events antecedent to the Cadbury Committee. Concern 
was being expressed about the attitude of directors to the companies they headed. 
Even in periods of poor performance it was possible for directors to earn fabulous 
income on the backs of the shareholders. One of the phrases that was synonymous 
with these episodes was “fat cat” which is still used today to describe the fact that 
directors earn disproportionately high sums compared to their performance or to the 
realities facing the enterprises they lead. Furthermore, one of the foremost sections 
of the report is the one that details the reasons for setting up the committee.  The 
reports states that: 
 
”....its sponsors were concerned at the perceived low level of confidence both 
in financial reporting and in the ability of auditors to provide the safeguards 
which the users of company reports sought and expected” (The Cadbury 
Report, 1992: page 13, section 2.1). 
 




“.....the underlying factors were seen as the looseness of accounting 
standards, the absence of a clear framework for ensuring that directors kept 
under review the controls in their business and competitive pressures both on 
companies and on auditors which made it difficult for auditors to stand up to 




“....these concerns about the working of the corporate system were 
heightened by some unexpected failures of major companies‟ and by 
criticisms of the lack of effective board accountability for such matters as 
directors‟ pay.” (The Cadbury Report, 1992: page 13, section 2.2) 
 
These quotations show clearly that the committee was set up to address growing 
concerns and dissatisfaction about the spate of corporate misbehaviour and to 
address the dwindling confidence in the system as a result of management excess 
and lack of transparency in the accounting and auditing practices in the country‟s 
corporate environment.  The committee received over 200 comments and responses 
to its proposals contained in the report (Cadbury Report, 1992). The 
recommendations of the committee covered various aspects of the corporation 
including the structure and composition of the main board, structure and operations 
of key board standing and ad hoc committees, the role of non-executive directors 
and the reporting and control mechanisms in corporate entities in the UK (Mallin, 
2004). Although the report is lengthy, it also contains a code of best practice which 
has 19 main points across four key subjects covering: 
1) The Board Structure 
2) Non-Executive Directors 
3) Executive Directors and  
4) Reporting and Controls.  
 




On the topic of structure and composition of the board, the committee recommended 
that the board should meet regularly, retain full and effective control over the 
company and monitor the executive management. There should be a balance of 
power and responsibilities at the top of the company with no individual having 
unfettered powers of decision making. The roles of the chairman and chief executive 
of the organisation should be vested in different individuals, but with clearly defined 
roles and responsibilities for each office. This is to prevent boardroom tussles and 
power play by achieving a balance of power and compensating controls within the 
board itself.  The board should have a set of matters reserved for its attention.  
 
On the issue of non-executive directors, the committee recommended that they 
should bring an independent judgement to bear on issues of strategy, performance 
and resources. They should form the majority of the membership of the board and be 
independent of the management. They should be appointed for a specified term 
without automatic reappointment.   
 
On executive directors, the committee recommended that directors‟ service contracts 
should not exceed three years without shareholders‟ approval and executive 
directors‟ pay should be subject to the recommendations of a remuneration 
committee made up wholly or mainly of non-executive directors. There should be full 
and clear disclosure of directors‟ total emoluments and those of the chairman and 
highest-paid UK director, including pension contributions and stock options. 
Separate figures should be given for salary and performance-related elements and 
the basis on which performance is measured should be explained.   
 
On reporting and control, it recommended that the board should establish an Audit 
Committee of at least three non-executive directors with written terms of reference 
that deal clearly with its authority and duties.  
 
Following publication of the report in December 1992, there were various comments 
and criticisms of its contents and proposals. One of the most popular criticisms was 
the voluntary nature of the code. The provisions were presented on the basis of a 
comply or explain non compliance mechanism. This meant that firms could either 
choose to comply with the code or where they did not comply, they should explain 
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the reasons for such non-compliance and these should be stated in their annual 
report. It was thought that this disclosure would enable investors to assess the 
implication of non-disclosure on the level of transparency of an organisation and 
inform investors‟ economic decisions. Section (2.3.7) detailed some studies that 
have examined the impacts of the Cadbury code on certain aspects of corporate 
activities.  
 
2.3.3 Post- Cadbury Committee  
The Greenbury Committee (1995)  
One of the recommendations of the Cadbury committee was that the sponsors of the 
Cadbury investigation should sponsor another investigation by June 1995 to review 
the implementation of the Cadbury committee code and consider if there was any 
need to expand both the subject of the inquiry and the sponsorship so as to elicit 
wider support and ownership of the investigation.   
 
“The researchers recommend that our sponsors, convened by the Financial 
Reporting Council, should appoint a new Committee by the end of June 1995 
to examine how far compliance with the Code has progressed, how far our 
other recommendations have been implemented and whether the Code needs 
updating in line with emerging issues. Our sponsors should also determine 
whether the sponsorship of the new Committee should be broadened and 
whether wider matters of Corporate Governance should be included in its 
brief. In the meantime, the present Committee will remain responsible for 
reviewing the implementation of its proposals and for identifying further issues 
which its successor body might usefully consider. These steps will establish a 
continuing process of governance review”. (Cadbury Report, 1992: page 17 
section 3.12)  
 
However, it was the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) that took the initiative 
and, following public concern and the outcry over excessive directors‟ remuneration, 
and huge payments for poor performance and ridiculous severance payment 
packages popularly referred to variously as „golden handshakes‟, “golden 
parachutes”, “golden handcuffs‟ etc. Equally, executive share options especially in 
certain privatised utility companies were becoming excessive and questionable. The 
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CBI inaugurated the Greenbury Committee in January 1995. It was referred to as the 
Study Group on Directors‟ Remuneration with just one term of reference stated as: 
 
“To identify good practice in determining directors‟ remuneration and prepare 
a code of such practice for use by UK PLC” (Greenbury Report, 1995: 5 
section 1 .2) 
 
The Study Group which later became known as the Greenbury Committee, named 
after the chairman of the group, submitted a report of its findings in July 1995. The 
committee also produced a Code of Best Practice which deals with the following 
issues:  
 The establishment, membership and status of remuneration committees 
 The determination of remuneration policy for executive directors and other 
senior executives 
 The disclosure and approval of the details of remuneration policy and  
 The length of service contracts and the determination of compensation when 
these are terminated.  
The code of best practice is to be implemented by listed companies although both 
medium and small sized companies were also encouraged to implement the 
recommendations of the committee. Public companies that do not comply with these 
recommendations are required to explain the reasons for non-compliance.  
Regarding establishment of a remuneration committee, Greenbury suggested that all 
public companies should have a standing remuneration committee. This committee 
should comprise of wholly non-executive directors with a minimum of three members 
with clearly defined terms of reference. 
 
Furthermore, the committee recommended full disclosure regarding all aspects of 
remuneration. It requires that such disclosure should form part of the information in 
the financial statements of public companies. This disclosure should include all 
elements of total level of remuneration, disaggregating total remuneration into all its 
component parts. Thus the annual bonus scheme and long term incentive schemes 
including executive share options are all to be disclosed for every director in the 
company. Further, the measures of performance which are to be used in the 
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determination of the reward packages and the relationship between these rewards 
and the long term objectives of the firm are all to be disclosed.  
 
On submission of its report, the committee came in for heavy criticism in the national 
press and from the government. The focus of the criticism was on the complaint that 
the recommendations of the committee did not go far enough in curbing excessive 
payouts to directors. For instance, the Labour Party claimed that the report had been 
watered down and its recommendations were incapable of stopping “corporate 
greed” (Rodgers, 1995). The report was rated 5 out of 10 in meeting its objectives by 
Dr. Cunningham a Labour Party spokesman (Rodgers and Hotten, 1995).    
 
In terms of its academic relevance, the committee‟s report has featured in 
investigations into remuneration and executive payment options including studies by 
Canyon and Peck (1998), Canyon and Schwalbach (2000a, 2000b) McKnight and 
Tomkins (2002), Bucks, Bruce, Main and Udueni(2003)  Konstantinos, Susanne and 
Martin (2004)  among others.  
 
The Hampel Committee 1998 
Both the Cadbury Committee (1992) and the Greenbury Report (1995) requested the 
establishment of another committee to review the implementation of their 
committees‟ recommendations. In keeping with these requests and due to the 
exigencies of the time in respect of the Corporate Governance situation in the 
country and the criticisms that trailed in the wake of the report of the Greenbury 
Committee, on the initiative of the chairman of the Financial Reporting Council, the 
Hampel Committee was set up in November 1995.  
 
The committee submitted its report to its sponsors in January 1998 against the remit 
which is contained on page 65 of that report. The committee‟s terms of reference 
consisted of five main points which were:  
a) Conduct a review of the Cadbury code and its implementation to ensure that 
the original purpose is being achieved, proposing amendments to and 
deletions from the code as necessary 
[55] 
 
b) Keep under review the role of directors, executive and non-executive, 
recognising the need for board cohesion and the common legal 
responsibilities of all directors 
c) Be prepared to pursue any relevant matters arising from the report of the 
Study Group on Directors‟ Remuneration chaired by Sir Richard Greenbury 
d) Address as necessary the roles of shareholders in Corporate Governance 
issues 
e) Address as necessary the role of auditors in Corporate Governance issues 
and 
f) Deal with any other relevant matters  
 
The committee suggested that it consulted widely using a questionnaire which 
elicited over 140 submissions. It also engaged in discussions with over 200 
individuals and groups. in addition, the committee received a further 167 
submissions on its preliminary report. It reported that over 252 individuals or 
organisations responded to its consultation. The committee recommendations are 
contained on pages 16-22 of the report which states the Principles of Corporate 
Governance. Importantly, it made a distinction between a principle of Corporate 
Governance and more detailed guidelines on Corporate Governance such as the 
Cadbury and Greenbury Committee guidelines 
 
The Hampel report endorses most of the recommendations of the Cadbury and 
Greenbury reports. The committee‟s report touched on board structure, the 
separation of the roles of the chairman from the chief executive, board balance and 
the role of the non-executive directors on the board. The role of institutional investors 
in governance, the relationship with shareholders and the role of auditors in 
Corporate Governance all featured in the report. The committee was unequivocal 
regarding the roles of stakeholders in organisations. It believed that stakeholders‟ 
interests should be protected but not at the expense and survival of the business. Its 
chairman was quoted as saying “companies must be accountable, but they also 






The Turnbull Report (1999) 
Following the Hampel report, the Combined Code was prepared in 1998 which 
essentially merged the recommendations of the three previous committees viz: the 
Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel committees‟ reports. The code continued to 
operate on the „comply or explain‟ principle. In 1999, the Turnbull committee report 
was produced. The committee had been set up by the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales to provide guidelines on the implementation of 
the internal control requirements of the Combined Code. The report of the Turnbull 
Committee focused on three main provisions of the Combined Code. These are 
provisions D.2, D.2.1, and D.2.2.  
 D.2. states that „the board should maintain a sound system of internal control to 
safeguard shareholders‟ investment and company  assets‟  
 D.2.1 states that „the directors should at least annually conduct a review of the 
effectiveness of the group‟s system of internal control and should report to 
shareholders that they have done so. The review should cover all controls, 
including financial, operational and compliance control and risk management‟ 
and  
 D.2.2 states that „companies which do not have an internal audit function 
should from time to time review the need for one‟. 
 
The report asserts the responsibility of the directors in respect of internal control and 
risk management. It emphasised that directors need to ascertain that appropriate 
internal control procedures are in place and that they are working. The nature and 
kind of risks facing the organisation do change and directors need to be aware of 
these and review the procedures in place to be certain of their adequacy and 
relevance in view of the nature of new risks confronting the organisation.   
  
The Higgs Committee Report (2003) 
The Higgs committee reported on the role and effectiveness of non-executive 
directors. The remit of the committee was set against the backdrop of current events 
unfolding in the corporate environment globally. Firstly there was the corporate 
collapse involving ENRON, the Seventh Biggest Company in the world and also the 
highest profile corporate misdemeanour in WorldCom. Secondly there were global 
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responses to the uncertainty that seemed to confront companies in a globalised 
world where the impact of corporate failure in one corner of the globe was felt 
worldwide. For example, the US responded with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, France 
unleashed the Bouton Report and in Germany it was the Cromme code, all of which 
were set up with the intention of strengthening Corporate Governance in view of 
recent events (Higgs Report, 2003: 15).   
 
In conducting this research and drawing up its report, the committee sent out a 
consultation paper in June 2002 and received around 250 responses. Members of 
the committee held meetings with people and representatives of bodies and groups 
of interested individuals. The reports of the committee were based on findings from 
three main sources. Firstly the committee relied on research data supplied by 
Hemscott Group; this was very useful in that it enabled the committee to know the 
population of non-executive directors in UK listed companies. Secondly, MORI 
surveyed 605 executive directors, non-executive directors and chairmen of UK listed 
companies in August 2002 with a view to understanding current practices with 
respect to non-executive directors‟ performance, recruitment, training and 
effectiveness. Lastly, the committee conducted interviews with 40 directors of FTSE 
350 boards. This was with a view to understanding the situation that facilitates an 
effective non-executive director‟s function. 
 
In terms of its conclusions, the report supports most of the recommendations already 
contained in the Combined Code and made additional recommendations such as 
requesting listed companies to disclose in their annual reports the number of 
meetings of the board and its committees as well as the attendance record of the 
individual directors. It endorsed the recommendation that the position of the chief 
executive and chairman of the board should be separated, non-executive directors 
should meet as a group at least once a year without executive directors being 
present and annual reports should indicate that such a meeting had been held.  
 
 
The Smith Committee Report (2003)  
Just about the time that the Higgs report was being released, the UK‟s Smith 
Committee Reports were also being made available in January 2003.  The Smith 
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Committee had been established in the wake of the corporate failures in the US. The 
concern of the government was the possibility of such a failure happening in the UK. 
To find an answer to the question: CAN IT HAPPEN HERE? (Referring to corporate 
collapses in the US), the government requested the Financial Reporting Council 
(FRC) to review the country‟s preparedness in preventing such a collapse in UK 
listed companies. In September 2002, the FRC announced the establishment of the 
Smith Committee with its terms of reference and membership. By January 2003 the 
committee submitted its report. The summary of major points from the committee‟s 
activity is reported below.  
 
The committee reported on five main areas of the Audit Committee. These are its: 
 Purpose  
 Membership, procedure and resources 
 Relationship with the board 
 Roles and responsibilities and  
 Communications with shareholders  
The committee also proposed new code provisions on the Audit Committee that 
should be included in the Combined Code. This is attached as an appendix (1) to 
this thesis. It is important to reiterate that the committee emphasised the important 
role of the Audit Committee in the bigger picture of Corporate Governance. The fact 
that while „all directors have duty to act in the interest of the company, the Audit 
Committee has a particular role, acting independently from the executive, to ensure 
that the interest of shareholders are properly protected in relation to financial 
reporting and internal control‟(Smith Committee, 2003: page 3 Para. 1.5) 
 
The Combined Code (2003) and (2006) 
Since its first edition in 1998, the Combined Code has been updated on a regular 
basis in line with developments in the corporate environment and changes in the 
global Corporate Governance guidelines that are deemed necessary in the context 
of the UK. Listed companies are required to comply with the code or explain non-
compliance. The most recent editions of the Combined Code are those issued in 
June 2006 for application in accounting periods beginning on or after November 
2006 and the June 2008 edition for application in accounting periods beginning on or 
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after 29th June 2008. The main difference between the two is that the amendments 
to the June 2008 edition essentially present two major changes. Firstly, it removes 
the restriction on an individual chairing more than one FTSE 100 company. 
Secondly, for listed companies outside the FTSE 350, it allows the company 
chairman to sit on the Audit Committee where he or she was considered 
independent on appointment (Combined Code, 2008).  
 
 
2.4 The Audit Committee  
A careful consideration of the responses to the recent wave of corporate fiascos 
(especially those at the turn of the 21st century) worldwide suggests that far more 
focus is being placed on two prominent control mechanisms: the Audit Committee 
and the enhancement of the external auditors‟ independence. This is evident in the 
OECD (2004) report, the USA Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 and the UK Combined 
Code2003. All of these have similar themes and approaches in their attempt to set 
up a framework that should be effective in putting in place governance mechanisms 
and the procedures that should help in preventing corporate mismanagement and 
collapse. This rests partly with enhancing the auditors‟ independence and having an 
independent board with financial oversight functions on the management among 
others. The logic is appealing: fortify the internal control mechanisms with a stronger, 
more powerful and independent board with an equally independent and unbiased 
Audit Committee and combine these with a more independent external auditor who 
provides a certification of the financial statements as a true and fair reflection of the 
financial results and position of the organisation to its stakeholders and users of the 
financial information contained therein. In the following sections, the study will 
concentrate on literature examining the role of the Audit Committee and its impact on 
a number of aspects of the firm. This review examines various definitions of the Audit 
Committee, traces the history of the Audit Committee, establishes the reasons for 
the rise in Audit Committee adoption in the UK, analyses literature on Audit 
Committee Independence, composition/structure, the Audit Committee process, 
experimental studies on the Audit Committee and lastly considers literature on the 
Audit Committee‟s effectiveness. There is a preponderance of US studies in this 
review and this is due to the scanty nature of research on this aspect of Corporate 
Governance especially in the UK (Spira, 2002). There is also a more visible 
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emphasis on the positivist paradigm (Beattie and Fearnley, 2002), perhaps due to 
the sensitivity of the issues involved and problems with access that would have 
favoured a qualitative study.  
 
2.4.1  The Audit Committee - Definition  
Since the Cadbury report of 1992, which focused on the financial aspects of 
Corporate Governance, and a number of other Corporate Governance reports, there 
has been a significant rise in the voluntary adoption of Audit Committees in the UK. 
This adoption of Audit Committees arose prior to the 1998 requirement by the 
London Stock Exchange that listed companies reporting from 31st December 1998 
until reporting year starting on or after 1st November 2003   should disclose their 
compliance with the Combined Code (1998), revised in 2003, 2006 and 2008, which 
essentially is a combination of the major requirements of the various committees‟ 
reports that have been produced.  In the UK the Corporate Governance guidelines 
are principle based and allow flexibility so that companies can comply with the code 
and make the requisite disclosures or, in cases where they are unable to comply, 
they will need to explain their reasons for non-compliance and disclose the same in 
their annual report. These disclosures are thought to enhance the decision 
usefulness of information in the financial statements and also to reinforce confidence 
in the system. This contrasts with the approach in the US and Canada, where 
Corporate Governance provisions are rule based and compliance is compulsory. 
This is not suggesting that the informational content and usefulness of the financial 
statements prepared in these countries are in any way inferior to those in the UK. 
Further, both the UK and US place great emphasis on the potential of the Audit 
Committee to play a crucial role in the emerging Corporate Governance provisions in 
both countries.   
 
Finding a definition for the Audit Committee is not as difficult and elusive as the 
definition of Corporate Governance itself.  A number of Audit Committee definitions 
are now reviewed.  The Audit Committee is defined as the existence of a sub-
committee of the main board comprised mostly of non- executive or independent 
directors with responsibility for oversight of auditing activities (Birkett, 1986; Cadbury 
Committee, 1992; Collier, 1992). Following developments in the global corporate 
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environments, specifically, the numerous corporate collapse on the turn of the 
Millennium (2001-2008), there has been increased requirement for the Audit 
Committee to be comprised ONLY of independent non-executive directors.  Section 
C.3.1, page 16 of the Combined Code 2003 provides that:  
“ The board should establish an Audit Committee of at least three, or in the 
case of smaller companies two, members, who should all be 
independent non-executive directors. The board should satisfy itself that 
at least one member of the Audit Committee has recent and relevant 
financial experience.” 
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) section 205(a) defines the Audit Committee as 
 
 “a committee (or equivalent body) established by and amongst the board of 
directors of an issuer for the purpose of overseeing the accounting and 
financial reporting processes of the issuer and audits of the financial 
statements of the issuer”  
 
Another definition sees the Audit Committee in terms of its expected responsibilities 
and functions; 
 “The Audit Committee is a committee composed of independent, non-
executive directors charged with oversight functions of ensuring responsible 
Corporate Governance , a reliable financial reporting process, an effective 
internal control structure, a credible audit function, an informed  whistleblower 
complaint process and an appropriate code of business ethics with the 
purpose of creating long-term shareholder value while protecting the interests 
of other stakeholders” (Rezaee, 2009:120).  
 
This definition of the Audit Committee is quite comprehensive, in the sense that it 
underscores the expected responsibilities of the Audit Committee not only in the 
context of the shareholders but also in the context of a bigger picture that includes all 
other stakeholders.  
 
And, as will be discussed later on in this section, this broader perspective on the 
roles of the Audit Committee has brought significant changes to the global 
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expectation of the Audit Committee and has impacted drastically on its roles from an 
advisory and reactive body (Spira, 2003; Turnbull, 2005) to a more  legitimate and  
proactive organisational organ (Rezaee, 2009).  
 
A common feature of all these definitions is in describing the status, composition and 
anticipated roles of the committee. Firstly, the committee is described as a sub-
committee of the board in the sense that the Anglo-American model of Corporate 
Governance only allows a single tier board which is the main board of directors 
supposedly appointed by the shareholders. This is the “powerhouse” and the head of 
the firm. Taking a clue from the social contract theories of Hobbes  (1651) and 
others, it will be intuitive to reason that the shareholders, knowing that they all cannot 
be directly involved in the running of the firm, unless they want chaos, have decided 
to appoint their representatives i.e. the directors (in a way or manner specifically 
enumerated in their  articles of association which guides the voting process in a firm 
during the AGM etc), all of whom sit on the board of directors and debate and make 
decisions in a similar fashion to parliaments. They consider and take decisions in the 
best interests of the shareholders.  
 
It then implies that the Audit Committee derives its existence, power, structure and 
terms of reference from the BOD acting on behalf of the shareholders. This is partly 
comparable to the idea of delegated authority in politics and governance (which 
denotes power given to a lower level of government by parliament to make laws in 
the interests of the people; such delegation of power arises from a number of 
reasons. For example, law making authority may be delegated to a body believed to 
be better placed to make such laws because of their expertise, closeness to the 
people, for exigencies of time and cost etc), except that BOD do not have to debate 
and vote on the decisions of the Audit Committees as is the case in the parliaments 
with respect to delegated authorities. Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) undertook 
extensive work on the role of power in the Audit Committee discourse. They 
suggested that the Audit Committee has a legitimate power which, quoting from a 
number of power literature sources they describe as: 
“The ability to act based upon a mandate from a widely accepted authoritative 
source. Ultimately this power is based upon shared norms of allegiance to a 
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third party perceived to be acting in an appropriate manner” (Kalbers and 
Fogarty, 1993:28) 
 
Secondly, definitions of the Audit Committee also focus on its composition. All the 
definitions mentioned above described the Audit Committee as a committee 
comprising of mainly independent non-executive directors (IND). This is in line with 
the requirement of the Combined Code 2003 and its revised versions, the SOX in the 
US and a number of other Corporate Governance provisions. It is imperative that the 
membership of the committee is independent in order to be able to defend the 
interests of the shareholders and look at issues in a pragmatic and unbiased way. 
Lastly, the committee has been defined in terms of its anticipated roles and 
responsibilities which have changed significantly over time.    
 
2.4.2 A Brief History of the Audit Committee  
“The history of Audit Committee development internationally indicates that it 
has been driven by concerns about the credibility of financial reporting, 
particularly in relation to the issue of auditor independence............ ”                                    
(Spira, 1998: 30)  
 
The history of Audit Committees dates back to the early 1940s when they were 
recommended by the Securities and Exchange Commission as a response to the 
McKesson and Robins Inc fraud in the US in 1938. Between 1938 and the eventual 
requirement for companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)  to have 
an Audit Committee in 1978, there were a series of reports, recommendations and 
congressional hearings on the issue. For instance, in 1939 the NYSE recommended 
the establishment of the Audit Committee for all companies listed on the exchange. 
In 1940 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), in its Accounting Series 
Release (ASR) No.19, recommended that all listed companies form Audit 
Committees. In 1973, a NYSE white paper suggested that Audit Committees were a 
necessity in all listed companies. But by 1978 it had become part of the listing rules 
of the NYSE, when it provided that:  
 
“Each domestic company with common stock listed on the Exchange, as a 
condition of listing and continued listing of its securities on the Exchange, 
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shall establish no later than 30 June 1978 and maintain thereafter an Audit 
Committee comprised solely of directors independent of management and 
free from any relation that, in the opinion of the Board of Directors, would 
interfere with the exercise of independent judgment as a committee member”.  
                                           (Vanasco, 1994, p18) 
The NASDAQ and other exchanges in the US have also made the establishment of 
Audit Committees a part of their listing requirements (Deli and Gillan, 2000).  
 
Growth in the adoption and voluntary formation of Audit Committees seems to be 
prevalent in a number of developed economies such as the US, UK, Canada and 
Australia. In terms of Continental Europe and the economies of Asia, the adoption of 
Audit Committees is at varying levels (Van Hoek, 1988). This is perceived to be due 
to the models of Corporate Governance popular in these parts of the global economy 
(Tricker 1978:28). For instance, Corporate Governance structures in Continental 
Europe have been described as concentrated-insider led, which enjoy significant 
ownership by financial institutions that also play key roles in their governance. In 
such a situation internal control and monitoring functions that are supposed to be 
played by the Audit Committee may have been substituted for by the concentrated 
ownership and greater involvement of owners in management. Furthermore, while a 
unitary board system is common practice in the Anglo-American model of Corporate 
Governance, the Continental European model is characterised by a dual board 
system and this may also account for the reduced prominence of Audit Committees 
in these systems.  
 
In the UK the formation of Audit Committees did not occur earlier than 1970. Collier 
(1993) concluded that as of 1970 no UK listed company had an Audit Committee. 
However, there has been a phenomenal growth in the adoption of Audit Committees 
in UK listed companies post 1970. Between 1970 and 1990 more than 80% of listed 
companies were reported to have established an Audit Committee (Collier, 1993; 
Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998). In the following section the study traces reasons for 
this rise in the adoption of Audit Committees in the UK.  
 
2.4.3 Reasons for Rises in the Adoption of the Audit Committee in the UK 
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In the previous section, the researcher noted that there has been a phenomenal 
increase in the formation and adoption of the Audit Committee in UK listed 
companies. In this section an attempt is made to identify the reasons for these 
increases in spite of views questioning the ability of the Audit Committee to deliver 
the anticipated benefits (Zaman and Collier, 2005). The discussions here centre 
round six key points, all of which were enumerated by Collier (1996)  
 The influence of practices in the US  
 Increase in the number of non-executive directors.  
 Increase in the number of corporate collapses  
 Alternative board structures 
 Legislative pressure 
  Pressure from the accounting profession 
 
2.4.4 Influence of Practices in the US  
Collier (1996) argued that the experiences in the USA and Canada of corporate 
failures and fraudulent practices in the 1970s (Campbell, 1990) have necessitated 
self regulatory organisations such as Stock Exchanges to require the formation of 
Audit Committees to improve the credibility of their Exchanges and protect their 
investors. Despite the pressure and lobbying to secure statutory backing that will 
require all public companies to establish Audit Committees as recommended by the 
Treadway Commission of 1987, this was not successful and establishment of Audit 
Committees continued to be voluntary. However, Collier (1996) argued that growth in 
voluntary adoption of Audit Committees in North America and especially the US had 
a significant influence on the formation of the Cadbury Committee and on its report 
coupled with corporate failures of the 1980s such as Polly Peck, BCCI and Maxwell. 
Further, Cheffins (2001) argued that the UK followed the „industrial capitalism‟ that 
was developing fast in the US in the late 1970s and 1980s (Chapter 2 section 2.4). 
This may further establish the link between the formation of Audit Committees in the 
US and the UK.   
 
Although the influence of US Corporate Governance is noticeable, the British 
Corporate Governance system still maintains a unique approach. Essentially, while 
Corporate Governance provisions in the US are rule based, the UK favours principle 
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based Corporate Governance. The differences in Corporate Governance provisions 
between the two countries have also been observed by Charkham (1994). He 
suggested that board composition in the British system is different from that in the 
US. For example, it is usual to have a bigger board size in the US compared to the 
UK. This is due to the size of corporations in the US which are often bigger than in 
the UK since they tend to serve a bigger market.  Also, the antecedent of the modern 
corporation in the two countries differs. US corporations emerged with much 
flexibility and latitude in terms of how they are governed compared to the UK, with 
each state in the US able to make its own laws to regulate corporations (Turnbull, 
2005).Furthermore, the extent of shareholder dispersion is much broader in the US 
than in the UK, with the effect that the extent of separation between owners and 
management is wider and consequently there is a greater need for corporate 
monitoring and governance. However, with the UK following the shareholder 
dispersion model, it was necessary that corporations in the country equally institute 
forms of corporate controls including the growing use of the Audit Committee as was 
the case in the US (Tafara and Peterson ,  2007).  
 
2.4.5 Increase in the Number of Non-Executive Directors  
The increase in the adoption of Audit Committees in the UK is inextricably linked with 
the rise in the importance attached to the presence of Non-Executive directors on UK 
boards (Collier, 1993). Audit Committee members are Non-Executive directors and 
will possibly serve on more than one sub-committee. So, the greater presence of 
non-executives on the board is something of a precursor to the wider formation of 
Audit Committees in UK listed companies. The call for the more visible presence of 
the Independent Non-Executive Directors (IND) in Corporate Governance predates 
the Cadbury Committee as well as the voluntary formation of Audit Committees in 
the UK in the later part of 1970. Collier (1996) traced the development of the IND 
and identified significant milestones such as the Watkinson Report in 1973, the 
establishment of the promotion of the IND agency in 1982 which pressured for the 
inclusion of more INDs on the boards of companies suggesting that the positive 
impact of these pressures is also noted in two surveys conducted on Times 1000 
companies in 1977 and 1988 respectively. The first survey conducted by the Bullock 
Committee which reported that a quarter of the companies had no IND and that only 
36% had more than two INDs, but this compares to the report of the Bank of England 
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research in 1988 which found that 89% of respondents by then had INDs, while 60% 
of companies had three or more independent non executive directors on the board.   
 
The effect of these developments on the formation of Audit Committees is succinctly 
presented in Collier (1996). He reported on the trends in adoption of Audit 
Committees in UK companies. His report shows that three periods represent the 
peaks of these formations. The period from 1979 to 1981, 1986 to 1990 and 1992 to 
1993. Thus between 1979 and 1993, 70% of all the Audit Committees in UK listed 
companies were established. Further, Collier (1996: 122) showed that during the 
peaks of 1979-1981, 10 companies that had audit companies compare to 20 
companies in 1989, 55 companies in 1992 and 60 companies by 1993. This thus 
established a trend between increases in the presence of INDs on the boards and 
the rise in the formation of Audit Committees in UK corporations. 
 
2.4.6 Corporate Collapse  
The wave of corporate collapses has also been responsible for the increase in the 
formation of Audit Committees. In fact the antecedents of Corporate Governance 
and indeed Audit Committees have been linked to corporate misdemeanour 
(Cadbury, 1992). A careful consideration of most governance codes would show the 
importance attached to the Audit Committee in improving Corporate Governance 
through financial and audit reporting oversight function in the organisation (Wolnizer, 
1995; Smith Report, 2003; Rezaee, 2009).  But cautions have been expressed 
against placing too many expectations on the Audit Committee (Spira, 2002; Turley 
and Zaman, 2001, 2007).  Incidents of corporate collapses including those of the 
energy giant ENRON and the current global economic downturn seem to have justify 
the need to be realistic about the level of expectations from the Audit Committee. 
This is because their (Audit Committee) effectiveness and activity depend on many 
factors some of which are not within their influence (Kalbers and Forgarty, 1993; 
Turley and Zaman, 2007). 
 
Notwithstanding the above, the Audit Committee remains one of the most important 
governance mechanisms that has been suggested for improved corporate 
transparency, accountability and reporting quality in organisations (Zhang et al, 
2007: 305). In order to restore market confidence and stop panic divestment, it was 
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important that sufficient safeguards in the form of guidelines and structures were 
provided that could reduce corporate exposures to failures resulting from weak 
corporate control and lax governance regimes. 
 
2.4.7 Alternative Board Structure  
          “it is possible that Corporate Governance reforms in the UK, including the 
introduction of Audit Committees, may in part be motivated by a desire to  
deflect the imposition of alternative board structures ” (Collier, 1996: 129)  
 
In the late 1970s, there were concerted efforts to permit employee representation on 
the governance boards of companies (Tricker, 1978). These efforts included the 5th 
European Economic Community Directive which recommended the adoption of the 
German two-tier board system against the single-tier system popular in the UK. The 
Bullock Committee Report (1977) also reflected this trend leading to the 
government‟s white paper on The Conduct of Company Directors which essentially 
recommended that employees should be represented on the boards of companies.  
Cheffins (2001) suggested that the election victory of the Conservative government 
and the economic policies of the Thatcher government were pro-market and so were 
not favourably disposed towards employee representation on the boards of 
companies. Meanwhile this was a good indication for the directors of companies who 
essentially are opposed to the idea of a two-tier governance system so instead they 
supported the idea of sub-committees of the main board and especially the Audit 
Committee.  
 
2.4.8 Legislative Pressures  
Another factor that may have contributed to the rise in adoption of Audit Committees 
in UK companies is the effects of legislation. The legislative history of Audit 
Committees suggests that since 1977 starting with Sir Brandon Rhys Williams up 
until 1992 when the Cadbury Committee reported, there had been consistent efforts 
to legislate on the adoption of Audit Committees in UK listed companies and on each 
occasion, the legislative routes have been unsuccessful Audit Committees. Instead 
establishing an Audit Committee remained voluntary. However, the persistence of 
the attempt to secure legislation on Audit Committees in companies may have 
galvanised the rise in adoption. This is suggested by the fact that the peak periods 
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for adoption of Audit Committees (1979-81 and 1986-90)  Audit Committees 
coincides with the period when there were intense efforts to introduce legislation on 
the issue. This is further evidenced by this quote:  
 
“.... the widespread adoption of Audit Committees in the UK might well reflect 
no more than an attempt to avoid legislative solution to deficiencies in 
Corporate Governance” (Collier, 1996: 135) 
 
2.4.9 Pressure from Accounting Professional Organisations  
Charlton (1976) suggested that Audit Committees can be part of the solution to 
auditors‟ problems in the face of corporate scandals. Ridley (1976) decried the 
apathy of accounting professional bodies to the potential of Audit Committees in 
enhancing auditors‟ (internal) position and improving internal audit effectiveness. The 
editorial in the 1,000th issue of Accountancy in 1976 had the heading „Introduce 
Audit Committees now‟. It called for the establishment of Audit Committees in listed 
companies suggesting that such a move would improve auditor independence. The 
editorial agreed with Ridley (1976) that the Audit Committee was a new development 
in the UK (Woolf, 1976). There were a number of articles in the accounting 
professional journal that examined a number of issues regarding Audit Committees 
For example Byrd (1977) studied the benefits of the Audit Committee from a 
practitioner‟s perspective, Gough (1978) examined the steps involved in setting up 
an Audit Committee, Jubb (1979) focused on the objectives and advantages of 
having an Audit Committee and Davidson (1978) suggested the following as the 
functions of an Audit Committee: review accounting developments; a review of 
accounting policies; expected accounting and reporting; and audit scope.  
Furthermore, the Consultative Committee of Accountancy Bodies also outlined the 
possible benefit of Audit Committees and unequivocally supported their 
establishment (CCAB, 1977). The Accountant International Study Group (1977) also 
extols the benefits of having an Audit Committee. It suggested the following 
functions: 
 Responsible for understanding both the internal and external audit functions 
 Review the effectiveness of accounting and internal control systems and  




2.5 Evolution of the Audit Committee  
This section reviews the evolution of the functions of the Audit Committee. Two of 
the Corporate Governance guidelines are very relevant to the discussions in this 
section. These are the Cadbury Committee Report with respect to Audit Committees 
and the Smith Committee Report on Audit Committees. However, their provisions 
have now been merged into the Combined Code (2003), thus the analyses of the 
evolution of Audit Committee functions in the UK will be undertaken by comparing 
the provisions of the Combined Code and the provisions contained in the Private 
members‟ Bill (1988) on Audit Committee. Section 2.4.8 explains the impact of 
legislation on the rise in the adoption of Audit Committees in UK companies. The first 
of these legislative attempts was the Private members‟ Bill proposed in 1977 which 
suggested that companies should have Audit Committees with non-executive 
directors and that such committees should be consulted on major issues relating to 
the company. Its main functions were stated as:  
 To review all audited or unaudited financial statement of the company prior to 
their submission to the board and  
 To report thereon to the board 
The 1977 bill was defeated and in 1988 it was represented with three main 
proposals, which were that:  
 The directors‟ report of public companies to identify which directors were 
independent 
 The annual report to indicate whether additional appointments are proposed, 
where the number of independent directors on the board of a major public 
company is below three and  
 The shareholders to have the right to require a major public company without 
an Audit Committee to form one  
The Bill also suggested the following provisions for the formation of the Audit 
Committee:  
 Not less than three independent directors 
 A majority of independent directors 
 At least two meetings per year 
[71] 
 
 External auditors to be notified of meetings and have the right to request a 
meeting 
 Audit Committee meetings to be minuted and the minutes circulated to 
directors and  
 The function of the Audit Committee to be:  
o To review the financial statements prior to publication 
o To meet the auditors  
o To make recommendations on the appointment and remuneration of 
auditors  
o To report via the annual financial statements whether the board has 
properly considered its reports  
Although the Bill was defeated in parliament, its success would have changed the 
landscape of Corporate Governance in the UK as early as the late 1980s. It would 
have been the first code on Audit Committees in the UK and would have also set a 
precedent in the legislative backing for the establishment and prescription of the 
functions of the Audit Committee. Nonetheless, its content remains the only 
documented, articulated proposal (that this study is aware of) for an Audit 
Committee‟s functions in the UK prior to the Cadbury Committee Report. Thus in this 
section the researcher can only compare the provisions of the Combined Code on 
the Audit Committee with the provisions of the Private members‟ Bill of 1988. A 
comparison of these functions with the expected functions of the Audit Committee as 
envisaged by the Combined Code show that although in terms of structure and 
composition they share some similarities, the functions of the Combined Code are 
significantly different from the expectations of the 1977 and 1988 Audit Committees 
proposals. For instance the Combined Code which unifies the provisions of the 
various governance codes in the UK enumerated the following functions for the Audit 
Committee. 
  
2.5.1 The Roles of the Audit Committee  
The Combined Code provides that the Audit Committee is expected:  
 to monitor the integrity of the financial statements of the company and 
any formal announcements relating to the company‟s financial 
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performance, reviewing significant financial reporting judgements 
contained in them; 
 to review the company‟s internal financial controls and, unless 
expressly addressed by a separate board risk committee composed of 
independent directors or by the board itself, the company‟s internal 
control and risk management systems; 
 to monitor and review the effectiveness of the company‟s internal audit 
function; 
 to make recommendations to the board for it to put to the shareholders 
for their approval in general meeting in relation to the appointment of 
the external auditor and to approve the remuneration and terms of 
engagement of the external auditor; 
 to review and monitor the external auditor‟s independence and 
objectivity and the effectiveness of the audit process, taking into 
consideration relevant UK professional and regulatory requirements; 
 to develop and implement policy on the engagement of the external 
auditor to supply non-audit services, taking into account relevant 
ethical guidance regarding the provision of non-audit services by the 
external audit firm;  
 And to report to the Board, identifying any matters in respect of which it 
considers that action or improvement is needed, and making 
recommendations as to the steps to be taken. 
                                                                                                (The Combined Code, 2003)  
 
It is obvious that the substance of these functions is similar to the identified functions 
of the unsuccessful Private members‟ Bill mentioned earlier, the difference is in the 
scope and the nature of the responsibility envisaged for the Audit Committee. The 
scope of the responsibilities of the Audit Committees has changed significantly in an 
increasingly global business environment (DeZoort et al, 2002:38) to include review 
and monitoring of internal control, internal audit functions and risk management in 
addition to the traditional reporting functions and interactions with the auditors 
(Zaman, 2001). However, concerns have been expressed at the high expectations 
placed on the Audit Committee with likely adverse consequences should these not 
be met (Zaman, 2001; Spira, 2003; Turnbull, 2005).  Also, the changes in language 
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and tone in which the functions and responsibilities of the Audit Committee are 
expressed also matter in understanding the changes in the expectations of the Audit 
Committees. For instance, while the proposed Bills only use terms such as „review‟ 
and „report‟, the Combined Codes used more imperative verbs such as „monitor‟, 
„develop‟, „implement‟ in addition to „review‟ and „report‟. In fact, the Smith Report 
defined the Audit Committee functions using terms such as „oversight‟ and 
„assessment‟. These terms convey higher and stronger meanings and reflect current 
perceptions of the expected roles of the Audit Committees. They reflect the fact that 
the Audit Committee should conduct a high level overview on the management and 
the corporation‟s activities (Mallin, 2004) not least because of the prevalence of 
corporate failures (DeZoort et al, 2002). 
 
Spira (2003) also observed that in the description of the roles of the Audit Committee 
terms such as to review; to discuss; to recommend; to undertake; to examine etc, 
were used  to indicate the nature of their responsibilities. Essentially, they are terms 
that suggest oversight functions on activities or roles performed by a third party. This 
may be over members of the company staff such as internal control personnel or the 
management or over persons or entities employed by the firm such as the external 
auditor. She further suggested that the Audit Committee essentially plays the 
following advisory roles:  
“..the Audit Committee is a sub-committee of the main board of directors, with 
a remit covering issues relating to financial reporting, audit and internal 
financial control. It has no decision-making powers and does not report 
directly to company shareholders. Its “output” consists of reports and 
recommendations to the main board, offering assurance by providing formal 
evidence of its oversight activities. Its role is advisory and largely reactive” 
(Spira, 2003:182).  
 
A similar trend has been documented in the US. Rezaee (2009) divided the Audit 
Committee‟s roles into pre and post reform (referring to the SOX) Audit Committees 
functions. The table 2 below further shows the changes in the functions and 




Table 2: Comparison of Audit Committees Functions (pre and post SOX 
Corporate Governance reforms) 
Pre-reforms Post-reforms  
Voluntary formation of Audit Committees Mandatory formation of Audit Committee 
Personal and economic ties to 
management and the corporation  
All members must be independent  
Financial expertise  
Liaison between management and 
independent auditors  
Directly responsible for appointing, 
compensating, retaining and overseeing 
independent auditors  
Limited knowledge of financial reporting Must establish procedures for receipt, 
retention and treatment of complaints 
relating to accounting, auditing and 
internal control matters  
Infrequent and short meetings  Has authority to engage advisors  
Lack proper authority and resources  Given appropriate funding, as 
determined by the committee, for 
external auditor and advisors 
Reduced  accountability  Disclosure of existence of at least one 
Audit Committee financial expert, or if 
not, why? 
Inadequate oversight of financial 
reporting and audit activities. 
Name of the financial expert and 
whether independent from management  
 Overseas financial reporting, risk 
management, internal control and audit 
activities    
 Pre-approves all audit and permissible 
non-audit services 
More accountability  
Meets at least four times a year  
Annual evaluation of the Audit 





Although the table relates to changes in the functions of the Audit Committees in the 
US it more or less captures the trend in the UK except that the principle in the UK is 
comply-or-explain while compliance is compulsory in the US 
 
 
2.6 Summary  
 
This chapter provides the background to the study; it starts with a review of the 
various definitions of Corporate Governance. It established that there are difficulties 
in agreeing a universally accepted definition of Corporate Governance but that an 
integrated definition will be useful for practitioners, academics and other 
stakeholders in the issues of corporate governance and auditor independence. In the 
second section of the chapter, the researcher reviews both the internal and external 
control mechanism and finally in the third section of the chapter, the researcher 
traced the development of Corporate Governance in the UK, including the 
development of Audit Committee and factors that account for such development in 
the UK. The benefit of these historical analyses is to enable a context for the 
subsequent part of the thesis and enhance further analyses. In the next chapter, the 





















In the previous chapter the researcher reviewed definitions of Corporate 
Governance, developed an integrated definition of the concept, analysed the various 
control mechanisms and traced the development of Corporate Governance in the 
UK. The current chapter continues with the discussion on the topic by reviewing 
relevant literature on two main control mechanisms that are the focus of this thesis. 
These are the Audit Committee and the external auditors. 
 
The first part of the review starts with the Audit Committee considering a number of 
relevant themes on the subject.  
 
The second part of this chapter reviews the literature on auditor independence. 
Starting with a definition of independence, threats to independence and then a 
number of themes under this topic are considered. The chapter makes a distinction 
between independence in appearance and in fact and identifies the aspect that most 
appropriately suits this investigation.  
 
The third part of this chapter centres round the audit profession and the debate 
about audit and non-audit fees in the context of auditors providing non-audit services 
to their audit clients.  
 
At the end of this chapter, the researcher provides a synthesis of the arguments and 
summarises the main points. Finally, this chapter provides the basis for the 
discussions in the methodology chapter. The approach was to focus mainly on 
literature from the UK and then supplement with literature from other parts of the 





















3.1 Audit Committee Independence, Composition and Characteristics 
An important concern relating to Audit Committees‟ performance centres on their 
independence. The presence of the Audit Committee should alleviate agency 
problems associated with moral hazard and adverse selection (Rainsbury, Bradbury 
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and Cahan, 2008: 394) through monitoring and oversight functions in reporting and 
auditing (Reinstein and Weirich, 1996:28). With remits to provide oversight functions 
on financial matters and communications between the management and the external 
auditor (Zaman and Collier, 2005: 761), the Audit Committee needs to be 
independent to be able to function properly (Zaman and Collier, 2005: 758).  
Independence is just as important to the Audit Committee as it is important to the 
auditor (Deli and Gillan, 2000; Power, 1997). This will allow them to deal with the 
company‟s issues in an objective manner without any form of bias.  
 
The Cadbury report in section 4.12 provides that non-executive directors should be 
independent and it explains independence to mean: 
 
“.......  that apart from their directors‟ fees and shareholdings they should be 
independent of management and free from any business or other relationship 
which could materially interfere with the exercise of their independent 
judgement. ..........”  
Paragraph 9.5 of the Higgs committee report states that “a board is 
strengthened significantly by having a strong group of non-executive directors 
with no other connection with the company. These individuals bring a 
dispassionate objectivity that  directors with a closer relationship to the 
company cannot provide”  
 
The Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC) on „Audit Committee effectiveness‟ defines 
independence as the exclusion from the board of current and former employees, 
relatives of management and persons receiving compensation from the company 
(except directors‟ fees). The BRC also recommended the exclusion of directors who 
are partners in, controlling shareholders or executive officers of any for-profit 
business organisation to which the corporation made or from which the corporation 
received significant payments in the last five years (BRC 1999). 
 
The SOX defines independence in the context of the Audit Committee in section 301 
to mean:  
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“... in order to be considered independent for the purpose of this paragraph, a 
member of an Audit Committee of an issuer may not, other than in his or her 
capacity as a member of the Audit Committee, the BOD or any other board  
committee :-  
 Accept any consultancy, advisory or other complementary fee from an 
issuer or be an affiliated person of the issuer or any subsidiary 
thereof.............” 
 
The importance of the Audit Committee‟s independence is highlighted by the nature 
and scope of its expected roles. Audit Committees are expected to enhance public 
confidence in the corporate system with regard to their transparency (NASD; 1999), 
adequacy in reporting and a reassurance of sufficient safeguards against fraudulent 
reporting and creative accounting (Rezaee et al, 2002: 536; Cadbury, 1992; DeFond 
and Jiambalvo, 1991: 651). It is also anticipated that the Audit Committee should 
buffer the relationship among many governance organs within the firm as well as 
external organs (Rezaee, 2009: 121)   The Audit Committee is crucially important in 
enhancing the relationship between the external auditor and management not only 
during the course of their duties but also in cases of disputes between them 
(Rainsbury et al, 2008: 394; Knapp, 1987). The Audit Committee should also 
enhance the relationship between the external auditor and the internal audit function 
(Wolnizer, 1995: 47). This is achieved through regular review of the activities of both 
organs and by determining the extent and scope of their work as well as by 
reviewing the audit process and making informed modifications (Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Knapp, 1987; Dezoort and Salitero, 2001; Rezaee, 2002). In order to 
discharge their oversight functions effectively, it is important that the committee is 
independent of management. Lack of independence from the management may 
inadvertently turn the members of the Audit Committee into an extension of the 
management team itself and this will defeat the objective of having the Audit 
Committee in the first place. Independence entails having sufficient scope in taking 
decisions relating to their functions, having access to adequate and timely 
information to enable them to function, having the enabling environment in which to 
operate including the requisite resources and access to professional advice and 
training required to discharge the expected functions of the committee (Combined 




A considerable number of studies have also focused on examining Audit Committee 
composition and characteristics. In terms of committee composition, most Corporate 
Governance guidelines provide that the Audit Committee should be composed of 
mainly independent non-executive directors with at least three members. The 
Cadbury report in section 4.11 states that:  
 “.....the calibre and number of non-executive directors on the board should be 
such that their views will carry significant weight in the board‟s decisions.. 
.......all boards will require a minimum of three non-executive directors, one of 
whom may be the chairman of the company provided he or she is not also its 
executive head, additionally, two of the three should be independent in the 
terms set out in the next paragraph” (4.12). 
 
The question of the composition of the board has been the focus of several studies 
and three types of directors are known to serve on the board of directors in a single-
tier board system. These are outside directors (completely independent of the 
management), the insider director (director but also an employee of the organisation) 
and affiliated or grey area directors (outside director but with a commercial or other 
form of relationship with the firm, a recent employee of the firm or someone external 
but with a substantial shareholding in the firm) (Deli and Gillan, 2000). While the 
outside directors are considered independent (Fama and Jensen, 1983) the other 
two are not considered to be independent. For instance, Vicknair et al (1993) 
recognised the problem of affiliated or grey area directors. These are directors who, 
though they might appear to be independent of the management and of the 
organisation, still have some connections with the company or its board and are thus 
capable of undermining the board‟s independence. They also enjoy, either directly or 
indirectly, a financial interest in the firms on whose committees they serve. Therefore 
the presence of “grey area” directors on the board has the propensity to reduce 
board independence. Fama and Jensen (1983) observed that the executive director 
is an internal manager of the organisation and has privileged information about the 
firm, while the external directors are independent and so should be able to resolve 
disagreements between internal managers and exercise independent judgements in 
cases of conflict of interest between management and shareholders including 
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situations relating to reward and compensation for senior executives and to the 
review of financial statements.    
 
Against the background of the national and international requirement for the board of 
directors to be composed mainly of independent non-executive directors, Clifford and 
Evans (1997) examined the level of independence of boards in Australian listed 
companies. Of relevance is the finding that the presence of grey area directors or 
affiliated directors may corrupt and confuse the independence perceptions of the 
boards. This is because, although the number of non-executive directors on the 
board may appear higher than the number of executive directors, as required by 
most Corporate Governance guidelines and which may signal good Corporate 
Governance practices, yet not all the non-executive directors are strictly independent 
of management, due to the presence of „grey area‟ directors. The „grey area‟ 
directors still have some commercial or other forms of affiliation with the 
management which may compromise their independence. The study population was 
the Australian top 500 companies based on market capitalisation, listed on the 
Australian Stock Exchange as at December 30th 1993. A sample size of 100 was 
used, but this was reduced to 90 because 10 companies were trust companies or 
companies domiciled outside Australia. Of the remaining 90 companies, forty three 
did not provide sufficient information to allow classifications of their non-executive 
directors and so were excluded from the investigation. Thus the study was based on 
information on non-executive directors from 47 companies out of the 90 in the 
sample. Data on firm size was proxied by turnover and total assets which were 
collected from companies‟ annual reports. Three main questions were asked to 
determine the presence of affiliated directors on the board: (1) is a non-executive 
director involved in transactions with the company other than those required to fulfil 
the role of director? (2) Is a non-executive director a substantial (shareholding 
greater than 5% of the issued ordinary capital) shareholder in the company? And 
lastly, (3) is a non-executive director a previous employee of the company?  
 
The authors found that 35% of non-executive directors in 47 of the top 90 Australian 
listed companies were involved in transactions with their companies which places 
them into the category of grey area directors and such connections and interests 
may threaten their independence posture. They implied that the combination of the 
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„insider‟ non-executives and „grey area‟ directors would constitute the majority of the 
board for most of the companies involved in the study and this may give a wrong 
impression of the apparent independence of these boards. Despite a majority of 
seemingly non-executive directors, there is considerable control and influence from 
the management due to the commercial relationship they maintained with the 
company. 3.2% of non-executive directors were found to have substantial 
shareholdings in the companies in which they served as INDs and around 1.4% had 
been previous employees of the companies in which they served as INDs. Although 
they reported similarities in their findings with other studies, the greatest limitation of 
this study is in the sample size. Given the importance of the subject matter (Audit 
Committee independence and the grey area directors) and the huge attention 
Corporate Governance has generated in recent times, it is necessary that reported 
findings are fairly representative of the reality in terms of the relevance of the 
research question and the scope of the study for which this survey is inadequate.  
 
Studies have also suggested that the method of committee members‟ appointment is 
an important determinant of their independence and how independently they can be 
seen to act. Where members of the committee are appointed by management they 
are to perform oversight functions on, their objectivity and independence becomes a 
subject of concern. It will be more likely that their independence will be compromised 
and their views become biased (Verschoor, 1993; Klein, 2002; O‟Sullivan and 
Diacon, 1999). And where the board is composed of a greater number of executive 
directors than independent non-executive directors this may have adverse effects on 
the firm as can be implied from the following studies. Beasley (1996) reported that   
firms in which fraud is committed have fewer independent directors than firms where 
fraud is not committed.  
 
Although statutorily the appointment of the external directors is the preserve of the 
shareholders exercised at the annual general meeting, in practice the executive 
directors recommend these appointments. However, the Cadbury report section 4.30 
requires the establishment of a nomination committee charged with the 
recommendation and appointment of directors to the board. Following on from this 
recommendation, the Higgs report reiterated this requirement and provided an 
outline of the expected duties and structure of the nomination committee. It is now 
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within the remit of the nomination committee to undertake the selection and 
appointment of directors which is then ratified at the AGM. The Smith Committee 
Report provides in sections 3.3. and 3.4  that:  
3.3. “..appointments to the Audit Committee should be made by the board on 
the recommendation of the nomination committee (where there is one), in 
consultation with the Audit Committee chairman. 
3.4. Appointments should be for a period of up to three years, extendable by 
no more than two additional three-year periods, so long as members 
  continue to be independent” 
 
Closely related to this, is the selection of the auditor and the impact of the Audit 
Committee members in this regard. It is thought that if the recommendation for 
appointment of the external auditor is within the remit of the independent Audit 
Committee it is more likely to enhance their independence than if the 
recommendation to shareholders is made by the executive management.  The Smith 
Report (2003) provides that the appointment, retention and determination of the 
independence of the auditor are now within the remit of the Audit Committee acting 
on behalf of the main board of directors. If auditors‟ appointments and the 
determination of their remuneration continue to be the preserve of the management 
(purportedly acting on behalf of the shareholders it puts the auditors in a difficult 
situation in the context of their independence and objectivity (DeAngelo, 1981).  
 
Although there are regulatory safeguards in terms of maximum percentages of a 
firm‟s fee that can be earned from a client or group of related clients, recent 
corporate collapses indicate that auditors are still susceptible to fee dependence. 
This may in part explain reasons for the recommendation that the selection, 
appointment and determination of the auditor and audit fee as well as the scope of 
the services to buy from the auditors be within the remit of the Audit Committee 
(Cadbury Report, 1992; Smith Report, 2003).  However, this may not be over 
stressed as it has been shown that Audit Committee members may equally become 
biased in their selection process.  
 
For instance, Reinstein and Weirich (1996) examined the conscious or unconscious 
bias exhibited by Audit Committee members when deciding on auditor selection 
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and/or retention. In this US Study of 247 New York Stock Exchange listed firms, they 
reported a significant relationship (5% level of significance) between CPA firms 
selected by Audit Committees and by the CPA firms which audit the Audit Committee 
member‟s own organisation. For instance, of the 77 Audit Committee members that 
selected Arthur Andersen (this research was carried out before the ENRON debacle 
and the eventual collapse of Arthur Andersen) as their auditor, 19 of these 
committee members (24.7%) also had a “home employer” audit relationship with 
Arthur Andersen which may be thought to have biased their selection choices. They 
concluded that a business relationship existing between the members of the Audit 
Committee and the audit firms they appointed signalled the absence of 
independence in the committees‟ selection process. However, they pointed out that 
such bias can only have a positive impact on auditor independence. Since the 
preference for the Audit Committee member‟s affiliated company auditor may be due 
to their quality and given that Audit Committee members tend to support the auditors 
in disputes between the auditor and management. On the other hand, such bias 
questions the objectivity of the Audit Committee towards the auditor especially now 
that the Audit Committee determines the scope, type and volume of services 
purchase from the auditor, their fees as well as reviewing their independence.  
 
This is an important study in the context of the independence of the Audit Committee 
especially against the background of their increased responsibilities; however, one 
area the study could have examined is the switching decision of the auditee and the 
role of the Audit Committee in this. Although the study pointed out that Audit 
Committee members‟ selection bias can only lead to improvement in auditor 
independence, this may not always be the case. Lack of objectivity and transparency 
in the auditor selection process has the potential to compromise auditor 
independence and thereby affect auditing and reporting quality. It is important that 
members of the Audit Committee remain independent not only of the management 
but also of the auditors so as to be objective in their assessment of the auditors‟ 
independence (Abbott et al, 2000) 
 .                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Deli and Gillian (2000) in a US  study of Audit Committee independence examined 
factors associated with Audit Committee composition and its importance in the 
contracting process in organisations (the contracting process refers to the steps 
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involved in entering into the nexus of contracts that subsist among many 
stakeholders in the corporate environment). Their study is consistent with the 
general theme that suggests that firms with higher demand for accounting 
certifications are more likely to have high quality auditors and form Audit    
Committees. They tested four main hypotheses which investigated the relationship 
between the probability that a firm has a completely independent and active Audit 
Committee and the level of firm growth opportunities, firm size, managerial 
ownership and firm leverage. They also controlled for some other factors that may 
affect Audit Committee independence and composition such as regulatory pressure 
and trading venues (Stock Exchanges).  
 
 
Deli and Gillan (2000) posit that firms with growth opportunities tend to have fewer 
observable assets and will therefore demand fewer accounting certifications, unlike 
firms that comprise mainly of „assets-in-place‟ who have greater demand for 
accounting certification. Growth opportunities were measured as the ratio of firm size 
to the book value of assets while firm size was calculated as the sum of the market 
value of equity, book value of debt and the book value of preferred stock. Managerial 
ownership was measured as the sum of the percentage ownership of all employee 
directors. Leverage was measured as the ratio of long term debt to firm size.   
 
They reported the result of their multivariate logit regression and found a significant 
negative relationship between the probability of the existence of an independent and 
active Audit Committee and firm growth opportunities, since there is little demand for 
accounting certifications. Managerial ownership was also found to be negatively 
related to independent and active Audit Committees. As insider executive directors‟ 
shareholding increases the demand for Audit Committee activity falls since 
managerial ownership will probably align management‟s and owners‟ interest. Also 
since increased managerial ownership may mean a higher presence of management 
on the Audit Committee, this would serve to dilute the Audit Committee‟s 
independence. Further, Audit Committee independence and activity was found to be 
positively related to firm size and leverage. Bigger firms require more monitoring and 




Although the study achieved its set objectives, those objectives were limited as the 
study could have examined other related issues pertaining to the role of the Audit 
Committee in the contracting process. The impact of the Audit Committee in 
moderating the cost of equity capital could have been examined especially in view of 
the fact that a number of governance codes envisage improved financial reporting 
and auditing as a result of Audit Committee activity. The role of the Audit Committee 
in debt contracting could have been examined extensively.  Using the sum of market 
equity, debt and preferred stock to measure firm size is unusual. It is usual to use the 
natural logarithm of total assets or natural logarithm of turnover in a period. These 
are more stable and reflect the long term performance of the organisation more than 
volatile measures such as equity and debt.  
 
In a related study, Klein (2002) examined whether Audit Committee and board 
characteristics are related to earnings management by the firm using a sample of 
692 publicly traded US firm-years. The main hypothesis was that more independent 
Audit Committees and boards are associated with a lower incidence of earnings 
management which was proxied by abnormal accruals. The study considered three 
definitions of independence. Firstly, independence was interpreted as the 
percentage of outside (non executive) directors on the Audit Committee or on the 
main board. Secondly, a committee was only considered independent if and only if 
all its members are outside non executive directors. Thirdly, a committee was 
considered to be independent if a majority of its members were independent of the 
management. The study found the third definition to be more feasible to 
operationalise.  
 
 The authors would have preferred the second definition, that is, to have 100% non-
executive directors on the Audit Committee. This is the requirement of most 
Corporate Governance guidelines. However, while this may be possible in the case 
of the Audit Committee it is not likely in the case of the main board to be composed 
of only outside directors since there will be a need for inputs from the executive 
directors relating to the strategic and operational functions of the organisation (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983). The study noted that the difference in the definition of 
independence can potentially affect board structure and size. Achieving a 100% 
independent Audit Committee may imply additional costs for the firm in terms of 
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recruitment and associated costs. It is also important to balance the size of the board 
and committee since Yermack (1996) posits that firms with a smaller board size tend 
to attain better performance.  
 
The paper reported the results of both univariate and multivariate models. It found 
that the magnitude of abnormal accruals is more pronounced in firms with Audit 
Committees which did not comprise of a majority of independent directors. It also 
reported a negative relationship between abnormal accruals and the percentage of 
outside non-executive directors. This implies that the higher the percentage of non-
executive directors the lower the level of abnormal accruals. It also showed that firms 
with boards and/or Audit Committees that move from a majority-independent to a 
minority independent structure experience large increases in abnormal accruals in 
the year of the change compared to their counterparts. However, using abnormal 
accruals to capture the effectiveness of the Audit Committees in constraining fraud 
and earnings management remains debatable. This is because there is no single 
acceptable accurate measure of abnormal accruals and this exposes findings from 
this study to measurement bias. This limits its implications and power of 
generalisation in respect of the roles and effectiveness of the Audit Committee. 
Additionally, the study reported its result with a caveat to the effect that the result did 
not measure causality between the variables; rather it only indicates a form of 
relationship.  
 
Cotter et al (2003) examine the relationship between board structure, independence 
and firm value. With Agency Theory as their theoretical framework, they examined 
the impact of other mechanisms used to control agency conflict on full board and 
committee independence (audit and compensation committees) and the association 
between independence and firm value in 109 large Australian companies. They 
documented a strong association between the proportion of independent non-
executive directors on the full board and its audit and compensation committees. 
They observed that both committees tend to have a greater proportion of 
independent directors than the full board. They also found that greater full board 
independence is associated with low management ownership and an absence of 
substantial shareholders. Greater Audit Committee independence is associated with 
reduced monitoring by debt-holders when leverage is low and that the low level of 
[89] 
 
these other monitoring mechanisms seems to be compensated for by a higher level 
of board and Audit Committee independence.   
 
Their study was unable to provide evidence that firm value is enhanced through 
stronger monitoring committees or full board independence. Equally, their result may 
not be generalised for smaller companies and for companies that do not have both 
audit and compensation committees. This is because the study was based on large 
Australian companies. They stated that their poor result may be due to problems with 
cross-sectional tests, but they failed to elaborate on the nature and reasons for the 
problems with cross-sectional tests. Furthermore, associating greater Audit 
Committee independence with reduced monitoring by debt-holders when leverage is 
low is just stating the obvious. The researcher would expect debt-holders to be 
interested in enhanced monitoring if leverage is high since this increases their risk 
exposure and it is against this type of scenario that the study should have measured 
the independence of the Audit Committee rather than when leverage is low and the 
risk and consequences of default are minimal.  
 
In a study analysing the effect of Audit Committee and board of director 
characteristics including  independence on auditor resignation, Lee et al (2004) 
conducted a comparative analysis of 190 auditors‟ resignations with 190 auditor 
dismissals during the period 1996-2000 and found that when Audit Committees and 
boards of directors are independent, auditors are less likely to resign but where they 
did resign, they are more likely to be replaced with an audit firm with a perceived 
higher profile and hence a higher perception of audit quality. They also found that the 
degree of Audit Committee member‟s financial expertise to be negatively related to 
the occurrence of an auditor‟s resignation. A similar result could not, however, be 
found with respect to the main board. These results have important implications for 
the auditor selection process and audit quality. It confirms the expectation that an 
independent Audit Committee reinforces the auditing functions through their inputs in 
the audit planning process with respect to both internal and external audit functions.  
 
Equally it provides an alternative communication route to the auditor which may 
prolong the auditor‟s tenure through governance requirements (Combined Code, 
2003) that the Audit Committee should have closed-door meetings with the auditors. 
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This type of meeting provides additional opportunities to the auditor to discuss 
important issues relating to the auditor‟s function and independence. Further, the 
result of the study fits the context of the Audit Committees enhancing auditing 
quality, for example, by replacing a resigning auditor with an auditor of perceived 
higher quality. The importance of the financial literacy of the Audit Committee 
member was also reinforced by this study. Overall, the study may be seen in the light 
of the enhanced roles of the Audit Committee. For example, in the UK, Audit 
Committees now play more active roles in the auditor selection process, determining 
the scope of the audit and in assessing the independence of the external auditors 
(Combined Code, 2003).  
 
Abbot et al (2003a) examine the impact of some Audit Committee characteristics 
identified by the Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC, 1999) on improving the effectiveness 
of corporate Audit Committees on the likelihood of financial restatement. They 
studied 88 US based companies with restatement of annual results (without 
allegations of fraud) in the period 1991-1999 and a matched pair control group of 
firms of similar size, exchange listing, industry and auditor type with no restatement . 
Using Audit Committee independence and activity to proxy for committee diligence, 
they reported a significant and negative association between Audit Committee 
diligence and the occurrence of restatements. They also documented a significant 
and negative relationship between an Audit Committee that includes at least one 
member with financial expertise and restatement. This suggests that firms that do 
not have financial experts on their Audit Committees are more likely to experience 
the incidence of earnings restatements. The study adopted the BRC definition of 
independence and defined an outside non-executive director as being independent if 
he or she is not a current or past employee of the company and does not have any 
other affiliation with the firm or its management except in the normal discharge of 
their board functions.   
 
Their study may not be generalised due to certain limitations. For example, the 
sample size of 88 firms appears to be too small to allow a meaningful generalisation 
on an important and sensitive issue such as earnings restatement. A study with a 
bigger sample would give more comfort as the consistency and power of the findings 
would be enhanced. Another limitation in this study was the subjectivity involved in 
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the judgement between financial literacy and financial expertise and deciding on their 
suitability. What level of knowledge will qualify for financial literacy and how many 
years and the precise nature of the experience gained by an individual will be 
acceptable in order to meet the code of best practice‟s requirements that at least one 
member of the committee should be financially literate. The study could have used 
the distinction between Accounting Financial Expert (AFE) and Supervisory Financial 
Expert (SFE) (Hoitash et al, 2009). While AFEs have an accounting qualification 
gained through experience (e.g. Chief Financial Officers), SFEs are those individuals 
who have qualifications suggestive of knowledge obtained through supervising 
accounting tasks (e.g. Chief Executive Officers).  
 
Similarly, Abbot et al (2003b) examined the relationship between Audit fees, 
Nonaudit fees and Audit committee characteristics for a sample of US companies. 
Using a sample of 538 companies based on proxy documents submitted to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) between February 5, 2001 and June 
30, 2001, they found that Audit Committees that are more independent and that 
meets at least four times in a year tend to have lower Nonaudit fees ratio to Audit 
fees. They argued that their result supports the move and expectations by the SEC 
in the US regarding the increased oversight functions of the Audit Committees. While 
suggesting a number of areas for future research, they noted that lack of statistical 
significance of some of the agency –costs based variables may be connected to their 
data. They observed that their study used data from periods when SEC required 
registrants to disclose information about fees paid to the auditor for both audit and 
nonaudit services, the result may be different if management have had enough time 
to adjust to the requirement of the new regulations by buying less non- audit services 
from their incumbent auditors.  
 
One study that seems to play down the impact of financial literacy on the perception 
of Audit Committee performance is Raghunandan and Rama (2003). This study 
examined the impact of Audit Committee composition on shareholders‟ action with a 
specific focus on shareholders‟ voting patterns during auditor ratification. It does this 
by examining shareholders‟ voting patterns in ratification of external auditors in 199 
US companies. The authors hypothesised that the proportion of shareholders not 
voting for ratification of the auditor in the presence of high non-audit fee ratios will be 
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lower at companies that have (1) solely independent non-executive directors on the 
Audit Committee and (2) have at least one member with accounting or financial 
expertise on the Audit Committee. These hypotheses were developed following 
suggestions by the SEC that the composition of the Audit Committee can influence 
the monitoring of the auditor-client relationship and hence influence shareholders‟ 
perceptions about auditor independence.  
 
They found that the presence of an Audit Committee with wholly independent non-
executive directors is capable of explaining why shareholders are less likely to vote 
against or abstain from ratification of the auditor even when non-audit fees are 
relatively high. They suggested that Audit Committee composition is associated with 
shareholders‟ perceptions of the independence and performance of the auditor and 
provide a direct test of the association between Audit Committee composition and 
shareholders‟ actions. Their study also suggested that financial expertise does not 
provide a good explanation for shareholders‟ voting actions. The study carried a 
caveat warning that its results should be interpreted with caution due to the very low 
shareholders‟ vote against auditors‟ ratification which was less than 2% in the 
sample studied. These could be because shareholders are not sophisticated enough 
to be interested in such voting, it may simply indicate lack of interest in such issues 
by the shareholders believing that their vote would not count and lastly it may be that 
the shareholders are already convinced that the big auditing firms symbolise quality 
and thus would not be motivated to vote against them 
 
Davidson et al (2004) studied stock market reaction to the announcement of the 
appointment of a director with financial expertise to the Audit Committee. The study 
examined 136 voluntary appointment announcements for the period from 1990-2001 
and found a significant positive relationship between stock price movements and the 
appointment of a director with financial expertise. A number of regression analyses 
were run to test the hypotheses controlling for the state of the Audit Committee 
before the appointment and for alternative definitions of financial expertise. 
 
Davidson et al (2004) concluded that the market rewards firms that appoint financial 
experts to their Audit Committees and their findings are supportive of other studies 
that have documented a negative relationship between  the proportion of „experts‟ on 
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Audit Committees and earnings management  (Abbot et al, 2004; Bedard et al, 
2004). The result from the study raises fundamental questions regarding its internal 
validity. The study proposes measuring the reaction of stock price to the appointment 
of a financially literate non-executive to the Audit Committee but did not indicate how 
it controlled for other noise effects on the stock price. Since it is known that stock 
prices vary due to a variety of noise or news (Verma and Verma, 2006) the increase 
in stock price may not be totally due to the announcement of the appointment of a 
financially literate non-executive director to the Audit Committee; it could just as 
easily be due to other announcements or other positive effects or noises that just 
happened to coincide with such an announcement.   
 
Mangena and Tauringana (2008) this important study examined the relationship 
between Audit Committee characteristics and voluntary external auditor involvement 
in UK interim reporting.  Specifically they used Audit Committee shareholdings, 
expertise and size as the proxy for Audit Committee characteristics, in addition to 
other main board characteristics and control variables such as company size, 
gearing and profitability. They used a logistic regression on data from 259 listed 
companies in the UK and reported an increase in the likelihood of the external 
auditors‟ involvement in the interim report when the Audit Committee has experts 
and less likelihood of external auditors‟ involvement with Audit Committee 
shareholdings. Audit Committee size was not found to be significant in the 
involvement of the external auditors in interim reporting.  
 
3.2 The Audit Committee and Experimental Studies 
Audit Committees are set up to enhance communications between management and 
auditors and to provide further assurance regarding firms‟ internal control procedures 
and especially their roles in respect of financial oversight on management (Nichols 
and Price, 1976; Johnstone et al, 2001). Both roles require that members of the 
committee should be able to make reasoned financial judgements. This is indicative 
of the requirement set out in most Corporate Governance guidelines that at least one 
member of the committee should be financially literate. In order to test the efficacy of 





Knapp (1991) investigates the degree to which three key audit context variables 
(audit firm‟s size class, length of tenure and general audit strategy) affect Audit 
Committee members‟ assessment of audit quality. He used a full-factorial, 2x3x2, 
ANOVA in which a sample of Audit Committee members responded to cases 
describing a problematic audit setting. The result of the study suggested that Audit 
Committee members‟ assessments of audit quality are significantly influenced by 
auditor size and length of auditor tenure. Audit Committee members believe that 
auditors from the (then) Big 8 audit firms are more likely to discover and disclose 
material errors than auditors from non-Big 8 firms. 
 
In addition, Audit Committee members‟ opinions concerning the detection and 
disclosure of material error by auditors are also a function of their exposure to both 
Big-8 and non-Big-8 audit firms. Committee members that have interacted with 
auditors from both classes of audit firm do not think that non-Big-8 auditors will not 
disclose material error detected during the audit. Furthermore, he reported a positive 
relationship between length of tenure of the auditor and audit quality in the early 
years of an auditor-client relationship and an inverse relationship in the subsequent 
years due probably to auditors‟ complacency, familiarity and over reliance on the 
client‟s internal control. Finally, Knapp (1991) did not find that Audit Committee 
members ascribe a higher level of audit effectiveness to a structured audit approach 
compared to an unstructured audit approach. This particular finding may have 
implications for the requirement that members of the Audit Committee should be 
financially literate. Structured audit approaches pre-suppose proper audit planning 
and may be expected to enhance the audit process and, more importantly, should 
contribute to audit quality compared to unstructured audit approaches which are not 
properly planned. 
 
DeZoort and Salterio (2001) study the reaction of 68 representative Canadian Audit 
Committee members to a “form vs. substance” dispute between the auditor and 
corporate management over a material accounting policy choice issue, specifically 
the timing of revenue recognition and associated expenses. They set out to test 
whether there are systematic differences in support for the auditor among committee 
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members with varying degrees of independence and financial knowledge. They 
identified two threats to Audit Committee members‟ independence. Firstly the 
amount of board experience as an independent director. They suggested that a 
positive association is likely to exist between members‟ board experience and 
independence. Thus more board level experienced is crucial for members‟ 
independence. Audit committee members that have serve longer on the board may 
exhibit better and confidence in handling issues related to their functions, compare to 
inexperience independent non-executive directors.  Secondly, whether combining 
roles as a member of the committee and as a member of senior management in the 
same firm could affect members‟ independence. They argued that a negative 
association exists between role combination and independence of a committee 
member. Finally they tested the financial-reporting and audit-reporting knowledge of 
committee members through an accounting policy dispute task, knowledge and 
ability test and an experience questionnaire. 
 
They created the experimental task with the assistance of four audit partners from 
the (then) Big 6 firms, a Big 6 national office accounting consultation partner, a 
corporate director with significant Audit Committee experience and four accounting 
professors. The task was also pre-tested on 12 MBA students with significant work 
experience. They reported that more independent board membership experience 
and higher audit-reporting knowledge is associated with greater support for the 
auditor in the dispute with client management.  
 
Furthermore, they found that concurrent board and management membership is 
associated with higher levels of support for management in the dispute scenario. 
They reported no relationship between financial-reporting knowledge and Audit 
Committee members‟ judgement. Their study re-echoed the call for a committee that 
comprises wholly of independent members and also decried directors‟ duality. A 
committee that comprises mainly of independent non-executive directors has the 
potential to protect the interests of the shareholders and act independently of the 
management and question their decisions and strategies in a constructive manner 
compared to an Audit Committee on which the management is represented. This 
restrains the independence of the committee and compromises their effectiveness.  
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BuPoew Ng and Tan (2003) conducted an experimental study that investigated the 
effect of two contextual features – (1) „availability of authoritative guidance and (2) 
the effectiveness of the client‟s Audit Committee – on auditors‟ perceived outcome of 
auditor–client negotiations concerning an audit adjustment that affects the client‟s 
ability to meet analysts‟ forecasts‟. The study involved 113 audit managers from a 
Big 4 audit firm and these auditors were required to provide a judgement relating to a 
proposed audit adjustment that is quantitatively immaterial but that will affect the 
client‟s ability to meet or beat analysts‟ consensus forecast. They manipulated the 
availability of precise authoritative guidance and Audit Committee effectiveness 
between subject variables allowing them to gain further insight into issues relating to 
audit adjustment and Audit Committee communication. They also used „an audit 
adjustment context that relates to the potentially inappropriate choice of revenue-
recognition method that has prompted the release of authoritative guidance on 
revenue recognition using a 2x2  between subject factorial design with Guidance 
Availability (absent, present) and Audit Committee Effectiveness (low, high) as the 
independent variable‟. 
 
They found that the availability of authoritative guidance has a greater effect on 
auditors‟ perceived negotiation outcome when the client‟s Audit Committee is 
ineffective rather than when it is effective. They also found that Audit Committee 
effectiveness has a greater effect on auditor‟s perceived negotiation outcome in the 
absence of authoritative guidance than in its presence. This suggests that 
authoritative guidance and effective Audit Committees are potential 
substitutes/compensating mechanisms for enhancing auditors‟ effectiveness and 
financial reporting quality. Furthermore, their study suggested that Corporate 
Governance mechanisms such as effective Audit Committees may prevent the 
potentially adverse effect of imprecise accounting rules by bolstering auditors‟ 
position during negotiations with clients and provide support for continuing efforts to 
enhance the effectiveness of the Audit Committee. The study also has implications 
for financial expertise on the board and showed that Audit Committee effectiveness 
makes up for inadequacies in authoritative guidance thereby providing a buffer for 




Although the study was meant to be an experimental study in actual fact it was not. 
The laboratory setting was lost because the study was eventually conducted online. 
The choice of the participants is also a likely deficiency in the study. The use of audit 
managers rather than audit partners who are actually more involved in negotiations 
with clients leaves the results from this study unclear. All the participants from the 
study were from just one audit firm and the result may have been different if the 
participants had cut across auditing firms.  
 
Dezoort et al (2003) examine how accounting and auditing issue characteristics 
affect Audit Committee members‟ judgements in an auditor-management 
disagreement. Two characteristics – (1) materiality justification (“a quantitative 
justification that only addresses the magnitude of the item versus a qualitative 
consequences-oriented justification that highlights the interruption of the company‟s 
earnings trend if the adjustment is recorded”) and (2) precision of accounting issues 
(subject to precise measurement or imprecise estimate) – were tested. 
 
The study was set up using Audit Committee members in public companies. Due to 
difficulties in gaining responses from Audit Committee members in very large 
companies, DeZoort et al (2003) used Audit Committees in small and medium sized 
companies. Information about Audit Committee members was gathered from The 
KPMG Audit Committee Institute (ACI) and after adjusting for 38 undeliverable and 
34 respondents who failed a manipulation test they were left with 55 usable 
responses from a sample of 362. Dezoort et al (2003) tested the hypotheses using a 
2x2 between subject design where materiality justification and accounting precision 
were the experimental variables and Audit Committee members and auditors were 
the control variables. Respondents were asked to complete a case study focusing on 
whether a company should record an adjustment to „write-off‟ a customer‟s accounts 
receivables balance. Participants were requested to indicate whether they supported 
the auditor‟s view (proposed adjustment should be recorded) or the management 
view (proposed adjustments should not be recorded) 
 
They found that auditors enjoyed more support from the Audit Committee members if 
their materiality justification included both qualitative and consequences-oriented 
factors and when the accounting issue was subject to precise measurements. They 
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also documented a relationship between Audit Committee members‟ experience and 
professional qualification and support for auditors in an auditor-management dispute. 
Specifically, more experienced Audit Committee members were more likely to 
support the auditor and CPAs among Audit Committee members were also shown to 
be more supportive of auditors in such dispute.   
 
The study has important implications for improved communications between the 
auditor and Audit Committee members. It underscores the importance of experience 
and expertise as invaluable characteristics for Audit Committee members. The 
limitation of the study lies in its choice of small and medium sized companies. The 
reality is that medium and small sized companies are not statutorily required to form 
an Audit Committee and they could also seek exemption from audit. This is not the 
case with bigger companies and therefore the choice of small and medium sized 
companies limits the practical usefulness of this study. Furthermore the study 
examined the behaviour of individual committee members, but the reality is that the 
committee acts and sees itself as a group and the result may have been totally 
different had a group setting been used such as a focus group approach. 
Song and Windram (2004) reported their findings on the current level of activity 
within major UK Corporations in respect of Audit Committees.  Their study provided 
further insights into the roles, responsibilities and characteristics of non-executive 
directors and the operations of UK Audit Committees. Their postal survey of 
Financial Times 500 companies focused mainly on the Audit Committee chairmen. 
With a 40% response rate they found that there is a significant shift in Audit 
Committee function from the traditional financial reporting role to a greater focus on 
internal control and risk management. They also found that independence is seen as 
a very crucial feature of Audit Committee members. Lack of time, pressure from 
executive directors and an unclear remit are documented as major impediments to 
the effectiveness of the Audit Committee.   On the other hand they observed a 
positive relationship between meeting frequency and number of non- executives on 
the board.  
 
3.3 The Audit Committee and Earnings Management   
A number of studies have examined the impact of the Audit Committee on 
constraining earnings management.  
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Xie et al (2003) examined the role of the board and especially the Audit Committee 
in constraining earnings management. Their objective was to find out if there are 
relationships between board composition and characteristics and the extent of 
earnings management in organisations. Specifically, they wanted to know if 
members‟ financial sophistication or background and frequency of board meetings 
could explain smaller discretionary current accruals. Current accruals were defined 
as the change in non-cash current assets less the change in operating current 
liabilities. Since accruals can either be discretionary or non-discretionary, they had to 
deconstruct total accruals. This was done using the methods adopted by Teoh et al 
(1998a) and Jones (1991). In line with Teoh et al (1998a), they deflated the variables 
in the model by the book value of total assets from the prior year due to 
heteroskedasticity in the error terms. 110 firms from the S&P 500 index as listed in 
the June Standard and Poor‟s directory for 1992, 1993 and 1994 generated 330 
observations out of which 48 firms either had insufficient or missing information 
leaving 282 firm-year observations. Data on board composition and structure for 
these companies was gathered from the proxy statements nearest to but preceding 
the date of announcement of annual earnings in each year. 
 
Xie et al (2003) ran a univariate ordinary least squares regression with discretionary 
current accruals as the dependent variable and overall company and total board 
characteristics variables as the independent variables. At 10% significance levels, 
they found an inverse relationship between meeting frequency and discretionary 
accruals.  They also documented a negative relationship between the percentage of 
independent outside directors and discretionary current accruals. The coefficient for 
the proportion of outside directors with a corporate background in relation to the total 
board was found to be negative and significant at a 0.05 (5 percent) level. Their 
study has implications for the proposal that boards should have members that are 
financially literate and have sufficient experience at board level in order to constrain 
creative accounting and earnings management. Board that have more experienced 
and financially literate members are more likely to identify transactions or accounting 
treatment that has to do with creative accounting or/and earnings management.  
 
Bedard et al (2004) examined the effect of Audit Committee expertise, independence 
and activity on aggressive earnings management measured by the level of income 
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increasing and income decreasing abnormal accruals. They used two groups of US 
firms, one with relatively high and one with relatively low levels of abnormal accruals. 
They reported that the presence of at least one Audit Committee member with 
financial expertise and the level of governance expertise on the committee generally 
are associated with a lower likelihood of aggressive earnings management. Their 
results also suggest that share option schemes for non-executive directors 
compromise their independence since such stock options can be exercised in the 
short term and option schemes are positively associated with the likelihood of 
aggressive earnings management. Audit Committee expertise, firm size and 
frequency of committee meetings were not related to the likelihood of abnormal 
accruals. The major deficiency in this study is the likely measurement errors in the 
estimation of the abnormal accruals.  
 
Peasenell et al (2005) as part of a study examining the relationship between 
earnings management in UK firms and board monitoring reported an absence of 
evidence to support the assertion that the presence of an Audit Committee directly 
affects the extent of income-increasing adjustments to meet or exceed a threshold. 
They also found that Audit Committees do not impact directly on the degree of 
downward adjustments when pre-managed earnings exceed thresholds by a large 
margin.  
 
Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) examined the association between board and Audit 
Committee characteristics and management earnings forecasts (their occurrence, 
precision and accuracy) for 1995 Fortune 500 listed companies. Using Audit 
Committee independence, meeting frequency and expertise as characteristics of the 
Audit Committee, they found that firms with more effective Audit Committees 
(effectiveness was operationalised using BRC suggested criteria) make or update an 
earnings forecast and that, while their forecast is less likely to be precise, it tends to 
be more accurate and receives a more favourable market response than companies 
with ineffective Audit Committees. They pointed out that less precision in forecasts 
from well governed firms is only with respect to bad news, noting that such practice 
is compatible with minimising chances of disclosing misleading information to the 




Yang and Krishnan (2005) studied the relationship between seven Audit Committee 
characteristics and quarterly earnings management. They argued that effective Audit 
Committees should not just focus on annual earnings management but rather such 
committees should also constrain earnings management contained in quarterly 
reports. Their study used a sample of 250 publicly traded companies for the period 
from 1996-2000 drawn from 10,386 US firms listed on the 1997 COMPUSTAT 
database. Audit Committee characteristics used include committee independence, 
expertise, meeting frequency, shareholding, number of outside directorships, 
experience and number of independent non-executive directors. They found that 
quarterly earnings management is lower for firms with more financial experts on the 
Audit Committee; a positive relationship was documented between likelihood of 
earnings management and Audit Committee members‟ share ownership. In other 
words, the more shares owned by Audit Committee members, the higher the 
likelihood of occurrence of quarterly earnings management and, lastly, more 
experienced Audit Committee members constrain quarterly earnings management. 
As with most earnings management studies, measurement bias and lack of causality 
are the major drawbacks of this study.  
 
3.4 Audit Committee Process 
Studies have also examined the Audit Committee working process. The 
communication and relationship between the members of the committee on the one 
hand and between the committee and other organs of the organisation on the other 
are important in assessing its effectiveness. It has been shown (section 3.3) that the 
Audit Committee now has enlarged responsibilities in the wake of the corporate 
collapses that have occurred and the need to restore confidence in the market by 
signalling transparency in reporting and audit quality. Committee responsibilities now 
extend far beyond the traditional financial and auditing oversight to include internal 
auditing, risk management and „relational‟ management at least between the 
external auditor and management. These duties require the right type of skills and 
expertise to discharge them effectively. The importance of inter-personal skills 
cannot be overemphasised especially when working as a small group such as the 




DeZoort (1997) studied Audit Committee oversight responsibilities from the actors‟ 
reflective perspectives of their expected roles and duties. Five hundred Audit 
Committee members selected from a random sample of 134 US companies 
participated in the study. The study has relevance against the backdrop of the 
increasing concern that Audit Committee members do not seem to appreciate the 
extent, nature and scope of their roles as corporate monitors charged with oversight 
functions on accounting, auditing and Corporate Governance in general (Wolnizer, 
1995). DeZoort‟s study built on the work of Wolnizer (1995) and explores Audit 
Committee members‟ appreciation of their oversight responsibilities. The study used 
qualitative research methods which involved two elements namely descriptive and 
exploratory components. The descriptive component provided insight into Audit 
Committee members‟ prowess in recognising their assigned committee 
responsibilities; their thoughts about having sufficient expertise and experience in 
providing oversight in accounting and auditing, self assessment of expertise in 
oversight areas and their attitudes towards expanding the scope of their 
responsibilities.  
 
DeZoort (1997) employed two methods to gather exploratory information for the 
study. Firstly, open-ended questions were used to gather information about the Audit 
Committee‟s tasks and the issues facing them. Secondly, members were asked to 
rank their committee‟s five most important objectives in line with Wolnizer‟s (1995) 
list from the most important to the least important.   
 
The study found that Audit Committee members surveyed were generally unable to 
recognise their assigned responsibilities as contained in the proxy statements with 
the exception of their roles relating to the review of internal audit and review of 
internal and external auditors‟ work.   
 
The study reiterated the importance of clearer definitions of the roles and 
responsibilities of the Audit Committee and the need to ensure that they are actually 
discharging these responsibilities. This will involve members being aware of their 
duties in the first instance. This study re-echoed the caution raised on the ability of 
the committee to perform the „mega‟ duties now being expected of it. It has to be 
observed that this study was conducted before the ENRON and other recent 
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collapses and that the requirements in terms of the composition and duties of the 
Audit Committee have changed. Audit Committee members are now expected to be 
financially literate and the scope and nature of disclosure required has increased 
significantly. However, the positive impact of these changes has not yet been 
investigated especially in the wake of the recent corporate collapses and the 
subprime market crises.  
 
Raghunandan et al (1998) examined the association between Audit Committee 
composition and their interaction with internal audit. This interaction is measured in 
terms of the involvement of the Audit Committee in decisions to dismiss the chief 
internal auditor, meetings between the Audit Committee and the chief internal 
auditor, Audit Committee review of the internal auditing program and the results of 
internal auditing in 398 Canadian manufacturing companies with turnover in excess 
of $50 million Canadian dollars. The study used questionnaires mailed to the chief 
internal auditors of these companies after stratifying them into large and small 
companies. They reported that the Audit Committee was involved in the dismissal of 
the chief internal auditor in only 48% of the cases studied, while only 59% of Audit 
Committees met three or more times with the chief internal auditor during the 
financial year, 79% of Audit Committees studied granted private access to the chief 
internal auditor and 69% of the Audit Committees studied reviewed both the internal 
audit program and the results of internal audit.  
 
This study is limited by the fact that it assumes a narrow purview of the internal 
auditing roles of the Audit Committee when their roles now involve more corporate 
risk assessment. Furthermore, it is possible that the internal audit function may be 
influenced by other factors not accounted for in this study such as the chief internal 
auditor‟s personality, qualifications and experience, all of which will impact on the 
interaction between the Audit Committee and the chief internal auditor. But the study 
definitely showed the changing nature of the committee‟s tasks and re-echoed the 
call for members to be more appreciative of their roles (Song and Windram, 2004). 
This was also well articulated by Spira (2003) who questioned the potency of the 
Audit Committee against the backdrop of the complexity and vagueness that 
characterise their operations. She observed that Audit Committee members need to 
be able to ask relevant, tough questions and demand appropriate answers. She also 
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observed that this requires a reasonable amount of skill so that the committee does 
not become bogged down in the rituals of corporate cultures and logistics.  
 
3.5 Audit Committee Effectiveness 
A very important dimension to the study of Audit Committees is investigating their 
effectiveness. Since the formation or mere presence of an Audit Committee may not 
be equal to its effective discharge of its oversight duties (Sommer, 1991), especially 
when studies have documented Audit Committee formation for reasons such as 
compliance, appearance and signalling best practice rather than for their intrinsic 
benefit (Menon and Williams, 1994; Collier, 1996; Kalbers and Fogarty, 1996). 
Similarly some researchers have questioned the relevance of the Audit Committee 
as part of the panacea for corporate debacles (Birkett, 1986; Vershoor, 1990; 
McMullen, 1996; Spira, 2003).  
 
However, considering the growth in formations of Audit Committees and the 
important recognition it has enjoyed in national and international Corporate 
Governance regulations and debates, most commentators suggest that the Audit 
Committee is better placed to provide important oversight functions on the 
management. This is expected to enhance the auditor‟s independence through 
improved communication, contributing to audit quality, transparent reporting and 
corporate risk management (BRC 1999; Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002; Combined 
Code, 2003). It is therefore surprising to observe the low number of studies in this 
important area of Audit Committee activity. This situation has been noted in studies 
including Kalbers and Fogarty (1993), McMullen (1996), Scarborough et al (1998) 
and Spira (2003).  
 
A number of reasons may be responsible for this including, for instance, how to 
operationalise or measure effectiveness against the backdrop of the very many 
meanings construed for the word in different fields. It is also important to be able to 
differentiate effectiveness of a process from its outcome. Equally, distinctions exist 
between effectiveness and factors associated with effectiveness (Cameron, 1986). 
Unfortunately, previous studies have been unable to operationalise the term in such 
a way as to totally capture a comprehensive meaning for the term. This difficulty has 
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been observed in previous studies (Cameron, 1986; Collier and Gregory, 1996; 
Spira, 2002). 
 
The earliest documented research into Audit Committee effectiveness was a study 
by Mauz and Neumann (1977). They set out to answer the following questions. Why 
do some businessmen find corporate Audit Committees highly useful while others 
find little good to report about their own experience of them? What is there about the 
committee that causes such strong differences of opinion? What are the major 
characteristics and patterns of operation of Audit Committees? What are their 
leading advantages and disadvantages from the standpoint of directors, operating 
executives and independent CPAs? Does experience show that an Audit Committee 
can make a valuable contribution to management and, if so, under what conditions?  
 
This extensive study used both qualitative and quantitative research methods. Over 
4,000 questionnaires were mailed to survey targets supplemented by 42 interviews. 
They concluded that the corporate Audit Committee can make a substantial 
contribution to Corporate Governance but it will do so only when it is properly 
constituted and competently staffed and when it exists within a corporate 
environment that encourages, rather than discourages, its activities. But, despite the 
extent and the ambition of this study it was flawed in its approach and methodology. 
The study failed to operationalise effectiveness in the light of the Audit Committee 
but rather suggested a general definition of effectiveness as it relates to Audit 
Committees. Furthermore, the study also failed to test any hypothesis and this failing 
seriously limits its usefulness and contribution to knowledge about Audit Committee 
effectiveness. Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) have observed this particular weakness in 
a number of other studies on Audit Committee effectiveness.  
 
Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) extended Mauz and Neuman‟s (1977) work by 
investigating the relationship between Audit Committee effectiveness and its power. 
Effectiveness was construed against the performance of Audit Committees‟ functions 
of financial reporting, external auditor liaison and internal control oversight. The 
study explored the definitions of power using French and Raven‟s (1959) suggested 
definitions with some modifications. According to French and Raven‟s (1959) 
typology of power, there are five power types viz: reward, coercive, legitimate, expert 
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and referent power with a later addition of information power (Raven, 1974). All six 
power types apply to the Audit Committee. The Audit Committee has legitimate 
power because it is the product of delegated authority through the Board of Directors 
from the shareholders and public expectations as well as through corporate codes of 
best practice. They have the power of reward through their activity and 
recommendations, some of the beneficiaries of their power of reward may include 
the external auditor, internal auditor and other corporate officers. They have 
informational power. This is because in order to discharge their functions Audit 
Committee members need to have access to confidential and top level information 
about the organisation such as the corporate strategy, information on financial 
performance before it becomes public knowledge etc. which may have 
consequences for many key players in the corporate environment. Audit Committees 
have expert power, because they are composed of highly skilled personnel whose 
knowledge and expertise can impact significantly on the strategic direction of the 
organisation and, lastly, Audit Committees are thought to have referent powers due 
to the fact that individuals on the committee may have strong personalities that can 
influence others and make a difference within the group.  
 
Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) used the Linear Structural Relation Model to test 
predicted behaviour between Audit Committee effectiveness and power. They 
concluded that the relationships between the power dimension and the effectiveness 
dimension are complex. Formal, written authority coupled with observable support 
from top management play the most important roles in Audit Committee power and 
its effectiveness. With regard to power sources, this was found to be dependent on 
the personal attributes of Audit Committee members and the will to act (diligence) 
which constitutes the most significant power source affecting effectiveness. 
Examining Audit Committee effectiveness from the view point of their power in the 
organisation was indeed a novel idea limited only to the extent that it may not be 
generalised to all Audit Committees especially since there may be sampling 
problems and the use of LISREL is relatively unpopular in the literature, although not 
necessarily because it is ineffective.  
 
Collier and Gregory (1996) was a study of Audit Committee effectiveness. 
Effectiveness was construed from the functional forms i.e. audit quality and internal 
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control. They hypothesized that the roles of the Audit Committee in audit quality and 
sound internal control are capable of exerting a two-way pressure on audit fees. 
They showed that an Audit Committee is effective in improving audit quality as 
measured by the size-related audit fee and in improving internal control as measured 
by the risk and complexity related audit fee. They control for other variables that may 
affect audit fees.  
 
Their sample was drawn from the FTSE 500 with variables included for the presence 
or absence of an Audit Committee. They also developed a model to test whether 
there is a difference in the size of the audit fee between companies with or without 
an Audit Committee. Their study documented a positive relationship between the 
size-related audit fee and the presence of an Audit Committee but the relationship 
between risk and complexity related audit fee and the presence or absence of an 
Audit Committee was ambiguous and inconclusive. They concluded that the Audit 
Committee is effective in its role of overseeing the external audit and ensuring that 
the scope of the audit is adequate but that there is no conclusive evidence to 
suggest that it is effective in engendering a stronger internal control environment that 
is reflected in reduced audit fees. 
 
Beasley (1996) conducted an empirical analysis of the relationship between board 
composition and financial statement fraud. Specifically the study tested the 
proposition that increased outside non executive director ownership coupled with 
greater representation of outside non executive directors on the board constrained 
the occurrence of fraud. However, the presence of the Audit Committee was found to 
be inconsequential in constraining financial fraud in organisations. The study brought 
a new twist to the debate on the effectiveness of the Audit Committee by suggesting 
that the whole board rather than just the Audit Committee has the potential to 
constrain fraud and material misstatements. This finding conflicts with results from 
Bedard et al (2004) and Xie et al (2003). 
 
Samples for “fraud firm” were drawn from two main sources. First, the Accounting 
and Auditing Enforcement Release issued by the SEC and the Wall Street Journal 
Index caption of “crime – white collar crime” for the years between 1980 and 1991. 
This population provided 75 usable sets of data for fraud firms. This was matched 
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with data from no fraud firms. Matching was performed in terms of characteristics 
such as size, industry, national stock exchange and time periods to allow 
comparisons between “fraud and no fraud” firms to be made. 
 
The research design involved the use of logit cross-sectional regression analysis. 
This was justified on the basis that the dependent variable is dichotomous and also 
because bias in the constant terms will not adversely affect the analyses and 
findings of the study especially when it is not meant to be a predictive model of fraud.  
A dummy variable was included in the logit regression to control for the presence of 
an Audit Committee and a further interactive variable was added to account for the 
bias that the inclusion of outside non executive directors on the Audit Committee can 
have on board composition.  
 
Beasley (1996) concluded that the presence of the Audit Committee has no 
significant effect on the likelihood of financial statement fraud and that the interaction 
of the Audit Committee with board composition does not impact on the likelihood of 
financial statement fraud. Furthermore, Beasley (1996) suggested that the board 
composition rather than the Audit Committee is more likely to constrain fraud in 
organisations, this finding being similar to that of Peasnell et al (2004) who found 
that the board rather than the Audit Committee are effective in constraining abnormal 
earnings.  
 
Collier and Gregory (1999) examined the relationship between Audit Committee 
activity and agency costs. Their research was a follow on from Collier (1993) and 
attempted to replicate Menon and Williams (1994), a US study, in the UK. On this 
basis they tested similar hypotheses as in Menon and Williams (1994) and explained 
to what extent Audit Committees‟ activities are influenced by agency variables such 
as leverage and firm size as well as other variables such as directors‟ shareholdings, 
proportion of outsiders‟ holdings and their representation on the board, the degree of 
dominance of the chief executive (i.e. whether the roles of the chief executive and 





Their study was mainly quantitative with eight hypotheses tested using a sample of 
major UK companies listed on the London Stock Exchange. Their original sample 
consisted of the top 250 of the Times 1000 for 1989-1990. They eliminated 
companies which were not UK based and not listed on the London Stock Exchange 
and, of the remaining 167 companies; they received 142 usable replies giving a 
response rate of 85%. Out of the usable 142 replies, 89 companies had an Audit 
Committee but one of them did not have the required accounting information, thus 
leaving a sample of 88 companies. Ordinary Least Squares, Poisson Regression 
and Heckman (1979) two-stage procedures were quantitatively used in the research. 
Collier and Gregory (1999) found a positive relationship between high quality 
auditors (now Big 4), leverage and Audit Committee activity. Audit Committee activity 
was found to be inversely related to director duality and the presence of a dominant 
chief executive. Audit Committee activities were reduced in companies where the 
position of the chief executive and chairman of the board are combined and firms 
with dominant chief executives constrained Audit Committee activity.  
 
Song and Windram (2005) conducted a UK study on Audit Committee effectiveness. 
It examined the effectiveness of UK Audit Committees in their financial reporting 
oversight functions. Comparing 27 companies that have been subjected to a 
Financial Reporting Review Panel Investigation with a control sample that have not 
over the period 1991-2000, Song and Windram (2005) used a binary logit regression 
model analysis similar to Archambeault and DeZoort (2001) and found that 
independence rather than size of the board enhances Audit Committee 
independence in their financial reporting oversight functions. Directors‟ share 
ownership and multiple directorships were found to undermine Audit Committee 
effectiveness. Although weakly associated, they found that director financial literacy 
and frequency of Audit Committee meetings contribute to Audit Committee 
effectiveness.  
 
They defended the choice of their small sample size by citing evidence from Mehran 
et al (1998), Maddala (1991) and Stone and Rasp (1991) and suggesting that the 
sample size is limited by the information provided by the FRRP on companies that 
have violated reporting practices. Although the study acknowledged that the period 
under review coincides with the production of a number of Corporate Governance 
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guidelines, the impact of these was not taken into consideration in the design of the 
study.  
 
Gendron and Bedard (2006), like Spira (2002), used qualitative research methods to 
study Audit Committee activity. Their aim was to find out how participants in Audit 
Committees in three Canadian listed companies gave meaning to their performance, 
how they internally developed and sustained a sense of effectiveness in their 
activities as members of a small group. They used a social constructivist approach to 
achieve this objective and concluded that attendees‟ reflective acts upon processes 
and activities surrounding Audit Committee meetings play a key role in configuring 
meanings of effectiveness.   
 
The limitation of this study in the context of this review is its stated objectives. 
Gendron and Bedard (2006) pointed out that they were not interested in “trying to 
objectively” assess whether the Audit Committees under study were indeed effective 
or in identifying factors that are positively linked to effectiveness”. Instead they 
wanted to understand better the process by which meanings of effectiveness are 
internally developed and sustained within the small group of people who attended 
the Audit Committee meeting.  
 
Turley and Zaman (2007) studied Audit Committee effectiveness from the 
perspectives of formal and informal processes, and power interplays within an 
organisational and Institutional context. This study is novel in its approach and 
contributions. It used a case study of a UK public company to study the role of 
informal process and impact of power in enhancing Corporate Governance 
outcomes. It showed that Audit Committee activity and effectiveness need to be 
understood beyond the constructs of the quantitative measures, which often neglect 
the potency of the informal interaction within organisation.  These informal 
interactions (informal communication outside the organisational dictates) among key 
actors (including Audit Committee chair, financial reporting and internal audit 
functionaries, and the external auditor) in the corporate environments were found to 
enhance Corporate Governance outcomes more than formal processes (i.e. as 
required by the governance codes in terms of disclosures and compliance with the 




Three sources were identified for data collection. They conducted semi-structured 
interviews with relevant personnel affected by Audit Committee activities (such as 
the main  board members, external auditors, internal audit and financial reporting  
functionaries within the organisation), internal documents, and publicly available 
information of the company were also used as sources of data for their analysis. In 
terms of the formal process, they found that the Audit Committee in their case study 
had limited impact on matters of internal audit and control, financial reporting, and 
external audit. The Audit Committee was not proactive, and was very much a 
receiving and responding body.  
 
Three episodes were narrated to show the impacts of the Audit Committee and how 
it influence Corporate Governance outcomes through the informal processes. The 
first relates to contest over the allocation resources within the organisation, the 
second episode had to do with the discovery by the internal audit  of reporting 
irregularities in the reports prepared by the Group Finance and lastly, a discovery by 
the internal audit of the misappropriation of the company assets by the a senior 
executive. Key participants involved in these episodes explored the informal 
communication channel through the Audit Committee to resolve these issues.  
Overall, Turley and Zaman (2007) suggested that the informal interaction and 
communication are important elements in the jig saw towards understanding Audit 
Committee effectiveness. They suggested that the Audit Committee can be used as 
a threat, ally and an arbiter in resolving conflicts within an organisation.  
 
Although this study is novel in its approach and in highlighting the importance of 
informal processes and communication, as well as the role of power in enhancing 
governance outcomes in an organisation, it is important to have a number of follow 
up studies with more cases. This will enable a comparison of outcomes thereby 
influencing policy directions and improve our understanding of the factors that affect 
Audit Committee operations and outcomes as an important Corporate Governance 
mechanism. It may be difficult to appreciate fully, the role of formal, informal and 
power in enhancing Corporate Governance outcomes on the basis of a single case 




Effectiveness is a vague and difficult term to operationalise in both qualitative and 
quantitative research. Studies that have purported to study AC effectiveness have 
ended up studying factors that contribute to the effectiveness or performance of 
Audit Committees with respect to a particular function such as reporting quality. The 
construction of effectiveness has also been attempted qualitatively in terms of how 
members of the committee make meaning of their effectiveness with little success. 
This is not unconnected with the sensitivity involved in the issues addressed by the 
Audit Committee and therefore the reluctance of members of the committee to grant 
access for the purpose of qualitative research. The best that has been done remains 
a measure of factors that may account for effectiveness or at best a partial measure 
of effectiveness in the context of a particular function. It seems the practical first step 
to disentangle a measure of effectiveness and particularly the effectiveness of the 
Audit Committee is to determine what factors actually affect its effectiveness. This 
can be best achieved through qualitative research approach but which is nearly 
impossible to operationalise due to access and sensitivity concerns rightly or wrongly 
attached to the issue.  
 
Table 3:  Some Key Results from Prior Studies on Determinants of Audit 
Committee Activity   
Author (s) Focus   Hypothesised 
relationships 









AC effectiveness is 
related to 6 power 
constructs. AC 
functions such as 
financial reporting, 
external auditing 
and internal auditing 
functions are distinct 
dimensions of AC 
effectiveness. Each 




Found that the relationship 
between power dimension 
and effectiveness 
dimensions are complex. 
Formal, written authority and 
observable supports from 
top management play the 
most important roles in AC 




each category of AC 
effectiveness. 
Organisational type 
of power are less 
directly related to 










construed from the 
functional forms e.g. 
audit quality and 
internal control. 
Relationship 
between firm size 
related audit fees 
and presence or 
absence of AC, 
relationship 
between complexity 
related audit fees 
and presence or 
absence of AC and 
relationship 
between risk related 
audit fees and AC 
Multivariate analysis: 
Positive relationship 
between size related audit 
fees and AC. But 
relationship between 
complexity and risk related 
audit fees and AC are 
ambiguous and 






agency costs  
Relationship 
between AC activity 
and agency costs 
variables such as 
leverage, firm size, 
ownership, degree 
Multivariate analysis, 
Poisson regression, and 
Heckman model:  
Found positive relationship 
between high quality 




dominance  and 
shareholders 
diversity  
activity. Ac activity is 
inversely related to directors 
duality and presence of 

















ownership and firm 
leverage  
Multivariate analyses: 
AC independence is 
negatively related to firm‟s 
growth potential and 
management share 
ownership but positively 
related to firm size and 
leverage  





Independent AC is 
associated with 




accruals.   
 Multivariate analysis: 
Earnings management is 
negatively related to AC 
independence 
Abbot et al. 
(2003a)  









proxy for its 
diligence, examined 





Match sample and 
Regression analyses: 
Significant negative 
relationship between AC 
with experts and incidence 
of financial restatements 
also negative relationship 
between meeting frequency 
and financial restatements  





and audit and 
non-audit fees  
Do AC 
characteristics‟ 
impact on fees paid 
to the Auditors?  
Multivariate analysis: 
AC that are more 
independent and diligence 
tend to have lower non-audit 















 Case Study: 
Found that informal 
processes and structures 
enhance the Corporate 
Governance outcomes more 
than the formal process and 
structures. Also that AC 
undertakes important power 
functions within the 
organisational and 
institutional contexts in 












effects of AC 
shareholding, 
expertise and size 
on external auditors 
involvements in 
interim reporting  
Logistic regression:  
Positive relationship 
between the likelihood of 
external auditor involvement 
in interim reporting and AC 
expertise, negative 
relationship between the 
likelihood of external auditor 
involvement in interim 















3.6 Auditor Independence 
 
Figure 6: Key Literatures on Auditor Independence 
 
Auditor independence is a topic of important concern to many stakeholders in the 
corporate environment. Auditors have a statutory duty to report on the truth and 
fairness of the stewardship report prepared by the management to the owners of the 
business. Further, stakeholders such as investors, financial institutions (including 
money and capital markets), governments and employees are often guided in many 
ways by the reports provided by the management in respect of the firm‟s financial 
position as certified by the auditor (Turner, 2001). Auditor independence is 
fundamental to public confidence in the reporting and auditing process as well as the 
reliability of the auditors‟ report. Audit reports add value to the financial statements 
provided by the management to shareholders since they provide independent 
[117] 
 
verification of what has been reported (Johnstone et al, 2001) but they also reduce 
the cost of informational exchange for both sides (Dopuch and Simunic, 1980) and 
also benefit the management in providing a signalling mechanism to the market that 
the information so provided is reliable.  
 
However, recent corporate fiascos, including those of early 2001-2003 and the 
recent crises triggered by the subprime market in the US, have heightened worries 
about threats to auditor independence and how best to safeguard it. It is difficult to 
give a definition of auditor independence that is generally accepted and all 
encompassing (Gray and Manson, 2005); however two suggested definitions are 
now presented.  
 
Auditor Independence (AI) has been defined as the conditional probability of 
reporting a discovered breach (De Angelo (1981). The International Federation of 
Accountants (IFAC) differentiates between independence of mind and independence 
in appearance. It defines independence of mind as the state of mind that permits the 
provision of an opinion without being affected by influences that compromise 
professional judgement allowing an individual to act with integrity, exercise objectivity 
and professional scepticism. Independence in appearance is defined by IFAC as „the 
avoidance of facts and circumstances that are so significant that a reasonable and 
informed third party, having knowledge of all relevant information would reasonably 
conclude that a firm‟s or a member of the assurance team‟s integrity, objectivity or 
professional scepticism had been compromised‟ (IFAC 2001). Knapp (1985) 
suggested that auditor independence is the ability to withstand client pressure while 
Magill and Previtts (1991) concluded that independence is a function of character 
with integrity and trustworthiness being the key.  
 
Furthermore, the Independence Standard Board (2000) defines auditor 
independence as the freedom from those pressures and other factors that 
compromise, or can reasonably be expected to compromise, an auditor‟s ability to 
make unbiased decisions. Carey and Doherty (1966) interpreted auditor 
independence in three ways: firstly in the sense of not being subordinate, secondly in 
the sense of avoidance of any situation which may even subconsciously impair the 
auditors‟ objectivity and lastly in the sense of avoidance of any relationship which to 
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a reasonable observer may suggest a conflict of interest. Other words that have 
been used to describe auditor independence include „completely objective‟, 
„unprejudiced by previous involvement in the subject of audit‟, „uncompromised by 
vested interest in the outcome or its consequences‟ and „unbiased and uninfluenced 
by considerations extraneous to the matter at issue‟ (Flint 1988). 
 
Mautz and Sharaf (1961) distinguished between practitioner independence and 
professional independence. Practitioner independence refers to a state of mind and 
deals with issues that may affect or influence auditors‟ disinterestedness. They 
observed that practitioner independence may be evident in three major ways, 
namely: programming (where auditors have freedom to develop their own audit 
programme without undue influence from the client), investigative (this suggests that 
the auditor has unlimited access to relevant information for the purposes of the audit) 
and reporting independence (where the content of the report is related to the scope 
of the examination undertaken). They further suggested that professional 
independence has to do with the independence of the profession itself. The 
profession must have an aura surrounding it and in the way its representatives 
project and conduct themselves. 
 
Although issues of auditor independence have been the subject of discussion for a 
very long time (and as early as 1900 according to Page and Spira, 2005), they have 
enjoyed varying degrees of attention depending on events in the global economy 
and the occasional spotlight due probably to events in which the auditors are 
expected to play a significant part or are found to have ‟underperformed‟ (for 
example, the global economic down-turn in the 1920s, the corporate collapses of the 
late 1980s and early 1990s and, more recently, the collapse of energy giant ENRON, 
the debacles of mortgage lenders, Northern Rock in the UK and similar happenings 
in the US with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac).   
  
Until the early 1990s the issue of auditor independence did not receive the kind of 
attention it has enjoyed recently. However, in 1991, with the establishment of the 
Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP) in the UK, the standard regulating bodies 
and the cooperation of the audit professional bodies, pronouncements on potential 
threats to independence and safeguards were released and these seem to have 
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engendered a stream of discussions on the issues surrounding auditor 
independence. The difficulties in having a good grasp of the issues relating to auditor 
independence lie in the abstractness of the concept of independence (Gray and 
Manson, 2005). It seems that independence is largely a function of whether there is 
a dispute between the auditor and the client on the treatment of audit reporting 
issues or in the event of a fraud or financial misstatements (Beattie et al, 2001). 
Other than these, it will seem difficult to make assertions about auditor 
independence either in appearance or in fact. This is also compounded due to the 
problem that there is no formal theory of auditor independence (Johnstone et al 
2001; Beattie and Fearnley, 2002) leaving researchers and academics to rove 
around the ambiguity ingrained in the conception and framing of ideas about what 
constitutes auditor independence. This ambiguity has been eloquently described by 
Page and Spira (2005) in their analyses of the persistence of ambiguity in the 
framing of the concept of auditor independence. In their opinion this ambiguity allows 
room for manoeuvring and enhances the creation of further ambiguities.  
 
However, various regulatory frameworks and professional body pronouncements 
seem to present possible situations that may constitute threats to independence and 
suggest safeguards which are to be observed to mitigate the risk to independence 
both in appearance and in fact. For instance, the UK regulatory framework on 
auditing (according to the Guide to Professional Ethics Statement (GPES) 1) 
identifies the following threats to auditor independence: auditor self review, self 
interest, advocacy, familiarity, intimidation and suggested safeguards which have 
been classified as those created by the profession (the practice environment), those 
created by legislation or regulations (regulatory safeguards and sanctions) and those 
involving third parties (client‟s Audit Committee, regulatory bodies or another firm) 
 
In addition to the regulatory approach, academics have continued to devote attention 
to the issues of auditor independence especially against the background of corporate 
collapse and the reputational loss suffered by auditors. The adverse effects of these 
misbehaviours on the auditing profession cannot be overemphasised. If fund 
providers are to continue to invest in the capital market which is essential for the flow 
of production and generation of further wealth there is the urgent need for greater 
efficiency and transparency in the governance system in corporations. Investors 
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need formidable protection for their funds. They need to be assured that the 
gatekeepers in the corporate palace are not careless in keeping a watch over the 
stewardship of management. Auditors need to be able to discharge their professional 
duties in an atmosphere that radiates confidence and guarantees their independence 
and objectivity. Failure to apply the necessary diligence and safeguards can end up 
with the total collapse of the audit firm as happened with AA over ENRON 
 
The importance of the auditors‟ responsibilities can be appreciated in the context of 
providing essential certification in all situations where conflicts of interest potentially 
exist. Auditors act as intermediaries between the management of an enterprise and 
all those interested in the entity (Porter et al, 2003). Lee (1986) referred to the 
„remoteness gap‟ to argue the need for an audit and indeed an independent auditor. 
He pointed out that where stakeholders are dispersed and are unable to observe 
their agent, in this case the management, it becomes imperative that the appointed 
auditor takes their place and asserts the authority granted to them to obtain 
necessary information to meet the requirements of the stakeholders.  
 
Thus the importance of the auditor and the auditing profession in ensuring the 
smooth running of the market system and sustaining the confidence in it cannot be 
overemphasised and their independence is crucial to these roles. Auditors used to 
face a precarious situation in that the consequences of qualifying a report may 
include the termination of their engagement since their appointment and 
remuneration was largely decided by the management on whom they report. This 
has now changed, since the recommendation for their appointment and a host of 
other issues relating to the auditors are now effectively within the remit of the Audit 
Committee. This includes the scope of their audit, an assessment of their 
independence and an alternative communication channel (Combined Code, 2003). It 
is intuitive to expect that this will free the auditor from the fear of intimidation by the 
management, by reducing their dependence on their decision in terms of their 
appointment and remuneration, improve corporate communication, enhance audit 
quality, and transparent reporting.  
 
This recommendation has now been adopted by many other market regulators 
including those in the US who now require that the Audit Committee rather than the 
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management should be responsible for the selection, appointment and review of the 
activities of the external auditors (SOX, 2002, Combined Code, 2003). A similar 
provision is true in the case of the UK where the Audit Committee recommends the 
appointment of the external auditor but the actual appointment is made by the 
shareholders voting in the general meeting. The Audit Committees effectively 
decides the scope of the audit evaluates the independence of the external auditor 
and pre-determines the scope of non-auditing services to be bought from the 
auditors. 
 
3.7 Auditor Independence: A Moral Judgement Question  
Independence is a state of mind and, to the extent that it is a personal phenomenon, 
it is capable of being influenced by each individual‟s personality, moral and ethical 
dispositions (Page and Spira, 2005; Falk et al, 1999). However, in order to provide a 
framework through which to ensure the observance of a common and minimum 
acceptable level of professional behaviour, the accounting and regulatory bodies 
have provided a code of ethics and professional conduct. This is designed to 
regulate the profession and ensure that members conduct themselves in a 
professional manner that signals independence, objectivity and integrity (Auditing 
Practices Board, 1995).  A number of studies have also established links between 
auditor independence and their level of moral cognition and some of these studies 
are now reviewed in this section.  
 
Ponemon and Gabhart (1990) in their three stages of moral development model 
(based largely on the work by Kohlberg (1969) who identified three ethical cognition 
levels - pre-conventional, conventional and post-conventional) used this ethical 
categorisation to examine the auditor‟s implicit reasoning in the resolution of 
hypothetical independence conflicts (Beattie and Fearnley, 2002). The pre-
conventional stage refers to situations in which the individual places self-interest well 
above the common interest of society and is sensitive to penalty attributes. The 
conventional stage refers to the stage in which the individual conforms to the rules of 
society and is sensitive to affiliation attributes while the post conventional stage 
refers to the situation in which the individual forms a judgement conforming to ethical 
principles and not to society‟s rules. They found that a systematic relationship exists 
between auditors‟ ethical cognition and resolution of independence conflict 
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situations. Independent judgement was also found to be very sensitive to factors 
relating to penalties and less sensitive to affiliation factors. Auditors‟ moral cognition 
was also found to impact on the way they rank factors affecting their independence.  
 
Windsor and Ashkanasy (1995) extended previous studies examining the impact of 
the theory of developmental stages of moral reasoning on auditors‟ moral 
judgements. Their study was unique in that it incorporated economic (clients‟ 
financial health and probability of tendering) and auditors‟ moral belief in a just world 
as part of the set of variables that affect their independence judgement. They 
identified three styles of auditor decision making (Beattie and Fearnley, 2002):  
 Autonomous – this is where auditors are responsive to personal beliefs and 
are more likely to resist client management power. 
 Accommodating – these are auditors who responded to both personal belief 
and client management power and who are least resistant to client 
management pressure. 
 Pragmatic – these are auditors who are responsive to client management 
power irrespective of belief.  
These three styles correspond to auditors with high, medium and low levels of 
moral reasoning respectively.   
Falk et al (1999) undertook an experimental study on auditor independence, self-
interested behaviour and ethics. They studied auditors‟ decisions on whether to 
preserve or compromise independence in client-auditor dispute scenarios. The 
research also underscores the role of belief and economic incentives in auditors‟ 
decision making processes. These are all reflected in their three research 
hypotheses which were:  
 While maintaining or violating auditor independence is costless, the external 
auditor is more likely to maintain auditor independence  
 As the difference between the expected cost of issuing a qualified report and 
the expected cost of issuing an unqualified report rises, the frequency with 
which auditor independence is violated rises  
 The frequency with which auditor independence is preserved is greater for 
subjects with higher Defining Issue Test (DIT) scores than for subjects with 
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lower DIT scores. DIT was developed by Rest (1979) as a tool for assessing a 
subject‟s moral development.   
They found that increases in the probabilities of losing a client by disagreeing with 
their decision increases the frequency of independence violations irrespective of the 
monitoring on the individual auditor‟s behaviour. They also reported a moderating 
effect of monitoring and penalties on the frequency of violations of independence 
when the probability of losing a client is small, but the frequency of violation is not 
reduced when the probability of the loss of a client is high. And, finally, they found 
that subjects with low moral development scores violate independence more 
frequently than those who have higher scores. This study did not specify the type of 
disagreement and on what accounting and auditing issues the disagreement arose. 
It also failed to indicate whether there are specific regulations on the source of the 
dispute between auditor and management.  
 
Emby and Davidson (1998) examined the effect of variations in engagement factors 
on auditor independence in Canadian companies. Factors such as the contractual 
arrangements, terms of audit engagements, conditions and the nature of services 
provided were manipulated in an auditor-client dispute scenario over an audit 
reporting issue. The paper hypothesized that a balance of power between the auditor 
and their client determines the extent of auditor independence.  
 
They used a 24 between-subjects ANOVA approach to test five hypotheses:  
 That auditors act as if they have relatively less power in conflict situations with 
their audit clients when clients have the ability to terminate the relationship; 
 That auditors act as if they have relatively less power in conflict situations with 
their audit clients when clients have the ability to determine the audit fee; 
 That auditors act as if they have relatively less power in conflict situations with 
their audit clients when clients have the ability to determine engagement 
working conditions;  
 That auditors act as if they have relatively more power in conflict situations 
with their audit clients when the range of NAS (non-audit services) services 
they provide to an audit client includes specialized services that are not easily 
available elsewhere and 
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 That large audit firms act as if they have relatively more power in conflict 
situations with their audit clients compared to smaller audit firms. 
They developed a hypothetical conflict situation between an auditor and their client 
on the treatment of a contingent liability. Variables in the case were manipulated at 
two levels with each subject receiving only one version of the case. A total of 140 
cases were distributed, 92 usable responses were received giving a response rate of 
66%. 
  
Emby and Davidson (1998) concluded that an auditor‟s power to insist on a 
judgement (disclosure of contingent liability) is reduced when a client‟s economic 
power is high. However, auditors that provide more specialised services to their audit 
clients are more able to insist on a judgement (disclosure of contingent liability) but 
they failed to document any relationship between the size of the client and their 
influence on an auditor‟s judgment. Their study has implications for the debate on 
whether the provision of non audit services to audit clients impairs auditors‟ 
independence and also that communications between auditors and their clients in a 
conflict situation require a moderating mechanism in such a way that the 
shareholders are eventually adequately protected. 
 
Johnstone et al (2000) studied the antecedents and consequences of independence 
risk. Their study suggested a broad and complete view of the threats to 
independence and concluded that an independence risk framework that identifies 
and understands the relationships between the various incentives and situational 
factors that determine the actual and perceived audit quality should enhance the 
discovery of more potent mitigating factors to actual and perceived risks to 
independence. They suggested the following mitigating factors to independent risks: 
 Corporate governance mechanism 
 Regulatory oversight 
 Auditing firm policies (on achieving Independence e.g. partner reviews, peer 
reviews etc). 
 Auditing firm culture and  




Fearnley et al (2002) examined the role of the Financial Reporting Review Panel in 
enhancing auditor independence and improving attitudes to compliance among UK 
listed companies. Their study underscored the importance of an effective regulatory 
framework with the ability to demand compliance and sanction non-compliance. 
 
Though the remit of the FRRP is with the directors of listed companies and not the 
auditors, auditors have huge incentives to avoid such enquiries. The economic and 
social cost of such actions may be disastrous to the auditor. The auditor-client 
relationship may be adversely affected, leading to the loss of the client and other 
clients and, as the information about the action spreads, this may raise a reputational 
crisis and questions of competence and independence. Furthermore, auditors risk 
being investigated by their professional body causing personal embarrassment and 
threatening their professional careers. All these costs are better avoided by the 
auditor, especially auditors at the conventional and post-conventional stages of 
individual cognitive moral development. 
 
Fearnley et al‟s (2002) qualitative study used semi-structured interviews and publicly 
available information on the FRRP‟s impact on audit firms. The financial directors 
and auditors of listed companies who had been investigated by the FRRP were 
interviewed. They made personal approaches to all potential interviewees from a 
population of 18 companies whose accounts had been criticised by the FRRP in the 
press. Five directors refused the interview and two dropped out later. Fearnley et al 
(2002) thus interviewed representatives of 11 UK listed companies and 4 audit firm 
partners. The study highlights the importance of reputation to the auditing profession 
and to the individual auditor. The single most important drawback of the study is the 
small sample size and the inability to generalise its findings and the possibility that 
respondents are just following a line rather than giving their true thoughts. 
 
3.8  Auditor Independence (AI) and Economic Modelling  
An approach to studying AI involves economic modelling of its implications and this 
requires decisions on the factors that may affect auditors‟ judgement in economic 
terms. It also touches on the modelling of the determinants of audit and non-audit 
pricing and the decisions by companies to buy their audit and non-audit services 
from the same audit firm and the rationale for these decisions. Model specification 
[126] 
 
issues, including whether to endogenously model the relationship between audit and 
non-audit fees or to use single equation models and their implications have 
relevance here. It is important to note that the majority of studies modelling AI in 
economic terms are from the US and are positivist in orientation.  
 
De Angelo (1981a) argued that the level of economic bonding between the auditor 
and the auditee has a tendency to impact on auditors‟ independence. To the extent 
that auditors earn client-specific rent, he posited that auditors‟ independence is 
determined in terms of the joint probability that the auditor will discover (competence) 
and report a mis-statement (objectivity and independence). De Angelo (1981b) 
provided a multi-period analysis of the economic relationship between the auditor 
and the auditee, arguing  that auditors are exposed to two main risks in situations 
where they earn significant client–specific rent and that there is a certain pressure to 
compromise independence in order to maintain the continuity of that rent. Firstly, 
auditors are under threat of losing a premium client if they fail to compromise 
independence as such a client may use the threat of switching to another audit firm 
in a very competitive and concentrated audit market. Secondly, where the auditor 
decides to compromise independence and the probability of being caught is high, 
auditors are at risk of losing all other client-specific rents due to the market‟s 
reaction. This happened in the case of Arthur Andersen when the problems at 
ENRON were discovered and eventually led to its collapse. This is because all other 
current and potential clients may now see the auditor as a reputational risk to their 
organisation (Lee, 2003: 96). Thus auditors may be inclined to consider 
independence on the basis of cost vs. benefit analyses depending upon which moral 
cognition level they fall into. These situations show that economic bonding imposes 
some limitations on auditor independence.  
 
In a similar study, Antle (1982) reported a single period economic model that 
examines the auditor‟s behaviour in the presence of economic bonding with the 
client. Antle (1982) suggested that where management exhibit the tendency to 
misrepresent information in order to take advantage of the shareholders, the auditors 
have a tendency to be drawn in if the probability of being caught is considered to be 
remote and also where the auditor considers that the economic benefit of 
compromising independence outweighs the consequences of being caught. In such 
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situations the auditor will have no incentive to either discover or report 
misstatements. On the other hand, Goldman and Barlev, (1974) in the context of 
auditors providing NAS to their audit clients had suggested that increasing economic 
bonding between the audit firm and the auditee may act to improve auditor 
independence as it may mean that the audit firm is becoming indispensable to the 
organisation, so this reduces the possibility or the credibility of a switch threat.  
 
3.9  Auditor Independence vs. Audit and Non- Audit Services (NAS)  
An area of auditor independence that has enjoyed much focus since the collapse of 
ENRON has been the debate about auditors providing non-audit services to their 
audit clients. Findings are inconclusive (Shockley, 1981; Knapp, 1985; Farmer et al, 
1987; Craswell et al, 2002; Beattie and Fearnley, 2002).  It has been suggested that 
such a practice may adversely affect the appearance of the independence of the 
auditor and may give rise to a situation where the auditors are auditing their own 
work (De Angelo, 1981a and 1981b; Antle, 1982). Furthermore, it has been argued 
that auditors may become more financially dependent on their clients and that 
financial considerations may prevail and inhibit auditors‟ professional judgement. For 
instance, Arthur Anderson was reported to have earned $25 million in audit fees from 
ENRON while non-audit services brought in over $27 million from the same company 
in the same accounting period.  
 
Supporters of the idea that auditors can provide non-audit services to their auditing 
client fail to see any real moral or professional threat to auditor independence. They 
argue that providing non-audit services to audit clients allows some economic 
benefits especially when knowledge of the business gained during the audit can be 
transferred in delivering efficient non-audit services and vice versa (Porter et al, 
2003: 79; Simunic, 1984) This knowledge transfer may promote a more efficient 
utilisation of resources and improve reporting quality from the auditors‟ perspectives. 
Whilst it may be appealing to suggest that provision of non-audit services may create 
a perception of dependence and thereby impair auditor independence especially in 
terms of self-interest, self-review and familiarity threats( Porter et al. 2003: 80),  it is 
very important to note that perceptions are not reality and may not translate into 
actions (Beattie and Fearnley, 2002: 62). Perception of dependence is not the same 




However, the issues remain in the balance between academics and professionals. 
Although Beattie and Fernley (2002) concluded that there is very little clear support 
for the view that joint provision of audit and non audit services impairs independence 
they agreed that joint provision adversely affects the perception of independence.  
Many recent Corporate Governance pronouncements appear to tacitly support the 
idea that auditors should not provide non-audit services to their audit clients and this 
is evident in the SOX (2002) and the Combined Code (2003). This point is also 
emphasised by the requirements for the establishment of the Audit Committee in 
listed companies, regulating the provision of auditing and non-auditing services.  
 
The regulatory framework in the UK in respect of auditors providing non-audit 
services to their audit clients requires that listed companies should disclose in their 
annual report the value of NAS bought in the period from their auditor (Beattie and 
Fearnley, 2002). This requirement has been in place even before the Cadbury 
committee reported in 1992. It also restricts the NAS that can be provided by the 
auditor and institutes appropriate safeguards without compromising auditor 
independence. Furthermore, the Audit Committee is to pre-approve such services 
and the value of non-audit services that can be bought. Where the anticipated value 
of services is higher than the pre-determined level any changes must be approved 
by the Audit Committee. In addition, the EC Directive on auditors (2002) requires that 
NAS provided should be analysed into their respective components e.g. assurance, 
tax, advisory etc. Following on from the aforementioned, two strands of research into 
auditor independence are now considered. First, research that have attempted to 
model determinants of audit and non-audit fees and, secondly, research that have 
established a relationship between audit and non-audit fees.  
 
3.10  Determinants of Audit and Non-Audit Fees 
The primary work in studying the determinants of audit and non-audit fees was 
conducted by Simunic (1980). This study compared audit fees and their 
determinants when they were bought alone and their determinants when they were 
bought along with non-audit services. Simunic (1980) found that audit fees are 
higher when both sets of services are bought from the same auditor compared to 
when they are not. He also found that the audit fee is a function of the auditee size, 
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complexity, risk and relative elasticity of demand for both audit and non-audit 
services.  
 
Collier and Gregory (1996) examine the relationship between Audit Committee 
effectiveness and auditors‟ fee and also found that auditors‟ fee is a function of 
auditee risk, complexity and size. Size was proxied by total sales, number of 
employees and total assets. Complexity was measured using the number of 
subsidiaries, the proportion of foreign subsidiaries to total subsidiaries and risk was 
measured using audit report qualifications, stock, debtors and their relationship to 
sales. Positive relationships were observed between size, complexity and audit fees. 
They also found some relationship between factors determining audit fee and the 
presence of Audit Committees. Specifically, they found that the audit fee associated 
with the client‟s risk and complexity tends to fall with the presence of Audit 
Committees although this finding is not significant at the 5% though it is significant at 
the 10% level. 
 
Craswell et al (2002) studied the relationship between auditor independence and fee 
dependence. Auditor independence was measured as the propensity of auditors to 
issue a qualified audit opinion which was represented by the ratio of audit fee to total 
national fee of the audit firm. They used both univariate and multivariate logit 
regressions with the square root of the number of subsidiaries to represent 
complexity, the natural log of total client assets as a measure of size and the ratio of 
current assets to total assets as a measure of complexity. They also controlled for 
auditor type and industry. Essentially, they reported that the level of economic 
dependence between the auditor and their client does not affect auditor propensity to 
issue a qualified audit opinion. They argued that their result showed that in a setting 
where public disclosure of audit and non-audit fees is mandatory, auditors appear 
willing to issue qualified opinions irrespective of the economic importance of the 
client to the auditor.   
 
Basioudis (2007), in the context of audit pricing, specifically explored the impact of 
audit firm alumni on audit fees in UK listed companies. This study is set against a 
background in which one in six directors of UK listed companies is a chartered 
accountant and in full knowledge of the fact that the big audit firms maintain a strong 
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interaction and links with their former employees through social events and 
maintaining contacts through alumni directories which enables them to keep track of 
their progress and subsequent employment after leaving the audit firm. The study 
argued that audit firms exploit this alumni influence in gaining an insight into the 
boardroom of a client or a potential client. This type of insight becomes very 
important in making engagement acceptance and continuation decisions in the 
context of the auditor‟s engagement risk. Three hypotheses were tested which were 
stated to be: 
 Clients who take on alumni of the incumbent auditor as executive directors will 
pay lower audit fees than clients that do not employ such alumni.  
 Audit clients will not  pay lower or higher audit fees when an alumnus of the 
incumbent auditor sits on the board of directors as a non-executive and  
 Audit clients will pay lower audit fees when an alumnus of the incumbent 
auditor sits on the client board of directors as the chair, chief executive or 
finance director.   
The sample comprised of all executives and non-executives of UK quoted 
companies who are simultaneously ICAEW qualified chartered accountants. As was 
the case with most other single-equation fee models in previous studies, the study 
used variables to capture size, complexity and auditee risk with additional variables 
including measures of alumni affiliation and used publicly available data in a multiple 
regression model to arrive at its findings. The study found that audit fees are 
significantly influenced by the audit firm‟s alumni among the executive board 
members. Specifically, audit fees are reduced by as much as 21%. In addition, non-
executive directors who have qualified as chartered accountants with the incumbent 
auditor do not influence the level of audit fees in the UK audit market. Further they 
found a significant negative relationship between audit fees and chairs, chief 
executives or finance directors who are alumni of the incumbent audit firm. This 
implies having more audit firms‟ alumni on the board results in downward pressures 
on the audit fees. 
 
One major drawback of this study lies in its tacit approval of auditors maintaining 
business relationships with their clients on the grounds that the preventative steps 
instituted by both regulatory bodies and auditing firms should be sufficient as 
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safeguards. Experience with Arthur Andersen has shown that regulatory frameworks 
either internally within an organisation or even those instituted externally by 
professional bodies can be overridden and this has also been shown by the credit 
crunch where control mechanisms and regulatory frameworks have failed (Windsor 
and Warming- Rasmussen, 2009; Fraser and Pong, 2009). 
 
Danielsen et al (2007) in the context of audit pricing considered whether the auditor‟s 
insider knowledge of a client‟s situation is reflected in their pricing of services 
supplied to those clients. They tested for the effect of knowing each client‟s unique 
risk situation on the audit fees charged. Higher audit fees were found to be charged 
to clients who were considered opaque and consequently were judged to be high 
risk. To these sets of clients market based measures of opacity are positively 
correlated with high fees. The second hypothesis considered the effects of a firm‟s 
decision to purchase reputational capital from their auditor and the subsequent effect 
on their audit fees. Firms will probably do this to signal better transparency and 
quality reporting since the market associates high audit quality with big 4 audit firms.  
 
3.11  Audit and Non-Audit Fee Modelling 
One other method that researchers have used to study auditors‟ independence in the 
context of their economic bonding with the auditee is to examine the determinants of 
the decision to purchase both audit and non-audit services by the client.   
 
The debates have been firstly on the flow of the relationship between audit and non- 
audit fees. Do audit fees directly affect non-audit fees or is the relationship the other 
way round? Are there other factors moderating the relationship between audit and 
non-audit fees? A line of argument holds that audit firms use audit services as the 
„loss leader‟ which allows them to gain a foothold in the client‟s organisation and then 
negotiate the provision of non-audit services at higher rates to compensate for the 
losses incurred on the audit. They suggest that in such a situation an inverse 
relationship will be expected between audit and non-audit fees (Collier and Gregory, 
1996; McMeeking, 2001). However, others argue that the relationship between fees 
may be explained in terms of auditors‟ specialisation, knowledge spillovers and cost 
vs. benefit considerations by the client. They maintain that the audit market is highly 
concentrated (dominated by the big four audit firms) and that high quality audit firms 
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select themselves into clients rather than using the audit as a loss leader. The 
proponents of knowledge spillovers argue for a positive relationship between audit 
and non-audit fees due to economies of scope and cost vs. benefit analysis 
(Ezzamel et al, 1996; O‟Sullivan and Diacon, 1996; Whisenant et al, 2002).  
 
Secondly, there are debates about the most appropriate method through which to 
capture the relationship between audit and non-audit fees. There are researchers 
who have modelled the relationship using single equation models where either the 
audit or non-audit fee has been the dependent variable while the other has been part 
of the explanatory variable in addition to other variables (Beattie and Fearnley, 
2002). However, others have suggested that such models may have been mis-
specified due to endogeneity concerns between audit and non-audit fees (Whisenant 
et al, 2002; Lee and Mande, 2005). They contend that using single equation models 
in the face of endogeneity makes OLS inconsistent and biased. This will affect the 
results in such a way that the estimates will be spurious and the outcomes of most of 
the statistical tests will be biased.  
 
They have suggested that audit and non-audit fees are jointly determined and, as a 
result, a simultaneous model will best capture the nature of the relationships 
between the two variables. They argued that results from such a model will be 




 3.12 Auditor Independence and Audit Committee 
The relationship between the Audit Committee and the external auditor has been 
assumed automatically by the Cadbury report (1992) and other subsequent 
Corporate Governance reports in the UK. Specifically, the Cadbury Report expected 
that auditors will be better able to discharge their responsibilities and in ensuring 
their independence through the existence of board level support from the Audit 
Committee. The Audit Committee is supposed to be the auditor‟s first point of contact 
in addressing concerns over auditing and reporting issues in the organisation. The 
level and areas of envisaged interactions between these two important control 
mechanisms are many and have grown over time (Rezaee, 2009). Their importance 
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in the smooth functioning of the market system, restoration of confidence in it and 
protection of the interests of its key players cannot be over-emphasised. It has been 
proposed that the existence of the Audit Committee should bolster the position of the 
auditor in the area of their appointments.  
Section 3.3 of this chapter reviews the anticipated functions of the Audit Committee 
and it enumerates its responsibilities with respect to the auditors. Importantly, 
auditors now have another line of communication with those charged with 
governance in organisations. Their appointment, determination of the scope of their 
work and their remuneration are no longer at the mercy of the management on 
whose reports they are to form an opinion. Auditors now have meetings with those 
charged with governance in organisations without executive management being 
present giving them the opportunity to express their concerns far more easily than if 
those meetings were with management.  
 
Sections 3.5 and 3.6 highlighted research activity documenting support for the 
auditors by Audit Committees in cases of disputes between the auditor and 
management. This has been argued to have a positive impact on auditors‟ 
independence. The Audit Committee is also to determine the independence of the 
external auditors with respect to the audit of the organisation. Here, the issues of 
joint provision of audit and non-audit services are pertinent. In the UK, the Audit 
Committee is to determine the type and value of non-audit services that may be 
bought from an incumbent auditor and if the agreed level is to be exceeded it must 
be approved by the Audit Committee. In theory and for the reasons outlined above, it 
would appear that the existence and role of the Audit Committee should enhance 
auditor independence. However, empirically this has not been shown to be the case. 
Section 3.5 also showed some of the doubts that have been expressed in the ability 
of the Audit Committee to discharge the „mega‟ responsibilities now envisaged for it 








Table 4: Some Key Results of Prior Studies on Corporate Governance and 
Auditor Independence   
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3.13 Summary of the Literature  
The focus of this chapter has been the review of current literature on the three main 
objectives of the thesis in the context of discussions on Corporate Governance and 
its impact on auditors and their independence. The questions have been focused 
upon: (1) the determinants of Audit Committee activity and effectiveness; (2) the 
relationship between the Audit Committee and auditors in respect of their 
independence; and (3) the debate about the relationship between audit and non-
audit fees and their impact on auditors‟ independence.  
 
The review showed the likely impact of committee independence, board composition, 
expertise, ownership structure and precise definition of committee duties in 
determining the activity of the Audit Committee in the context of enhancing market 
confidence and in protecting the interests of the shareholders in a situation of 
separation of ownership from management. However, the results are inconsistent 
and inconclusive. A large number of these findings are US based and may not be 
projected indiscriminately onto the UK situation. Apart from the work of Collier and 
Gregory (1996, 1999) which attempted to replicate the study by Menon and Williams 
(1994) in the US and the later work by Spira (2002, 2003) on Audit Committee 
effectiveness, there are very few UK based studies that have empirically assessed 
the determinants of Audit Committee effectiveness using any recent data. Collier and 
Gregory (1996, 1999) are the closest to this study in terms of their objectives and 
approach. Spira (2002, 2003) provides the UK insight to the study although the 
approaches adopted there are different to those chosen in the current study.  
 
The second objective of the review was to appreciate the gaps in the current 
knowledge stock of the relationship between Audit Committee activity and auditor 
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independence It showed that apart from Collier and Gregory (1999) there is a dearth 
of UK based empirical studies that have directly examined this important 
relationship. As for effectiveness, the definition of independence was found to be 
vague, imprecise and ambiguous. This has been documented by Page and Spira 
(2005). Section 3.10 showed that independence is related to ethical and moral 
judgement and the stage of moral development of the individual auditor. The review 
also found that experimental studies have enjoyed prominence in testing auditor 
independence and in assessing the roles of the Audit Committee in this respect. 
Quantitative studies using questionnaires have not recorded reasonable success, 
while qualitative studies have been few and far between in examining either Audit 
Committee activities or their relationship with the auditor in terms of their 
independence. Only two UK based studies used interviews with members of Audit 
Committees – Spira (2003) in the UK and Turley and Zaman (2007).  
 
Simunic (1980) and DeAngelo (1981) provided other possibilities for examining 
auditor independence using economic modelling (section 3.11). This allowed 
independence in appearance to be captured by proxies such as ratio of audit to non-
audit fees and the ratio of audit fee to total fees. Although they may not be a 
complete and precise measure of independence, these measures do provide an 
opportunity to measure indirectly the relationship between auditors‟ independence 
and Audit Committee activity. Many of the studies testing these relationships are US 
based and positivist in orientation. This is not inappropriate but it is important that 
studies are undertaken in other environments that will provide alternative and richer 
views on the subject. The continued use of positivist approaches may be consequent 
upon the difficulty in negotiating access to conduct such qualitative research.   
 
The debates surrounding audit and non-audit fees, their impact on auditor 
independence and the role of the Audit Committees in this respect have also been 
examined. The relationships between audit and non audit fees are inconclusive. 
While some have found a positive relationship, others have documented negative 
relationships. Further methodological issues have also been debated. Some have 
criticised the use of single equation models as inadequate and misrepresenting the 
nature of the relationship between the fees, suggesting simultaneous equation 




Finally, this review has shown that many areas of concern to this thesis deserve 
more attention and that there are more questions than answers. For instance the 
researcher needed to identify the real determinants of Audit Committee activity, 
effectiveness or diligence. There are gaps in our understanding of the relationship 
between Audit Committee activities and how they actually impact on auditor 
independence. The debate about the nature of the relationship between audit and 
non-audit fees and their impact on auditor independence, as well as the role of the 
Audit Committee in these, needs more clarification and convincing evidence.  
 
In the next chapter, the researcher explains the theoretical underpinning and the 


























Theoretical Underpinnings and Hypotheses 
 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the researcher provided a detailed review of relevant 
literature. This allowed the identification of gaps in current knowledge stock on the 
topics of the thesis. In this chapter, the researcher reviews relevant theoretical 
underpinnings for the study and also developed hypotheses to be tested in the study. 
The first part of the chapter concentrates on the theories and their importance in 
enhancing understanding on the topic. These include the Agency and Stakeholders 
theory. In the second part, the researcher draws on appropriate theoretical basis to 
justify the hypotheses to be tested.  
 
4.1 Theoretical underpinning for the study  
The role of theory in amplifying corporate phenomena and understanding 
interactions within and between organisations cannot be overemphasised. Theories 
shape meanings and help analyses of concepts and their implications (Riahi-
Belkaoui, 2000). A number of theoretical frameworks have been used in studying the 
nature of the governance relationship that subsists in the corporate environment. 
This section of the chapter discusses the various theories that have shaped the 
meanings of Corporate Governance and that have been used in the thesis to 
achieve its objectives. Two main theories have been used to varying degrees in the 





Figure 7: The theoretical framework for Corporate Governance  
These are: 
 Agency Theory (Fama and Jensen, 1976),  
 Stakeholder Theory (Freeman, 1984),  
4.1.1  Agency Theory 
This seems to be the dominant paradigm and has been used widely in different 
aspects of corporate finance and certainly in Corporate Governance studies and 
analyses (Davies et al, 1997; Dedman, 2004). The theory is rooted in the work of 
Berle and Means (1932) on the separation of firm ownership from management. It is 
also often credited to the landmark work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama 
and Jensen (1983). They suggested that Agency problems will arise in any 
circumstance where the Principal (owners, shareholders) employs the Agent 
(management) to undertake a number of duties on their behalf for a reward. Thus 
management acting as Agent to the Principals owe them a fiduciary duty of care to 
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run the organisation in the best interests of the owners for a stipulated reward (Berle 
and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1985).  
However, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that conflicts of interest do inevitably 
exist between the management and owners of businesses in cases where owners 
are not managers. This is because the theory assumes a model of man (manager) 
that is self serving, individualistic and opportunistic in nature, who prefers to 
maximise his own utility functions at the expense of the owners. As a result, the 
theory is built on the assumption that there is almost always a divergence of 
objectives between the goals of the management and those of the shareholders.  
 
Agency problems may also arise due to moral hazards and adverse selections 
(Meckling and Jensen, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1985).  Moral hazard refers to a situation 
where due to imperfections in the contract between the agent and the principal, 
management may take sub-optimal decisions and may be opportunistic. An example 
of such sub optimal decisions includes investment in assets or projects that give 
negative NPV or consumption of private perquisites rather than investing in a project 
that will give a positive NPV. While moral hazards tend to happen after the contract, 
adverse selection may occur both before and after the contract between the principal 
and the agent (Sung, 2001). Adverse selection refers to the possibility of 
shareholders hiring agents who do not have the right type and kind of skills that may 
enable them to deliver expected returns. This may be due to the existence of 
information asymmetry between the parties or inherent imperfections in the 
contracting process (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 2007).   
 
Furthermore, given that shareholders have different risk attitudes compared to 
management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), the continuous existence of information 
asymmetry may impose on the principal the need to institute some forms of controls. 
These control mechanisms require the allocation of resource and have the tendency 
to increase the costs of operations, often referred to as the agency cost. Agency 
problems may exist in a number of instances within the organisation. They are 
known to exist in diversification and investing decisions and in decisions relating to 
mergers and acquisitions (Lane et al, 1998). This may relate to management‟s 
tendencies to prevent suitable offers in furtherance of their own interests at the 
expense of the shareholders‟ (Kosnik, 1987; Buchholtz and Ribbens, 1994; Lane et 
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al, 1998). The agency problem is not limited to the relationship between 
management and shareholders alone, although this seems to have enjoyed the most 
attention. It may also be exhibited in the relationship between management and 
debt-holders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; 
Stulz, 1990). Often the primary concern is how to reduce or minimise the agency 
cost of operations and thereby increase the returns available for sharing among the 
residual claimants. 
 
However, in the context of increasing separation of ownership from management, as 
the ownership base becomes more dispersed, management tend to become less 
accountable and their activities less observable, at least to the shareholders (Fama, 
1980). While management are involved in the operational decision making of 
businesses, owners are either so numerous that they cannot all be involved in the 
management of the firm or they do not possess the right type of skills to manage the 
enterprise successfully (Morck and Steier, 2005). However, management are more 
closely involved in the business and for a longer time than the owners and thus have 
more information about the business than its owners individually. This creates the 
classic case of information asymmetry (Aboody and Lev, 2000). Differences in the 
nature and scope of information between the two parties exacerbate the agency 
problems.  For reasons mentioned earlier, shareholders are often at a disadvantage: 
this gives management an unbridled opportunity to consume perks or take sub-
optimal decisions that affect the organisation (Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993), 
conflicting with shareholders‟ wealth maximisation objectives.  
 
A number of mechanisms have been devised to reduce conflicts of interest and their 
impacts on organisations. These include incorporating in the contract between the 
contracting parties as many clauses as possible that simulate possible scenarios and 
attempt to provide for them in the contract. Other methods of control include 
incentivising the management and linking management compensation to 
performance, reducing the free cash flow available within the organisation through 
debt financing which reduces the possibilities of consumption of perquisites. Also 
increasing management‟s stake in the equity of the company has been suggested.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) have argued that increasing managements‟ share 
ownership should bring their interest more closely with those of other shareholders. 
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However, the risks of management entrenchments have also been identified (Lane 
et al, 1998; Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). This refers to a situation where 
management‟s share ownership is so substantial that they can wield significant 
power and hence influence the composition of the board of directors. This may 
facilitate management shirking and excessive consumption of perks.  
Agency Theory is very important in the context of a broader discussion of Corporate 
Governance and in the formulation of governance mechanisms and policies. 
Governance structures in the “Anglo-American countries” favour the agency model of 
governance. This explains why shareholders‟ value maximisation objective seems to 
be the overriding aim of firms in these economies and this is aptly reflected in the 
monitoring devices. For instance, since the composition of the board of directors is 
aimed at protecting the interest of the shareholders, it does not generally tolerate the 
representation of other stakeholders on the board. This is not the case in other 
governance models such as the Japanese and German models, where other 
stakeholder interests are represented on the board and their representatives take an 
active part in the board proceedings. In Germany, such representation is provided for 
by law. The existence of a number of committees such as the Audit Committee, the 
Remuneration Committee and the Nomination Committee, among others, aims to 
ensure firm continuity and the protection of firm values (Vafeas, 1999) for which 
equity holders are the residual claimants.  
 
In the context of this study, Agency Theory plays a fundamental role in the design 
and execution of the investigation. The study adopts the main variant of Agency 
Theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This relates to agency problems in a „modern‟ 
firm where the shareholders are separate from the management and where the 
equity base is dispersed. Unlike the alternative variant that examines agency 
problems in family owned enterprises (Tosi et al, 2000). Agency Theory provides the 
main theoretical underpinning of the thesis and determines to a great extent the 
approach used in the study. It influences the formulation of the study hypotheses, 
informs the research methodology and statistical techniques used in the study.  
Popular agency cost variables relevant to the study are examined. Relationships 




4.1.2 Corporate Governance, Audit Committees and Agency costs. 
The aim of this section is to further synthesis the relationship between Corporate 
Governance, Audit Committee and Agency costs. In the previous section the 
researcher reviewed a number of literature on the Agency theory, focusing on the 
type and nature of the Agency costs confronting corporations. Succinctly, agency 
costs arise due to the separation of ownership from management, resulting in 
information asymmetry between them, necessitating investments in various controls 
and monitoring devices by shareholders in order to achieve their primary objectives 
of investment. These devices could be used to reduce the extent of conflict of 
interest that may exist between owners and management. Corporate Governance 
mechanisms have become a more „recent‟ approach, at least since the early 1990s, 
to resolving these problems. This reflects the growing appreciations that 
management are becoming too powerful, protecting their own interest at the expense 
of the interest of the shareholders they were primarily employed to protect. The 
performance related incentives panacea seem to have done more harm than good to 
shareholders and perhaps the society at large judging from anecdotal evidences of 
disaffections expressed in the  press on bonus culture in the „city‟. 
 
Corporate Governance best practice requires that no single individual should have 
unfettered influence or dominates the boards in its activities and functions so much, 
as to compromise their fiduciary duty of care to the shareholders. The board is to be 
more balanced with more independent non-executive directors on the board, in 
addition to the establishment of a number of board sub-committees. It is expected 
that this approach will increase management transparency thereby reducing 
expenditure on monitoring and control devices and by extension reduce the agency 
costs associated with these function due to reduction in information asymmetry.  In 
the same way, the existence of Audit Committees should have direct effects on 
reporting quality through the benefits of oversight functions performed by the 
committee.  Improvements in these functions should enhance firm‟s reporting and 
auditing quality thereby reducing agency costs associated with these. The Audit 
Committee has featured considerably in recent discourse on Corporate Governance 
and improvements in the societal perceptions and confidence in the market system. 
Although a sub-board committee, the audit committee appear to have emerged as 
the main committee with the remit on ensuring accountability and integrity in the 
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reporting functions of the organisations. It is to be composed mainly of independent 
non-executive so that it would be able to bring an unbiased and independent 
judgement to bear on the activities of the organisation towards protecting the interest 
of the shareholders. This should ordinarily translate to improvement in reporting 
quality which is required in order to reduce agency costs.  
 
4.2 Stakeholder Theory 
One of the criticisms of Agency Theory is that it provides a short term perspective 
and explanation of the purpose of the firm (Freeman, 1984; Freeman, Wick and 
Parmar, 2004). Also, critics argue that its scope is narrow, since it projects the 
activities of the firm from the perspective of the shareholders only. An alternative 
proposition known as the Stakeholder Theory suggests that a firm‟s activities should 
be projected on longer and broader perspectives (Freeman, 1984). The theory posits 
that the essence of corporate activity is not only for the benefit of the shareholders, 
but also for the benefit of all relevant stakeholders (including the shareholders) and it 
is all these relevant stakeholders who should be the main remit of the „modern‟ firm 
(Freeman, 1984; Cadbury, 1992; Jensen, 2001). It argues that firms should be 
managed in such a way that they coordinate the diverging interests of their 
numerous stakeholders including employees, shareholders, customers, suppliers, 
the government and society in general. This consideration should thus impact upon 
the formulation of the corporate strategy of the organisation as a whole (Marcoux, 
2003).  
The arguments for the stakeholder view of the corporation have often been premised 
on moral and business ethics (Phillips, 1997). However, as pointed out earlier in the 
discussion of Agency Theory, the perception of the interaction and the nature of the 
relationship between the firm and society are greatly influenced by our own points of 
view on what the main purpose of the firm is.  One such view is that of the classical 
economist, summed up succinctly in Carr (1968). Although his views might not be 
totally representative of all classical economists, a good number of them share his 
notion of “pure-profit making” as the only objective of the firm. So much so that he 
suggested that businesses have a lower standard of ethics compared to society as a 
whole and therefore an abdication of all moral or ethical concern is consistent with 
the achievement of the firm‟s “pure profit making” goals.  A modified classicalist view 
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suggests that whilst businesses pursue the main objective of shareholder value 
maximisation, they should be aware of their responsibility to society by being 
obedient to the law and being  ethical, this is the “constrained profit making” view of 
the firm (Friedman, 1998 in Branco  and Rodrigues, 2007).  
 
However, even if the researcher assumes that businesses have a duty to protect the 
interests of all stakeholders, the researcher will still be confounded by the problem of 
tradeoffs involving the conflicting interests of all the stakeholders. Lack of 
measureable objectives with respect to each of the stakeholders still provides 
opportunity for management to be less accountable and to consume perquisites 
(Mallin 2004). Jensen (2001) has observed that proponents of the Stakeholder 
Theory have been unable to provide realistic resolutions of the numerous conflicting 
interests of stakeholders that businesses need to protect. He therefore suggested a 
strand of Stakeholder Theory which he referred to as the “enlightened Stakeholder 
Theory” or the “enlightened shareholders maximisation theory”. The theory posits 
that in order to maximise stakeholders‟ value, businesses should focus on 
maximising shareholders‟ returns and this in itself would ensure the maximum return 
to all stakeholders.  He further explains that a business would not be able to 
maximise shareholders‟ value if any stakeholder is ignored or mistreated.  
 
Stakeholder Theory is very important in the context of a spectrum of discussions on 
Corporate Governance, not least the form of the control mechanisms adopted, and 
the possibility of control mechanisms playing substituting and/or complementary 
roles (Fung, Rui and Firth, 2002). The continental European model of Corporate 
Governance is known to favour the stakeholder perspective of the firm (Moerland, 
1995). This is evident in the structures and composition of the board of directors and 
in the roles played by other stakeholders. For example, it is normal for financial 
institutions to own substantial stakes in companies in Germany or France and it is 
also usual that they have a representative on the governing board of such 
companies, in addition to the earlier mentioned roles of the employees in the firm‟s 
management, (Goergen et al 2007). This governance arrangement has been argued 
to provide financial stability for these firms and also to ensure closer monitoring from 
the financial investors (Goergen et al, 2007).    
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The stakeholder model approach to Corporate Governance has been criticised for 
being inadequate as a complete theory of the firm, but rather no more than a logical 
presentation of a series of techniques (Key, 1999 p320). Furthermore, Key (1999) 
wrote that:  
 “ Freemans‟ theory as presented can be criticised in four ways: 1) inadequate 
explanation of process; 2) incomplete linkage of internal and external 
variables; 3) insufficient attention to the system within which business 
operates and the level of analysis within the system; and 4) inadequate 
environmental assessment” (Key, 1999,p321).    
Another criticism that has been levelled against the Stakeholder Theory of the firm is 
that it is unrealistic. The notion that the firm exists to benefit all stakeholders who do 
not directly have a stake in the firm appears bogus and at best superficial and this 
perhaps explains the complexity or near impossibility of a mechanism that will 
effectively allocate residual returns of the firm to all its stakeholders (Jensen, 2001; 
Carr, 1968). It thus seems to have limited empirical applicability in Corporate 
Governance as it lacks specificity and is difficult to operationalise. This is especially 
so since it is not measurable and observable.  Unlike the Agency Theory of the firm, 
it is not suggesting a set of measurable variables that can proxy for stakeholders‟ 
interest or power in the firm.   
 
For the purpose of this thesis, the researcher has used Stakeholder Theory to 
provide alternative explanations (Brenner and Cochran, 1991) for the nature of 
interactions between the business and its stakeholders. Although there are variants 
of the Stakeholder Theory (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Jones, 1995; Jones and 
Wicks, 1999) the researcher has restricted his use to only the Primary Stakeholders 
theory as enumerated by Freeman (1984). This has improved the quality of the 
discussion in the thesis. It has also thrown up some concern about the suitability of 
Agency Theory and why it still assumes a dominant feature in Corporate 
Governance discourse. The table 5 below adapted from Kochan and Rubinstein 
(2000) summarises the important differences between the Agency Theory and the 







Table 5: Distinctions between the Shareholder’s and the Stakeholder’s 
Perspective of Corporate Governance  
 Shareholder Perspective  Stakeholder Perspective 
Purpose  Maximise shareholders‟ wealth  Pursue multiple objectives of 
parties with different interests  
Governance 
structure  
Principal-agent model (managers 
are agents of shareholders )  
Team production model 
Governance 
process  
Control  Coordination, cooperation and 
conflict resolution  
Performance 
metrics  
Shareholder value sufficient to 
maintain investors‟ commitment 
Firm‟s distribution of value 
created to maintain commitment 
of multiple stakeholders  
Residual risk 
holder  
 Shareholders  All stakeholders  
 
 
4.3  Relationship between the Theories: competing or complementary?  
 
The debate on the relationship between Agency and Stakeholder theories dates 
back to the early 20th century in the form of the arguments between the monotonist 
and pluralist  perspectives of the corporation, specifically, references here relate to 
the work by Berle 1931 and Dodd 1932 (see chapter 2). However, modern discourse 
and developments on these subjects have progressed from just academic 
engagements, at times to an ideological divide. By the end of the 20th century, the 
debate has shifted and metamorphosis broadly into a discourse between the Agency 
and Stakeholder theories of the firm, with Friedman and Freeman appearing to spear 
head each of the divide respectively.  Having enumerated the basic tenets of each of 
these theories, in sections 4.1.1 and 4.2 above, the researcher now provides  an 
idea of the current direction on the interactions between the two theories in order to 




Academics have remained exercised on the divide between Agency vs. Stakeholder 
theory. In a relatively recent dialogue among renowned academics on the subject, a 
line of thought that seem to advocate the common basis of both theories was visible. 
This is in the sense that both theories are concerned about understanding the 
relationship between humans and his environment in the context of the business and 
society. The national meeting of the Academy of Management in 2007 featured 
dialogue and contributions from Bradley R. Agle, Thomas Donaldson, R. Edward 
Freeman, Michael C. Jensen, Ronald K. Mitchell and Donna J. Wood (Agle et al, 
2007). Overall the dialogue emphasise the complementarities of the two theories 
rather than emphasise the apparent differences in them. For example, Freedman 
approached the discussion by examining the four main ideas that are implicit in the 
stakeholder theory vis: the separation thesis, the integration thesis, the responsibility 
principle and the open question argument. The separation thesis suggests that 
business and ethics are separate issues and should be distinct and remain so. On 
the other hand the integration thesis holds that ethics and business are intertwined 
and that it is not appropriate to talk of business without a consideration of ethics and 
vice versa.  Intrinsically, the integration thesis suggests that the centre of the 
discourse regarding business and ethic is human and this should feature more 
prominently in the continuing dialogue about business and ethics. The responsibility 
principle suggests that businesses should uphold some basic principles about life 
and the interaction of business with the environment in which it operates and finally, 
the open question. These are set of question which management should always 
attempt to answer every time value oriented decisions are made. These include; “for 
whom is value created or destroyed, who is harmed and benefited? Whose right 
were enabled or not? What kind of person would I be if I make this decision this 
particular way?” (Agle et al, 2007: 9) 
 
In his views, Jensen agreed on the importance of the issues, but was of the view that 
fundamental issues that remains unresolved with Stakeholder theory is that of 
resource allocation which he suggest cannot be left to the management as being 
suggested by Stakeholder theorists. He therefore reiterates the concept of 
enlightened value maximisation which he equates to enlightened stakeholders 
theory.  He further suggested that the introduction of normative human values into 
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the discourse on the interaction of businesses and ethics and indeed with humans is 
still far from being real.  
 
These shades of opinions highlights the complementarities of both theories to the 
extent that they both appreciate the importance of the considerations of the 
normative values in the discourse relating to businesses and its interaction with the 
society, however, there are apparent inconsistencies in the attitude and perspectives 
on the nature of these normative values and indeed on how to incorporate them 
adequately in the ensuring dialogues.  
  
 
4.4 Development of hypotheses: Determinants of Audit committee activity  
This section of the chapter concentrates on developing hypotheses to be tested in 
the thesis. The section is divided into three parts, each for the development of 
hypotheses for each of the main research questions in the thesis.   
 
Board and Audit Committee Composition and Committee Activity  
A significant body of existing literature (Cotter et al, 2003; Dezoort et al, 2003; Klein, 
2002; Song and Windram, 2004) suggests that a unique trend underlies the 
relationship between the board and Audit Committee composition and firm activity 
level which may include performance and other positive indices of financial and non 
financial performance. The theoretical framework suggests that Audit Committees 
that are composed of independent non-executive directors tend to be more active 
than those composed of mainly executive or grey area directors. Grey area directors 
are directors that are not totally independent of the management. This may be by 
virtue of their recent employment with the company or their shareholdings and 
affiliations (Vicknair et al, 1993). Denis and Sarin (1997) reported a positive 
relationship between an increase in the number of independent non-executive 
directors and the average stock price return. The announcement of the appointment 
of an additional outside non-executive director on the board had a positive effect on 
stock price increase (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990), while the presence of an Audit 
Committee has been related to a reduced incidence of reporting irregularities and 
material misstatements (Carcello and Neal, 2003). Thus Audit Committees are 
associated with improved reporting quality (McMullen, 1996). Dechow et al (1996) 
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suggested that firms subjected to enforcement actions by regulators are less likely to 
have an Audit Committee. Klein (2002) documented negative relationships between 
board and Audit Committee independence and earnings management. Board 
composition was documented to be an important determinant of corporate reporting 
quality. Beasley (1996) examined the role of the Audit Committee in constraining 
financial statement fraud. Comparing fraud and no-fraud companies, he found that 
no-fraud firms tend to have more independent non-executive directors than fraud 
firms, which underscored the importance of the board and Audit Committee 
structure. Current literature seems to indicate that higher numbers of independent 
non-executive directors on the board could enhance the protection of shareholders‟ 
interests.  
 
The a priori theoretical expectation is that there is a positive relationship between 
Audit Committee activity or diligence and the proportion of independent non-
executive directors on the board and on the Audit Committee. In other words, Audit 
Committee activity or diligence is an increasing function of the proportion of the 
independent non-executive directors on the board. This suggests that in line with the 
expectations of the Blue Ribbon Committee, the Smith Report and the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act, a higher proportion of outside non-executive directors on the committee 
should translate into a higher level of diligence and performance of the Audit 
Committee in discharging their oversight functions. This a priori statement is not a 
measure of the nature of the increased activity or what causes it; rather it is a 
statement predicting a relationship between increased committee activity or diligence 
and the increased presence of outside non-executive directors on the committee. 
The researcher would thus expect the beta co-efficient sign to be positive. This may 
indicate that an increase in Audit Committee activity is partly explained by an 
increase in the number of independent non-executive directors.   
The first set of the thesis‟ null hypotheses will investigate the relationship between 
board and Audit Committee composition and Audit Committee activity. This is stated 
as: 
  
H1: There are no relationship between Audit Committee activity and the proportion 




Audit Committee and Ownership Structure in Organisation  
Studies have documented relationships between the ownership structure of 
companies and the board structure as well as the structure of the Audit Committee 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Dechow et al, 1996). 
Where the Audit Committee is structured in such a way that it reflects ownership 
distribution in the organisation, it may have implications for corporate transparency 
and reporting. In the Anglo-American model of Corporate Governance, ownership is 
dispersed unlike in the Continental European and Japanese models of Corporate 
Governance where stock ownership is concentrated. In market led governance, 
shareholders‟ interest is best protected by an independent board (BRC, 1999; SOX, 
2002; Combined Code, 2003) and consequently by an independent Audit Committee 
that is composed mainly of outside directors (Smith, 2003).  
 
However, where management share ownership is significant, information asymmetry 
may be constrained and this may alleviate agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). This is because increased management share ownership may reduce 
management consumption of perquisites and management interests may coincide 
with those of the shareholders. Kaplan (1989) reported a positive effect of 
management buyouts on firm performance and a similar finding was reported by 
Smith (1990). Alternative arguments indicate that the relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm performance is not always positive and may not 
always be linear.    
 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) suggested that 
the relationship is positive to certain levels of managerial ownership (between 0-5% 
ownership) and that after certain levels (between 5-25% ownership) increases in 
managerial ownership will result in negative performance indicating that the 
increased presence of management on the board and on the Audit Committee may 
negatively affect firm performance depending on the definition of performance used. 
Bondholders favour firms that have more non-executives on their board than 
executives (Anderson et al, 2002). For instance, creditors and loan providers may 
indicate a preference for boards that are more transparent. Deli and Gillan (2000) 
documented a negative relationship between ownership structures and Audit 
Committee activity, while Cotter et al (2003) found a negative relationship between 
[153] 
 
committee independence and managerial ownership, which suggest that firms with 
lower management shareholdings tend to have more independent Audit Committees, 
compared to firms with significant share ownership by management.   
 
Further, institutional ownership is also important as a determinant of the activity or 
diligence of the board and Audit Committee and this was shown in chapter 2, Section 
2.3.4. page 47, although the findings are inconclusive. For instance, Agrawal and 
Mandelker (1990) provided evidence of a positive relationship between institutional 
investors and firm performance but Faccio and Lasfer (2000) could not report such a 
relationship. Mitra and Hossain (2007) suggested that the presence of institutional 
shareholders impact upon the effectiveness of stockholder monitoring of corporate 
affairs including for example audit and non-audit management process. An increase 
in institutional stock ownership was associated with a decrease in non-audit fee 
ratios. Extending this line of thought, it is expected that institutional investors play 
monitoring roles and are better informed than individual investors (Balsam et al, 
2002), and so they actively monitor the financial accounting process 
(Venkatachalam, 1998) which supports the conjecture that they are an important 
variable in the explanation of the activity or diligence of the Audit Committee.        
This inconsistency in the findings provides a basis for further examination of the 
relationship between ownership structure (both institutional and managerial) and 
Audit Committee activity or diligence. The second hypothesis is divided into two 
parts, one each for the two ownership structures variables considered in the thesis.    
The null hypotheses are stated as:  
H2a:  There are no relationships between managerial ownership and Audit 
Committee activity 
 
H2b:  There are no relationships between substantial outside shareholding and 
Audit Committee Activity  
 
Audit Committee Expertise 
One of the propositions of most post ENRON Corporate Governance provisions 
globally requires that the Audit Committee be composed of persons that have recent 
and relevant financial experience, thereby implying that they should be able to, at a 
minimum, read and understand the financial statements which include the income 
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statement, balance sheet, cash flow statement and the notes to the accounts 
Further, most of these provisions also require that at least one person among the 
members should have recent relevant financial qualifications. The definition of recent 
relevant financial qualification is ambiguous and there has not been a clear 
interpretation of this requirement. One suggested definition provided in the SOX is 
presented below: 
“a financial expert is any member who has the education or experience of a 
public accountant, auditor, principal financial officer, comptroller or principal 
accounting officer of an issuer, or has been in a position requiring the 
understanding of generally accepted accounting principles and financial 
statement experience in the preparation and auditing of financial statements 
of comparable issuers, experience in the application of such principles in 
connection with the accounting for estimates, accruals and reserves; 
experience with internal accounting control and an understanding of Audit 
Committee functions” (Dey, 2008:1151; Woodlock, 2006:52). 
 
The central issue to this provision is the need for the members of the Audit 
Committee to have between them the required skill and experience to be able to 
discharge their specific oversight functions effectively. They need to be able to ask 
relevant, probing and tough questions (Spira, 2003) in order to ensure that 
management are above board in their activities and in order to fulfil their duty of 
protecting the interests of the shareholders. The business environment is very 
dynamic and requires individuals that can keep up with the various dimensions of 
growth in the business world especially in a globally competitive market where 
confidence needs to be sustained and correct signals in respect of corporate 
accountability and transparency need to be projected (Cadbury, 1992). Lack of 
transparency may be taken to imply poor accountability and investors are sceptical 
of such organisations. Even at a national level, countries that have a history of 
suppression and anti-democratic practices have often been seen to be 
unaccountable and unsuitable for serious investment (La Porta et al, 2002).  
 
Abbot et al (2003) documented a significant negative relationship between the 
presence of a member of a board with financial expertise and the incidence of 
financial statement restatement. Similar findings were documented by Raghunandan 
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and Rama (2003), when they found that shareholders support the ratification of 
auditor appointment even when the ratio of non-audit fee to audit fee is high so long 
as there is a financial expert on the board. Davidson et al (2004) found positive stock 
price reaction to the announcement of the appointment of financial expertise to the 
Audit Committee. These findings can be explained in the sense that the presence of 
an expert on the board may imply increased committee vigilance and increased 
internal control and enhanced risk management functions of the committee. With 
such increases in the oversight function, all things being equal, it should constrain or 
reduce the vulnerability to internal control override by management, for example, and 
it may also mean better reporting quality and thus better protection for the 
shareholders and other relevant stakeholders such as the bondholders (Anderson et 
al, 2002). 
 
From the foregoing, it is intuitive to envisage an a priori relationship between Audit 
Committee activity and the presence of a financial expert on the board. If there are 
experts on the board, the board should function more effectively and this should 
explain increases in its activities. In terms of signs of the co-efficient of this 
relationship, the researcher envisages a positive relationship between the presence 
of an expert on the Audit Committee and its activities. The study will therefore be 
testing the null hypothesis stated as: 
 
H3:  There are no relationships between Audit Committee Activity and Committee 
Expertise. 
 
Audit Committee Charter  
One of the provisions of the Blue Ribbon Committee in the US, the Smith Committee 
Report and the Combined Code in the UK on the effectiveness of the Audit 
Committee is the requirement that every Audit Committee should have terms of 
reference defining their scope of operations, their functions, process and procedure 
and, importantly, as a basis for their evaluation. Every committee is unique and 
should have a charter drafted specifically for their needs. It is imagined that the 
availability of a charter provides clarification of the roles and expectations of the 
Audit Committee. It is not proposed that this charter should be static or fixed but 
rather should be reviewed on a regular basis to determine its appropriateness and 
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whether it needs to be modified in the light of current requirements and exigencies. 
The charter should provide a benchmark against which the committee and its 
personnel will be evaluated.  
 
This study therefore suggests an a priori theory that the availability of a committee 
charter making clear and stating the scope of the committee functions, resources, 
methods and basis of evaluation, all things being equal, should increase the 
activities of the committee in the discharge of its oversight responsibilities. In terms 
of the direction of the relationship, the research will expect a positive relationship 
between the presence or availability of a committee charter and the activity of the 
committee. In other words the co-efficient is expected to be positive. The null 
hypothesis to be tested here is stated as: 
 
H4:  There are no relationships between Audit Committee activity and Committee 
charter   
 
The following control variables are thought to be of importance in determining Audit 
Committee activity and have also been used in previous empirical studies. 
 
Other Variables  
An a priori theoretical suggestion indicates that a positive relationship exists between 
the size of the organisation and the activity of its Audit Committee. This expectation 
was confirmed by Collier and Gregory (1999) who showed that Audit Committee 
activity is positively related to firm size although the result was not statistically 
significant. Similar results had been reported by Pincus et al (1989). Equally, the size 
of the Audit Committee may affect the activity of the committee. A committee with 
more members may be able to do more in terms of monitoring reporting quality while 
Audit Committees in a large organisation may be expected to be more active than in 
a smaller organisation.   
 
Furthermore, the complexity of the organisation is also a factor that may affect the 
activity of the committee. Here, complexity is not in terms of the nature of the 
operations alone but also in terms of structure and number of subsidiaries. The 
complexity brought about by complex ownership structures and modes of operation 
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may spread across geographical boundaries. For such organisations complexity will 
impact upon the activity of the committee. Number of subsidiaries, proportion of the 
subsidiaries that are based in overseas jurisdictions and the ratio of current assets to 
total assets has been used as a proxy for firm complexity (Creswell, 2003; Goddard 
and Masters, 2000; Collier and Gregory, 1999). 
   
In all, this study anticipates relationships between these control variables and the 
level of activity of the Audit Committee. From the foregoing, the following a priori 
theories are suggested: firstly, that a complex structure will exercise the Audit 
Committee more and hence a positive relationship should subsist between Audit 
Committee activity and organisational complexity. Secondly, bigger organisations 
should require closer monitoring and this should imply greater activity for the Audit 
Committee. These expectations are based on an agency cost theoretical framework. 
The following null hypotheses are therefore examined:  
 
H5a:  There are no relationships between Audit Committee activity and firm 
complexity  
H5b: There are no relationship between Audit Committee activity and firm size   
 
Diligence 
An alternative definition of Audit Committee activity termed diligence is also 
examined in this thesis. In this study, DILIGENCE was defined as the linear sum of 
the number of Audit Committee meetings per annum, the binary value of the 
presence of a financial expert on the committee and the presence of a charter. Audit 
Committees that meet a minimum of three times in a year are awarded a point and 
Committees with less than three meetings a year are awarded zero. Further, the 
Combined Code (2003) requires that Audit Committees should have at least one 
member with recent and relevant financial expertise (the Code was not specific in 
terms of qualification or number of years and nature of experience that would qualify 
as recent and relevant. However, Dey (2008) used the definition provided in SOX). 
For the purpose of this study, expertise was defined as a committee member who is 
a qualified accountant or a committee with at least one member that meets this 
requirement; such committees were awarded a point with a mark of zero for 
committees that fail to meet this definition. Lastly, the Combined Code requires that 
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Audit Committees should have terms of reference that detail their expected 
responsibilities and procedures. The researcher expects that this should enhance 
committee effectiveness by providing a benchmark against which Audit Committees 
and their members are evaluated. The presence of a set of expected responsibilities 
and terms of reference serves as a target for the Audit Committee. Therefore, 
committees that have terms of reference or a charter were awarded a point with 
none given for committees that do not have such terms of reference or a charter. 
Based on this scoring method, the researcher derived a composite dependent 
variable and examines how much change in this variable is explained by the set of 
independent variables. 
 
4.5  Development of Hypotheses: Audit committee activity and Auditor 
independence 
 
 Board Composition and External Auditors’ Fee 
The motivation for the first research hypothesis in this part of the thesis develops 
from the requirement by most recent Corporate Governance guidelines (Combined 
Code, 2003; SOX, 2002) that boards of directors should be composed mostly of 
independent non-executive directors, who are expected to be able to protect the 
interests of all stakeholders in the corporation especially those of the shareholders. 
The presence of more independent non-executive directors should reduce agency 
costs through their monitoring and decision control functions (Fama and Jensen, 
1983). Dahya et al, 2002 documented an increase in the proportion of independent 
non-executive directors in UK listed companies. Song and Windram (2004) found an 
increase in the nature and scope of the work of non-executive directors on the board. 
Enhanced activity of the board has been found to reduce agency costs associated 
with financial fraud and with sanctions from regulating authorities (Beasley, 1996; 
Dechow et al, 1996). These findings support the conjecture that a higher proportion 
of independent non-executive directors on the board enhance board monitoring and 
controlling functions some of which may relate to auditing and reporting activities.  
 
However, the implications of these changes on auditing and related functions may 
not be clear cut. To the extent that independent non-executive directors are keen on 
projecting an appearance of high reporting quality, the researcher expects a positive 
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relationship between external auditors‟ fees and the proportion of independent non-
executive directors on the board. This suggests that the more independent non-
executive directors on the board there are, the greater the likelihood of demanding 
more services from the external auditor and consequently, the higher the external 
auditors‟ fees.  On the other hand, it could well be that an increased number of 
independent non-executive directors on the board would enhance monitoring, 
leading to improved internal control within the organisation. This may translate into a 
reduction in auditors‟ time used in completing their audit and related assignments, 
with the effects being a reduction in the total fees earned by the auditor from the 
client. From these analyses, the researcher suggests the hypothesis below:  
 
H6:  There are no relationships between the external auditors‟ fees and board 
composition 
 
Audit Committee Activity and External Auditors’ Fees. 
Further, a number of governance studies have examined the possibilities of the Audit 
Committee failing to discharge its enlarged responsibilities. Although, as already 
noted, it is extremely difficult to measure committee effectiveness, studies have tried 
to measure the activity and diligence of the Audit Committee (Collier and Gregory, 
1996; Kalbers and Fogarty, 1996; Stewart and Munro, 2007) by using its meeting 
frequency. Collier and Gregory (1999) used the number of hours of meetings in a 
year as the measure of the extent of work undertaken by the committee.  
 
The Audit Committee of the board has the primary responsibility of ensuring auditing 
and reporting quality in the corporation. This has been unequivocally supported in 
many Corporate Governance codes, although there are academics that question the 
level of expectations placed on the committee. The Cadbury Committee report and 
the Smith Committee reports envisaged an important role for the Audit Committee in 
ensuring corporate auditing and reporting quality. To achieve this Audit Committees 
are required to be composed of mainly independent non-executive directors. They 
are also required to meet at least three times in a year to deliberate on reporting and 
auditing issues. Rezaee (2009) showed that the scope of the activity of the 
committee has increased significantly to include internal control, and risk 




While it may be expected that diligent Audit Committees may mean lower audit fees 
being charged by the external auditor, at the same time members of the Audit 
Committees may be interested in signalling efficiency and may be keen on 
preserving their reputation (Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004) and human capital worth in which 
case they may buy more services from the external auditor (Collier and Gregory, 
1996). The human capital preservation argument holds that members of Audit 
Committees are appointed due to their knowledge, skills and experience which are 
referred to as their human capital (Livingstone, 1997). This capital is preserved by 
reducing exposures to factors that can deplete it.  
 
Previous studies have found conflicting results regarding the relationship between 
Audit Committee activity and external auditors‟ fees. While Abbot et al (2003) did not 
find any significant association between Audit Committee meeting frequency and 
audit fees, Stewart and Munro (2007) found a significant positive relationship. In this 
study, using more recent data, the researcher tests the relationship between Audit 
Committee diligence proxied by meeting frequency and external auditors‟ fees and 
perceived auditor independence proxied by the extent of economic bonding between 
the auditor and the auditee.  
 




Ownership structure and External Auditors’ Fee 
Consideration of this aspect falls into two parts in this thesis i.e. substantial outside 
shareholdings and substantial management shareholdings. These are now 
discussed below.  
 
Substantial outside shareholdings  
Previous researches (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Keasey and Short, 1999) have 
suggested that ownership structure in organisations matters in respect of corporate 
monitoring and controls. While individual stockholders may find it costly to monitor 
management, it may be more economical and efficient for investors with substantial 
[161] 
 
shareholdings in a firm to monitor management action in ensuring reporting and 
auditing quality (Mitra and Hossain, 2007). It has also been shown that substantial 
shareholders have access to important firm disclosures before they are made public 
(El-Gazzar, 1998) which may indicate their influence in a corporation. They could 
also observe and identify earnings management earlier than individual shareholders 
and are more likely to intervene where they perceive that such earnings 
management is capable of affecting the firm‟s value (Balsam et al, 2002). Kane and 
Velury (2004) suggested that substantial shareholders can influence management 
for two main reasons. First, because of the size of their holding they have real 
influence over security trade and can thus affect the firm‟s stock prices and, 
secondly, they can affect management through their impact on the strategic direction 
of the organisation. Taken together, substantial shareholders play Corporate 
Governance functions in organisations by constraining agency cost.  The researcher 
anticipates a negative relationship between substantial stock ownership 
(INVESTOR) and external auditors‟ fees.  
 
Management Shareholdings  
Section 2.3.5 page 48 of this thesis analysed the role of management ownership as 
an internal control mechanism. The researcher showed that the direction of the 
relationship between management share ownership and agency cost could be bi-
directional. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggested that substantial managerial 
ownership may constrain management from consuming perquisites, thereby 
reducing conflicts of interest between directors and other stakeholders. Others have 
suggested that the relationship between management share ownership and 
measures of agency cost may not be linear (McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Short 
and Keasey, 1999). Thus, this relationship is positive up to a certain range of 
management shareholding and negative thereafter. For this reason the researcher is 
unable to anticipate the direction of the relationship between substantial 
management shareholdings (MGTOWNER) and external auditors‟ fees. 
  
H8a:  There are no relationships between external Auditors‟ fees and managerial 
share ownership in firms. 
H8b:  There are no relationships between external Auditors‟ fees and substantial 




Other Governance Variables  
The following governance control variables were also used in the study.  
Expert  
This control variable relates to the Audit Committee. Its relevance is motivated by the 
Corporate Governance requirement that at least one member of the Audit Committee 
should be a financial expert. This is to enhance the effectiveness of the Audit 
Committee in discharging its financial oversight functions. However, previous studies 
have proved inconclusive with respect to the effect of the presence of a financial 
expert on auditing and reporting quality. While Abbott et al (2002) found that firms 
with financial experts on their Audit Committees are less likely to express financial 
reporting restatement or fraud, Carcello and Neal (2003) found that financial experts 
on the Audit Committee do not protect auditors from dismissal following the issuance 
of a going-concern report. In this study the researcher used a dummy variable 
(EXPERT) with a value of 1 if the Audit Committee has at least one financial expert 
and 0 if otherwise.  
 
Charter 
Section 5.2.4 page 163 of this thesis addresses the importance of the Audit 
Committee having terms of reference or a charter.  The Smith report and the Blue 
Ribbon Committee reports as well as other Corporate Governance reports require 
that the Audit Committee should have a charter that guides its activities. This is 
supposed to be reviewed annually. The researcher anticipates a negative 
relationship between the presence of a charter on the Audit Committee (CHARTER) 
and the external auditors‟ fees. This is because having a charter can contribute to 
the effectiveness of the Audit Committee in discharging its financial oversight 
functions which should result in a reduction in external auditors‟ fees as a result of 
the reduction in agency cost and increased diligence on the Audit Committee‟s part.  
 
Committee Size:     
The Cadbury Committee report suggested a minimum of three independent non-
executive directors on the Audit Committee; this is also the suggestion of the Blue 
Ribbon Committee in the US. Abbott et al (2004) were of the opinion that the 
requirement to have a minimum number of non executive directors on the Audit 
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Committee is an attempt to elevate the status and organisational importance of this 
governance mechanism. Turley and Zaman (2007) have shown that Audit 
Committees have organisational influence and power. Similarly, Kalbers and 
Forgarty (1993) enumerate the importance of Audit Committee legitimacy and power 
which may be reflected in the size of the committee. The researcher anticipates a 
positive relationship between the Audit Committee size (COMMSIZE) and their 
activity and, by extension, the researcher expects a negative relationship between 
Audit Committee size and external auditors‟ fee.  
 
Board Meetings 
Board meeting was used as a measure of board activity. The researcher expects 
that increased board activity should constrain external auditors‟ fees. A negative 
relationship is anticipated between this variable (BOARDMET) and the external 
auditors‟ fees.  
 
Control Variables  
Previous studies have identified a number of control variables that are important in 
determining external auditors‟ fees. These have been categorised into variables that 
measure firms‟ profitability, audit risk, complexity of operation, and size. These are 





The effect of profitability on audit fees can be bi-directional. To the extent that a 
client is profitable may imply more audit effort for the auditor in order to ensure that 
the assertions made in the financial statements are true, complete and accurate. 
This may require substantial audit work which invariably exerts an upward pressure 
on the fees paid to the external auditor. However, a profitable firm may be seen as a 
less risky client in terms of going concern assessments and, where a business risk 
approach is used in auditing the client, it may mean that the audit is completed more 
quickly thereby exerting downward pressure on external auditors‟ fees. Lee and 
Mande (2005) used return on assets as a measure of profitability. This was 
measured as net income divide by total assets. Mitra and Hossain (2007) used net 
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income divided by average assets to measure return on assets. The researcher 
adopts Lee and Mande‟s (2005) definitions of return on assets (ROA) because it is 
more complete and more widely used in previous studies.   
 
Risk and Complexity  
Intuition suggests that a positive relationship should exist between variables that 
proxy for firm riskiness and complexities and external auditors‟ fees. The more risky 
and complex a client is the more the audit effort and time required to gather the 
necessary audit evidence that could aid in the formation of an appropriate audit 
opinion and consequently the higher the external auditors‟ fees. A number of 
variables have been used in previous studies to proxy for risk and complexities of the 
auditee, including natural log of subsidiaries and the number of employees. For 
example, Stewart and Kent (2006) used the ratio of receivables plus inventory to 
total assets, while Lee and Mande (2005) used the square root of the number of 
employees in addition to other variables such as dummy variables that assume a 
value of 1 if a client has a pension scheme and 0 if otherwise, an indicator variable 
which is equal to 1 if a firm restates its earnings in the year and 0 if otherwise. In this 
study the researcher uses the natural log of the number of subsidiaries as a measure 





Previous studies have shown that client size is a major determinant of the external 
auditors‟ fees both for audit and non-audit services. The intuition is that bigger 
organisations require more time to complete their audit compared to smaller ones. 
They may also involve more visits and more sites than smaller firms. All these build 
up audit time and are reflected in increased fees. A positive relationship is expected 
between auditee size and the value of the external auditors‟ fees. Mitra and Hossain 
(2007) used the natural log of total assets to proxy for firm size a similar measure 
being used by Stewart and Kent (2006) and Lee and Mande, (2005). In line with 
previous studies, the researcher used the natural log of turnover (LNTOVER) as well 
as the natural log of number of employees (LNEMPLOY) to proxy for firm size.  
H9:  There are no relationship between external auditors‟ fee and firms‟ profitability  
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H10:  There are no relationships between external auditors‟ fee and firms‟ complexity  
H11: There are no relationships between external auditors‟ fees and firms‟ size 
 
4.6 Development of Hypotheses: Audit and Non-Audit fees and Audit 
Committees’ Activity.   
Existing research in this area has been inconclusive (Beattie and Fearnley, 2002). 
While there are studies that have established a relationship between non-audit fees 
and investors‟ perceptions of auditor independence, audit fees and non-audit fees 
(Dopouch et al, 2003; Davies and Hollie, 2004), others have not found any significant 
relationship between these factors, and indeed have suggested that the provision of 
non-audit services to audit clients results in better understanding of client businesses 
and reduces audit risk. Lee and Mande (2005) found a positive relationship between 
audit and non audit fees when estimated using a single equation model which 
implies that audit clients buy more non-audit services from their auditor and that 
more audit services purchased from the auditor may also lead to an increase in non-
audit services supplied to the client, but found no significant relationship when their 
study was modelled using a simultaneous equation.  Whisenant et al (2003) have 
also documented positive relationships between audit and non-audit fees but noted 
that knowledge spillovers from audit to non-audit services depend on model 
specification and may result in different interpretations. It has been argued that 
single equation models of audit and non-audit fees are inadequate as they suffer 
from simultaneous equation bias (Whisenant et al, 2003). The implication here is that 
the estimates and test results are spurious.   
 
The major concern of this part of the thesis is about methods and whether the 
established relationship between audit and non-audit fees is sustained under both 
single equation and simultaneous equation models of fees. This is important given 
the inconsistency and conflicting results in the literature. Thus, while the second 
main research question of this thesis addressed the relationship between external 
auditors‟ fees and Audit Committee activity, these have been undertaken on the 
assumption that audit and non-audit fees are not jointly determined. Furthermore, the 
researcher‟s estimates in the second main research question used each of the fees 
as the dependent variable. For example, when audit fee was the dependent variable, 
non-audit fees were not used as part of the explanatory variables and vice versa. 
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One of the questions that this part of the thesis addressed is, what will happen to 
governance variables and other firm specific control variables if one of the 
explanatory variables of each of the fee model has another fee variable?. And how 
does Audit Committee activity impact on both audit and non-audit fees when they are 
estimated in a single equation model compared to when they are modelled 
endogenously? The following hypotheses are tested to examine these issues. These 
hypotheses have their bases in the discussions in sections 3.11 - 3.14 pages 132-
138 of the thesis. 
 
H12:  There are no relationships between audit and non-audit fees when estimated 
in a single equation model 
H13:  There are no relationships between audit and non-audit fees when estimated 
in a simultaneous equation model 
H14:  There are no relationships between Audit Committee activity and audit fees 
when estimated in a simultaneous equation fee model  
H15:  There are no relationships between Audit Committee activity and non-audit 
fees when estimated in a simultaneous equation fee model   
 
 
4.7 Summary  
 
The focus of this part of the thesis was to provide a theoretical framework for the 
study and develop relevant hypotheses. This was achieved by providing an analysis 
of both Agency and Stakeholders theories. The relationship between the theories 
was also examined. In the second part of the chapter, sections 4.4-4.6, the 
researcher developed relevant hypotheses for each of the main research questions 
of the thesis. A total of fifteen hypotheses were developed based on Agency theory. 
In the next chapter, the researcher enumerates and justifies the methodology used in 













































This chapter discusses the methods adopted for this study and also enumerates the 
steps involved in conducting the research as well as highlighting the challenges 
encountered in the process. First, it begins with an analysis of the research 
questions and the importance of each of these questions. Secondly, it examines 
approaches that have been adopted by previous researchers to answer similar 
questions in this field and provides detailed analyses of these to identify their key 
points and areas in which they could be improved. Thirdly, the method adopted for 
this study is then explained and justified. The possibility of alternative approaches is 
also examined with their attendant benefits and challenges. Lastly, the chapter 
argues that the strategy adopted for this study represents the most realistic available 
given the research questions, scope and other limitations that confront the 
researcher. 
 
Three main questions are the focal points of this thesis. Firstly, what are the 
determinants of the activity of the Audit Committee? Secondly, how does the activity 
of the Audit Committee impact on auditor independence through external auditors‟ 
fees and, lastly, what is the relationship between audit and non-audit fees? In 
answering these questions the research uses the research methodology framework 





Saunders et al (2007) 
Figure 8: The Research Onion  
 
5.1 Research Philosophy 
The researcher now examines the important subject of research philosophy and 
strategy, so as to provide a basis for further discussion and analyses of the research 
questions and methodology later on in this chapter. This topic is very large with 
various shades of opinion and debates and it is practically impossible to exhaust the 
contents of this discourse in a study such as this. Therefore, the researcher has only 
summarised key findings that are relevant to this thesis. In doing so, the study 
explains the meaning of epistemology in research and makes a distinction between 
positivist and interpretivist approaches. In terms of research strategy, the study 
focuses on deductive and inductive research strategies and underscores the benefits 






5.2 Epistemology    
Essentially, researchers can be categorised in terms of their epistemological 
orientations. Social scientists that see reality in terms of tangible fact and favour the 
„scientific‟ approach to enquiry are broadly referred to as Positivists, because they 
adopt the „natural scientist‟ method of investigation which is characterised by 
expressing their research questions in the form of hypotheses and formulating 
appropriate equations to test the validity of the hypothesised phenomena (Bryman 
and Bell, 2003). Data collection approaches will also reflect this method of enquiry.  
These researchers will probably be more inclined to collect quantitative data that 
lend themselves well to rigorous scientific, mathematical and statistical analyses to 
answer their research questions (Remenyi et al., 1998). Their approach contrasts 
with those that see reality in terms of its descriptive qualities. They see business and 
management as being distinct from the natural sciences and consider the primary 
concern of the social sciences to be humans who cannot be subjected to the 
laboratory experimental method of enquiry used in core or natural sciences. Their 
perceptions of what constitutes true knowledge and how to gather facts about this 
truth are shaped by this orientation and the belief that scientific enquiry and methods 
are for the natural sciences and should not be borrowed and inferred in social 
sciences whose focus is humans. These types of investigations are referred to as 
Interpretivism (Saunders et al. 2007).  
 
Interpretivists see the researcher as a member of a social group in which he/she is a 
social actor and plays an active role in its formulation and development and in 
making meanings of its interactions. This philosophy has its background in the 
intellectual notions of phenomenology and symbolic interactionism which refer to the 
ways in which human beings seek to make sense of the social world around them 
and the fact that researchers are involved in a continuous process of making sense 
of the social worlds around us (Saunders et al, 2007). In terms of the method of data 
collection, the interpretivist would favour an approach that allows an in-depth inquiry 
into human behaviour which is capable of generating significant insights into the 
social dimensions of the enquiry. The method of analysis will also be suited to the 




One other issue that also characterises research epistemology is the power of 
generalisability and replicatability of the research. While positivist approaches are 
often generalisable and replicatable because they are based on a theoretical 
underpinning which to a great extent affects data collection and analysis, the 
interpretivist may actually be exploring the possibility of establishing a relationship or 
a social concept irrespective of whether it is capable of being replicated or 
generalised so that it might even be the precursor of a „grounded theory‟. The fact 
that it provides the opportunity to explore an isolated phenomenon and add to 
knowledge about social processes and methods of interpretation, extracting meaning 
from such investigations, may be considered a core contribution to knowledge in its 
own right. While it is not the intention to categorise research strictly on the basis of 
these philosophical strands, because reality suggests that overlaps do inevitably 
exist in the use of these methods, it is certainly instructive that researchers 
appreciate these philosophical divides and consider their implications on their 
research right from the outset (Reed, 1985; Bryman and Bell, 2003). It is also 
important to note that there are researchers who do not see the usefulness of the 
epistemological approach just as there are those who hold on to the mid-point 
between positivism and interpretivism. Closely related to the topic of research 
philosophy is the debate about research strategy.  
 
5.3 Research Strategy - Quantitative vs. Qualitative  
Two main strategies are identified (Saunders et al, 2007; Bryman and Bell, 2003) 
which are termed quantitative and qualitative. Some authors have referred to a third 
approach, the mixed method, which is a combination of the quantitative and 
qualitative approaches. Research strategy refers to the method of data collection 
and analysis adopted in the study. The quantitative research strategy favours the 
positivist epistemological orientation. It employs scientific methods of identifying the 
research question and sampling technique with a strong theoretical framework. 
Questions framed under this strategy are expressed in terms of hypotheses and 
estimation models in the form of derived equations with which to test the hypotheses. 
These may be tested with the help of mathematical equations, statistical analyses 
and econometric measurements, through which the researcher aims to find the 
answers to those questions. This method has also been termed the „deductive‟ 
approach to research. With this strategy, data are collected using semi-structured 
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questionnaires and in a number of other cases publicly available primary and 
secondary data are used in the analyses. The methods have a lot in common with 
the scientific method of enquiry. According to Robson (2002), a quantitative research 
strategy involves five steps which are: 
 Deducting a testable hypothesis from theory 
 Expressing these hypotheses in operational terms  
 Testing the operational hypotheses  
 Examining the specific outcome of the enquiry  
 Where necessary, modifying the theory in the light of the findings  
The quantitative research strategy allows for the establishment of causal 
relationships between variables and provides important insights into the 
interrelationships that could exist between very many variables of interest and 
enhances our understating of their links. The method also involves strict definition of 
terms and measurement of variables (i.e. operationalisation of the variables) of 
interest, so that the researcher is actually measuring what he sets out to measure 
and not another phenomenon. Further, because the approach makes use of 
mathematical and statistical tools which enhance the ability to make inferences and 
forecasts, it affords generalisation and replication of results and may improve study 
validity and originality. The approach is intuitive and logically driven.   
 
Major drawbacks of this method include the difficulty in finding suitable variables to 
capture the concepts the researcher wants to study. The use of proxy and/or 
surrogate variables for unobservable concepts is not equivalent to measuring the 
actual variable itself. Also, the method is fraught with problems such as wrong model 
specification such as the exclusion of important variables, inclusion of irrelevant 
variables and measurement errors either for the dependent or independent 
variables. The idea of using a proxy or surrogate variable may limit the impact of the 
established relationship and may cast doubt on the validity of the result from such a 
study. Elements of subjectivity are involved in determining the proxy or surrogate 
variables. These leave room for wide variations in the choice of variables and their 
measurements and may account for numerous inconsistencies in a number of 
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quantitative studies. Thirdly, the measurement validity and the choice of estimation 
techniques, model specification issues and statistical tests conducted may be 
inappropriate.   
 
The interpretivists have criticised this research strategy on the grounds that it 
assumes that social sciences, whose primary focus is humans and their social 
involvements, can be subjected to the same or similar methods of analysis as the 
pure sciences, whose main remit centres around inanimate objects which make 
„static‟ and „mundane‟ analyses in a laboratory setting ideal for a quantitative 
approach.  
 
Interpretivists prefer the use of an inductive approach to research. With this method, 
the research questions and methods lead to the formulation of theory and the 
discovery of a pattern of behaviour. Also, the values and perceptions of the 
researcher are inextricably linked to the research itself. The qualitative research 
strategy captures the social dynamics of business, its internal constituents, 
environments and stakeholders. It involves the use of data collection and analysis 
methods that are considered to be most suitable for investigating a social actor in a 
social setting. This is where human dynamics and vagaries are recognised in every 
stage of the research process. The qualitative research method would include the 
use of in-depth interviews, ethnography, observations, action research and focus 
groups among others. The major advantage of this method is the ability to explore 
and undertake an in depth investigation of a social actor or phenomenon. It thus 
provides the opportunity to make meanings of both spoken and unspoken responses 
and enables firsthand experience and interaction with the subject of the 
investigation, thereby removing the problems associated with using representative 
variables. The inductive approach to research can be the pivot to the emergence of a 
grounded theory, providing a more original insight and is perhaps the closest 
representation of reality. 
 
Despite the numerous benefits associated with using an inductive or qualitative 
approach to an investigation, it has a number of disadvantages. These include the 
problems of generalisability and of replicatability of the methods considering that no 
two individuals are the same in terms of feeling, emotional make up and other 
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individual uniqueness. The practical problems of access to respondents, especially 
where the research question relates to issues the respondent considers to be 
sensitive or not interesting and the possibility of biases arising from the researcher‟s 
own values, culture and perceptions mean that the results may not be separable 
from the subject of the investigation. Ethical considerations are even more important 
with inductive research. This is not to say that such considerations are any less 
important in the case of deductive research, but, because inductive research often 
involves direct contact with people of various ages and circumstances, issues 
around consent, vulnerability and participation may be directly related to ethical 
concerns in qualitative research but may be of less concern to deductive studies 
where secondary data may be used. Obviously, where other quantitative methods 
such as questionnaires are used, ethical considerations are just as important in 
qualitative research.   
 
The most important consideration concerning the method to use in a research 
investigation is the nature of the study itself (Saunders et al, 2007). Some issues can 
be suitably researched using a quantitative strategy, due to the difficulty of gathering 
appropriate qualitative data as in the case of negotiating interviews with senior 
management on corporate strategy or governance processes (among other sensitive 
information) since these may be regarded as sensitive issues, which may 
compromise corporate performance and survival in relation to their competitors. 
Usage of such a technique may also be due to the fact that data to undertake the 
research have been previously collected reliably and are either publicly available 
through government departments or agencies or through private providers and there 
is no point in reinventing the wheel so long as the data is reliable and free from error 
and bias. Researchers may also be constrained by resources such as time and 
finance. It takes a considerable length of time to negotiate access for interviews or 
other forms of qualitative study or even to persuade people to respond to 
questionnaires. Since the timeliness of the study may be of the essence, researchers 
may have to settle for secondary data which may be more readily available and 
faster to access and may make profound economic sense especially if the concerns 





Specifically in this investigation, the researcher will be using a positivist 
epistemological stance with a deductive approach using only a quantitative research 
strategy. These philosophical and strategic research choices are due to the nature of 
the investigation which lends itself well to these methodologies. These choices are 
also due to the resources available in terms of time and finance as well as the skill 
sets of the researcher. Further analyses and justification for these decisions are 
explained in the following sections. 
 
5.4 Data Collection Technique: Company Annual Reports  
The nucleus of the „research onion‟ suggested by Saunders et al (2007) relates to 
the data collection technique and the unit of analysis in a study. This aspect of the 
research is important and plays a crucial role in the research endeavour. As 
mentioned earlier the choice of the research technique including data collection 
procedures depends largely on the nature of the investigation, the researcher‟s 
resource availability and skills (Saunders et al, 2007; Bryman and Bell, 2003). For 
the purpose of this investigation the researcher has chosen to use secondary 
information (data) available in the annual reports of listed companies in the UK. In 
this section the study justifies this choice, drawing on relevant arguments and 
theories to support this decision.  
 
5.4.1 Relationship between Shareholders and Their Stewards 
The main focus of this research is on aspects of the relationships between the 
shareholders and those charged with the stewardship of the company – 
management, which is part of the central concern of Corporate Governance. This is 
being studied in the context of the accountability of the stewards (management) to 
the shareholders in the governance of the firm. In chapter 2, sections 2.2.1-2.2.4, the 
study enumerates different perceptions of the relationship between the shareholders 
and the management on the one hand and the business and its stakeholders‟ on the 
other. One important issue relates to the role of information among all parties in the 
corporate environment. Shareholders need information on the performance of the 
business and on the returns to their investment; other stakeholders need a variety of 




5.4.2 Accounting as a Language and the Annual Report as a Communication 
Device  
One way of providing information to all the stakeholders of the firm is through the 
annual report (Stanton and Stanton, 2002). It has long been argued that accounting, 
as it is currently constituted, fits the definition of a language (Mattessich, 1964) both 
in its lexical and grammatical characteristics (Belkaoui, 1980) and in the fact that it is 
the language of business (Bloomfield, 2008). Mattessich (1964:84) maintained that 
“it is comprehensive enough to warrant the transmission of information to a great 
many users”. Although it may not pass as communication, which is much more 
comprehensive and all encompassing than language (Littlejohn, 1983), it will 
certainly pass as a means of communication.  
 
One of the most obvious ways in which business communicates with its stakeholders 
is through the annual report. Notwithstanding its inherent deficiencies, it is still the 
most reliable means of communication in the modern business environment (Holland 
and Foo, 2003). This fact has been documented in numerous previous studies 
including Lee and Tweedie, 1975; Chang and Most, 1985; Day, 1986; Bouwman et 
al, 1987; Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000; Stanton and Stanton, 2002; Davison, 2002. Its 
uniqueness includes the fact that it is the only statutorily required piece of 
information providing a detailed account of the commercial activities that a company 
has been involved in for a specified period of time. It is widely relied upon by many 
stakeholders including the government and creditors. It has to be prepared to a 
certain prescribed standard and that standard of preparation as well as the truth and 
fairness of the information in it has to be certified by an auditor. These features of 
annual reports can favourably withstand the argument that the information in the 
annual report is just “boiler plate” and that it reflects just what the management want 
it to show.  
 
The annual report provides a considerable amount of information through which the 
researcher can project the activities of an enterprise. Statutory requirements for 
companies to provide certain information make it easier for researchers in such 
areas to access reliable data to work with. For example, in the United States listed 
companies are required to fill in form 20-F which provides sensitive information about 
governance in each company, while in the UK listed companies are required to 
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disclose the amounts paid to their auditors for both auditing and non-audit services  
as well as sensitive information about their governance structures. Using secondary 
and publicly available data frees researchers‟ time thereby allowing researchers to 
concentrate more on data preparation and analysis. Using such data thus helps 
them to be more focused, enables maximum use of available scarce resources and 
impacts positively on the achievement of the study objectives (Saunders et al, 2007).   
 
Secondary data, especially those that are legally required such as the annual report, 
have societal as well as statutory legitimacy (Stanton and Stanton, 2002; Gray et al, 
1995), have reputational value (Hooghiemstra, 2000) and enjoy very high neutrality 
(Lebar, 1982) both in the annual reports‟ numerical and narrative portions 
(Tauringana and Chiong, 2004). These features make them less error prone and 
more reliable. For these reasons, this study relies on the use of secondary data from 
the annual reports of companies listed on the London Stock Exchange. 
 
5.5 Methodology  
A review of the literature relating to Corporate Governance suggests that there is a 
strong bias towards quantitative research methods and visible Anglo-American 
positivist dominance. Out of a total of about one hundred main articles reviewed over 
ninety are biased towards a quantitative approach. In addition, the majority of studies 
in Corporate Governance use Agency Theory as the theoretical framework 
underpinning their investigations. Although there are studies that have used 
qualitative approaches (Spira, 2003; Gendron and Bedard, 2005; Turley and Zaman, 
2007), the researcher carefully considered the benefits and drawbacks of all the 
possible methods that could have been used to undertake this investigation as well 
as the most suitable theoretical framework to adopt. This study is conducted using 
the positivist epistemological paradigm, with Agency Theory as the main theoretical 
framework. This is because it is the most suitable approach considering the nature of 
the topic itself. Corporate Governance and Auditor Independence as well as the 
activity of the Audit Committees are important and sensitive issues to the extent that 
they can affect a firm‟s strategic stance, its performance and continue survival.  
Furthermore, a positivist approach is also the most appropriate considering data 
availability, problems with access to participant such as members of the Audit 
Committees and appropriate Auditors to facilitate an alternative approach, and the 
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researcher‟s skill sets.  The study also relies on secondary data as its data source. 
The justifications for these decisions are discussed below.   
 
In line with the reality of the nature of this thesis, it was decided to use secondary 
data to answer the research questions for the reasons stated earlier, some of which 
are now reiterated here. These reasons make the use of secondary data profoundly 
economical and the use of econometrics in data analyses suitable and justified. 
Firstly, the issues of Corporate Governance, auditor independence, Audit Committee 
activity and performance which form the central theme of this thesis are very 
sensitive. As a result, negotiating access to the appropriate person was found to be 
very difficult (Spira, 2002) and this very difficulty ruled out the use of a focus group or 
other forms of qualitative data gathering strategies. Further, there is a statutory 
requirement for all limited companies to submit their annual returns and accounts 
and these are required to be prepared to a statutorily required level.  
 
Equally, the accounting professional bodies, as well as the regulatory framework for 
reporting such as the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) in the UK and the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), do have set standards that guide 
the preparation and presentation of accounts and their associated information. 
Additionally, public limited companies are required to publish their annual reports 
and hold general meetings of shareholders on an annual basis. Such reports make 
information about companies easily accessible and most of the information that is 
needed which may have justified the use of questionnaires is publicly available. 
Listed companies also have additional listing rules that require them to disclose 
certain company specific information such as the methods used to comply and a 
statement of their compliance with the governance codes in place.  
 
Further, there are a number of private companies that provide broad level company 
specific corporate information which makes individual efforts in this respect 
unnecessary. Lastly, the turnaround time for data collection through other methods 
of gathering primary data make the use of secondary data the best option available.  
Consequently, the researcher decided to adopt a quantitative (deductive) approach 
to this research. In arriving at this decision, the researcher considered all other 
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methods that could have been used to answer the key research questions. These 
other methods and the reasons for their unsuitability are stated below. 
 
Possible research methods that were rejected by the researcher: 
 Qualitative research using interviews with auditors and persons charged with 
governance in organisations 
 Qualitative study using focus groups with auditors and non-executive directors 
 Content analysis of the minutes of board meetings  
 Qualitative study using interviews with retired auditors  
 Quantitative approach using questionnaires  
 
Essentially, these are all qualitative studies apart from the last option, with the key 
data collection method being through the media of interviews or a focus group. 
However, as earlier explained, the success of this method would depend largely on 
gaining access to interview the right sets of people who could provide relevant 
information for the study within the researcher‟s time frame. The researcher tried to 
follow up on a number of contacts with two professional accountancy organisations, 
viz the ACCA and ICAEW, with a view to gaining access to auditors who might be 
willing to take part in the study. The researcher followed up these contacts over 
several months until it became obvious that access at the level required could not be 
guaranteed. The researcher also tried following up the retired auditors lead but this 
was equally unsuccessful. Appendix 2 presents the e-mails and responses received 
from efforts made to gain access for the purpose of interviews. Due to these 
reasons, these alternative approaches were not considered to be feasible for the 
research, making the use of quantitative research the only available option.  
 
Agency Theory provides the theoretical framework for the analysis. This is because it 
represents the dominant and most powerful theoretical frame in this field of inquiry. 
In an Anglo-American Corporate Governance model, the market system plays a 
significant role and Agency Theory is a core concept in explaining interactions in the 





Table 6 below shows the sector distribution of the companies in the study; the 
classification was based on the UK Primary Standard Industrial Classification (2003). 
There are new classifications now being used. The 2003 edition relates to the data in 
this investigation. It shows that the surveyed companies are spread across various 
sectors in the economy, the highest contributing sector being the industrial and 
manufacturing sector with 36 companies. To test the hypotheses, data were 
collected for FTSE 350 firms for the year ending 2005-2006. This information was 
collected by hand from the annual reports of these companies and two regressions 
were run corresponding to two definitions of committee activities (the dependent 
variable) used in the study. Data collection commenced in April 2006 and continued 
until September 2007.  Table 7 presents the sample selection procedure. It showed 
that out of the total 350 listed companies that makes up FTSE 350, only 245 meet 
the selection criteria used.  
 
Table 6: Industry Description  
                     Number  
Aerospace and Defence  6 
Agriculture  1 
Automotive 2 
Biotechnology  2 
Building and Construction 14 
Business and Support Services 7 
Chemicals 3 
Computer, Technology and Internet  10 
Consumer and Retail Products 19 
Electronics and Engineering  15 
Food Manufacturing and Products  10 
Healthcare and Pharmaceutical 9 
Industrial and Manufacturing  36 
Leisure and Entertainment  18 
Metal and Mining 15 
Oil, Gas and Energy 13 
Publishing and Media   16 












Table 7: Sample Selection Criteria 
 Number  
Total companies in the FTSE350 350 
Exclude: Investment companies  36 
                Other companies in financial and regulated sectors 37 
                Companies with missing variables  32 
 
Total number of companies in the final sample  245 
 
 
5.6 Chapter Summary  
 
This chapter provided a general overview of research methodology and 
epistemological divides in social science researches. It also enumerates the 
justifications for using an interpretivist approach and secondary data for these 
investigations. Finally it reiterates the importance of the annual report as a source of 
company specific information and provided information about the study sample 
selection process and industry distribution of the firms used in the study. The 
following three chapters present the empirical findings of the study. They present the 
findings in respect of each of the three main research questions of the study. 
Chapter 6 focuses on the determinants of Audit Committee activity. Chapter 7 
reports on the relationship between Audit Committees and Auditor Independence, 
while chapter 8 reports on the relationships between Audit and Non-audit fees and 
Audit Committees. In doing these, each of the chapter had a specific methodology 
and data section which detailed the methods adopted and sources of the data used 
in the chapter. Further analyses and results were presented and comparisons with 








Determinants of Audit Committee Activity 
 
Introduction  
This is the first empirical chapter of the thesis and it examines the determinants of 
Audit Committee activity. The chapter provides an introduction to the subject and 
then enumerates the functions of the Audit Committee. In chapter 4 section 4.4, the 
researcher developed a number of hypotheses to test factors that accounts for Audit 
Committee activity. It reports the results of the hypotheses testing and discusses the 
findings in the context of outcome from previous studies and the broader issues of 
Corporate Governance and Audit Committee Activity. The chapter is structured as 
follows: section 6.1 discussed Audit Committees‟ functions, section 6.2 presents 
information on methodology and data, section 6.3 presents the correlation analyses 
and descriptive statistics. Hypotheses were tested in section 6.4 while section 6.5 
presents the results and discussions. Alternative model specifications were 
examined in section 6.6 result of this was discussed in section 6.7 while section 6.8 
provides a summary of the chapter.      
 
6.1 Functions of the Audit Committee 
 In the wake of the corporate failures that spread across the global economy in the 
late 1990s and the early 21st century, most of the codes of governance produced 
have ascribed or envisioned a large and important role to the Audit Committee, 
although there are some academics that have expressed their reservations for the 
seemingly hyped or exaggerated expectations of these Audit Committees (Spira, 
2002; Collier and Zaman, 2005). Under current governance requirements the 
committee is to provide oversight functions on the management in respect of 
auditing, financial reporting, internal control and risk management in organisations 
and thereby expect to protect the interests of the shareholders. While this is a 
laudable idea, what is now important is to be able to assess the performance of this 
committee as a basis for determining the appropriateness of the responses to 
corporate failures. Further, Audit Committees as sub-board committees are to 
ensure transparent reporting and reporting quality among other responsibilities, so 
an appreciation of the activity of the Audit Committee would stem from an 
understanding of their expected roles and responsibilities. The Combined Code 
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(2003), and specifically the Smith Committee (2003), focused attention on the roles 
of the Audit Committee. Previously, the Treadway Commission of 1987 in the US 
stated the expected roles of the Audit Committee and the importance of these roles 
in the corporate environment in which market confidence is to be sustained. Further, 
the Blue Ribbon Committee Report (BRC) of 1999 in the US emphasised the 
importance of the role of the Audit Committee and provided a list of factors that may 
enhance the committee‟s functioning. In the following section the study will 
summarise the proposed functions of the Audit Committee and measures that have 
been suggested to enhance the activity or functioning of the committee. 
 
A division of the roles of the Audit Committee can be categorised into two main 
periods namely the pre-Cadbury and post-Cadbury activities of Audit Committees.  
These time related roles depict the importance attached to the activities of this sub-
board committee most probably as a result of corporate misbehaviours and their 
effects on investors in terms of their lost investments, drastic falls in the value of their 
shares and also the effect on the market in respect of loss of confidence in the 
market system to protect investors. Pre Cadbury Audit Committees do not seem to 
enjoy as much attention as the post Cadbury committee .For instance, in the UK 
there was no high profile report on the activities of the Audit Committee prior to the 
Smith Committee report of 2003.  In the US the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) only 
came into effect in 2002. Although there have been reports such as the Treadway 
(1987) and BRC (1993) none of these enjoyed the congressional backing that SOX 
has. Post ENRON, Audit Committee activities are well defined and „enforced‟ (in the 
case of US companies, compliance is compulsory and non-compliance is sanctioned 
with exceptions given only for foreign registrants). The Audit Committee enjoys both 
corporate and social legitimacy and is an important feature of modern Corporate 
Governance mechanisms. Their roles as well as their expected contributions to 
corporate stability and sustainability are well codified. Prior to the Smith Report, a 
number of academics and professionals have tried to articulate the functions of the 
Audit Committee. These include the Cadbury Report (1992); Collier and Gregory 
(1993); Wolnizer (1995); Spira (2002, 2003); and later we had Dedman (2004); 
Mallin (2004); The Combined Code (2003); and Rezaee, (2009). According to 
Wolnizer (1995), Audit Committee functions can be categorised under three main 
headings: Auditing, Financial Reporting and Corporate Governance functions. This 
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categorisation by Wolnizer fits well with the Smith Report (2003) in the UK as well 
The Combined Code (2003). Chapter three (section 3.6c) of the thesis reviewed 
these functions.  
 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines activity or diligence as a set of endeavours, 
skills, tasks etc requiring the exertion of some degree of effort and for which there 
may or may not be an assessment. Two prominent British academics have authored 
works on the activity of the Audit Committee. First there was the work by Collier and 
Gregory (1996) on Audit Committee effectiveness and reporting quality and, 
secondly, the audit fee, Audit Committee activity and agency cost (Collier and 
Gregory, 1999). They defined Audit Committee activity to mean the diligence with 
which the committee carries out its work. Essentially they used the frequency of 
Audit Committee meetings to stand for committee activity and examined the 
relationship between the frequencies of Audit Committee meetings on other 
variables which were the explanatory variables.  
 
In these two studies, Audit Committee activities were defined in relation to the 
number of meetings held within the year and hours spend in meetings within a year. 
What is not known is the duration of each of the meetings and what was discussed 
during the meetings, the level of the discussions and their effects on reporting quality 
or indeed their effect on other variables of interest are not known. These are not 
observable except through access to the minutes of committee meetings. However, 
these studies were undertaken prior to the Cadbury reports and certainly before the 
recent corporate crises that is having enduring effects on corporate governance both 
in terms of regulations and expected monitoring and oversight functions of the 
control mechanisms such as the Audit Committees. Spira (2003) provided insights 
into the internal working of the Audit Committee and how they make meaning of their 
functions. Here she emphasised the difficulty in determining the effectiveness or 
activity of an individual let alone the effectiveness of a group and she also 
highlighted the difficulty in conducting research in this area because of the exclusivity 
of the members of the board and issues with access and sensitivity.  
 
Others have also identified the real difficulty encountered in defining the 
effectiveness of the performance of an individual or a group (Kalbers and Fogarty, 
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1993; Grendon and Bedard, 2005). Even in pure science, effectiveness as a defined 
concept is vague and subjective. This is because it has many domains and spheres 
through which it may be examined and there is no universal definition of 
effectiveness. However, it is possible to identify factors that may account for the 
committee‟s effectiveness or activity and these may be referred to as the 
determinants of the effectiveness of the committee. The Blue Ribbon Committee in 
the US provided indicators of an effective Audit Committee which include committee 
independence, composition and structure of the committee, the presence of an 
expert on the committee and the presence of a committee‟s terms of reference or 
charter to provide a basis for the assessment of the committee. 
 
The literature review chapter suggested the predominance of quantitative studies in 
Corporate Governance compared to qualitative studies especially because of the 
nature of the subject. Corporate governance spreads across disciplines touching on 
accounting, finance, economics and law. These are fields that are traditionally 
quantitative in orientation, with the exception of law. Although there are behavioural 
aspects to these disciplines, the overriding influence of positivist trends is clearly 
observable. Further, existing literature on Corporate Governance from an agency 
theoretical framework perspective has identified some base variables and likely 
control variables depending on the subset of the subject that is being examined. A 
synthesis of the previous literature revealed that an Audit Committee‟s activity or 
diligence is determined by variables such as committee composition, structure, 
expertise, and charter. Also firm specific variables such as firm size, complexity and 
risk are have been used in previous studies (Collier and Gregory, 1993; 1996; 1999; 




6.2 Methodology and Data  
The hypotheses will be tested using multiple regression analyses with the Ordinary 
Least Square model (OLS). OLS refers to the technique used in achieving a line of 
best fit, such that the sum of the squared deviation of all the distances from this line 
is minimised. It helps to explain variations in a variable known as the dependent 
variable by examining the changes in a series of independent or explanatory 
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variables while also capturing the unpredictable elements of the measurements. In 
other words, the OLS allows us to model so that the systematic component of 
variation in a variable of concern is captured as well as the estimate of the random or 
stochastic element of the variation. It requires that the dependent variable be 
continuous while the explanatory variables may either be continuous or categorical 
data in nature (Maddala, 2001). The model is stated formally in its simplest form with 
one independent variable as:  
 iiii xy ------------------------------------------------------- (1) 
Where: 
y  = a vector of the form n x 1  
x = a matrix of the form n x k 
 = a vector of the form k x 1  
 = a vector of the form n x 1  
 
Using Agency Theory as the theoretical reference, the study modelled the 
determinant of Audit Committee activity/diligence stated in the general term below 
as:  
)2...(.......................................................................3322 ininiiI XXXY  
Where i = 1, 2, 3.....................................N (which represent the various explanatory 
or independent variables)   
Y= Dependent variable and it is normally distributed  
X= independent variables explaining variation in Y 
  Represents the parameter co-efficient which is linear and determines the power 
of the model 
 the standard error term; this is random with an expected value of zero and 











In arriving at the choice of multiple regressions using OLS, the study considered the 
nature of the investigation and data availability. It may have been possible to use a 
binary logistic or probit regression but these would have been inappropriate for this 
type of investigation. Logistic regression is most suitable in estimating relationships 
where the dependent variable is dichotomous in nature although the independent 
variables could either be categorical or continuous variables (Maddala, 2001). 
Logistic regression applies maximum likelihood estimation by transforming the 
dependent variable into a logit variable which is the natural log of the odds of the 
dependent occurring or not. 
 
Although similar to OLS in that it relates the changes in the dependent variable to the 
independent variables, logistic regression finds the changes in the log odd of the 
























Table 8: Definition of variables  
All variables were sourced from the each company’s annual report (AR) 
Variables                              Definition  
AUACT Audit Committee activity, measured as the frequency of Audit 
Committee meetings 
BOSIZE Defines the number of directors on the board (both executive and 
Independent Non-Executive Directors) 
NONEXEC Defines as the proportion of the Independent Non-Executive 
Directors to total number of directors on the board (with no 
business or contractual relationships with the company apart from 
their roles as directors).  
 BOARDMET Defines the number of board meetings held in a year 
OWNSTRUC This is comprised of two measures:  
 1) INVESTOR: defines the number of shareholders holding 
more than a 3% shareholding in the company (disclosure is 
statutorily required).  
2) MGTOWNER: binary variable, equal to 1 if management 
hold up to 3% shareholding in the company‟s share and 
0otherwise (disclosure is statutorily required).  
AUEXP A binary variable measuring financial expert. Equal to 1 if at least 
one member of the board is a financial expert and 0 if otherwise.  
AUSIZ Total number of Independent Non-Executive Directors on the Audit 
Committee 
AUCHAT Equals to 1 if Audit Committee has  a Charter or term of reference, 
and 0 if otherwise 
LNNOEMPLOY Natural log of number of employee, use to proxy for firm size. 
LNTOVER Natural log of turnover, used to proxy for firm size. 
LNSUB Natural log of  the number of subsidiaries of a company, used to 
proxy for firm complexity 
ROA Return on capital , defined as net income divide by total assets, 





Further, making the dependent variable dichotomous in OLS violates its core 
assumptions. Specifically, the assumptions of normality and homoscedasticity are 
violated since normality is impossible with just two values (e.g., yes or no; 1 or 0 etc) 
Homoscedasticity is also violated because with two values 1 and 0, variances will not 
be equal, they will probably be low at both extreme ends of the regression line when 
Y=0 and Y=1 but will be high in the middle violating the assumptions of constant 
variance across the whole length of the regression line (Wooldridge, 2000). The 
same reasoning applies in the case of probit regression. On the other hand, using 
OLS is suitable for this investigation since none of the properties or assumptions on 
which OLS is based is violated. Despite this reassurance, pre and post estimation 
tests were performed to confirm the validity of some of the OLS assumptions 
especially violation of constant variance assumption or the perfect collinearity 
between two independent variables.  
 
6.2.1 Data 
This part of the thesis uses cross-sectional data from the FTSE 350 companies listed 
on the London Stock Exchange for the year 2005/2006 based on the report of the 
survey of the Accountancy Age magazine 2006 to answer the relevant research 
questions. Data to test these hypotheses were sourced from the Accountancy Age 
magazine, FAME database and from the annual reports of companies. It is normal to 
use the entire population in certain types of investigation. For example, studies 
focusing on Fortune 500, S & P 500 companies, FTSE 100 or FTSE 350 companies 
are all „population‟ based investigations. Sampling is appropriate where the 
population frame is so large that it is impossible to investigate it (Saunders et al, 
2007: 216), while random sampling allows an equal chance to all events but, where 
the population is not too large (as is the case with FTSE 100 and FTSE 350) a more 
focused investigation can be undertaken. The following studies have used population 
based studies. O‟Sullivan (1999) used the Times 1000, Klein (2002) used the S & P 
500, Song and Windram (2004) focused on the UK top 500, Xie et al (2003) used the 
S&P 500 index and Collier and Gregory (1996) used the FTSE top 500 companies 
as the focus of their studies. In this study the researcher will be using the UK FTSE 
350 companies. These represent the UK top 350 companies measured by reference 
to their market capitalisation. The FTSE 350 combines the membership of the FTSE 
100 and FTSE 250. Using the FTSE 350 solves the problem of changes in index 
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membership which would have been an issue if the investigation were focusing on 
just the FTSE 100 or just the FTSE 250. Firm specific information such as the 
variables proxying for size, complexity and risk were sourced from the database, 
governance information was collected by hand from the annual reports and accounts 
of companies both from the hard copies and on-line reports. Some of the variables 
were normalised: for example, the sales and number of employee figures were both 
used to proxy for organisational size. This was done by taking their natural log to 
avoid the problems of heteroscedasticity and the possible distorting effect of such 
problem on the estimations of parameters. Cross sectional investigations such as 
this often involve both very small and very big variables with differences in their 
variations. These differences are capable of influencing the regression results, for 
example, they inflate the correlation among all variables and could also be a source 
of heteroscedasticity.  
 
Although this study is based on the FTSE 350, the actual number of companies in 
the investigation is less than this for two reasons. Firstly, the FTSE 350 is normally 
stated in two ways, one which include investment companies and one that excludes 
them. The researcher uses the variation that excludes investment companies. FAME 
and Accountancy Age Magazines and most other stock exchange based studies also 
use the index that excludes investment companies. Excluding these companies 
normally leaves the FTSE 350 with 314 companies indicating that 36 companies are 
categorised as investment companies. Secondly, a number of companies‟ studies do 
exclude companies from the financial sectors and companies in regulated industries. 
This is due to the additional governance requirements of these companies as well as 
the complexities involved in the way they prepare and present their accounts which 
are industry specific. Including them in the sample may bias the results of the 
investigation. Another reason for a smaller sample size compared to the total 
number of companies on the index is the non-availability of governance and other 
variables needed for the investigation. This leaves the researcher with 245 
companies in the sample.  
 
 
6.2.2 Ordinary Least Square Assumptions  
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The use of OLS is based on meeting the basic assumptions upon which OLS is 
efficient. These are stated below. 
1) There is no correlation between the explanatory variables ad the residual (no 
simultaneity). Failure of this assumption result in biased estimates of the co-
efficient of the explanatory variables  
2) The expected value of the residual equal zero.  Failure of this assumption 
result in a biased estimate of the constant term 
3) Residuals are constant. Failure of this assumption result in inefficient 
estimates and lead to bias in hypotheses testing.  
4) The residual errors are independently distributed. Failure of this assumption 
results in inefficient  estimates and biased test of hypotheses 
5) The explanatory variables are not correlated. Failure of this assumption lead 
to inefficient estimates and biased the test of hypotheses. 
6.2.3 HETEROSCEDASTICITY TESTS 
In order to improve the validity of the study‟s results and hence their reliability, the 
researcher conducts a number of post estimation tests throughout the investigations 
in this thesis.  Application of the Ordinary Least Squares model is consequent on 
fulfilling the Gauss Markov assumptions. In section 5.4.2 above, the researcher 
enumerates these assumptions, which also relates to linear regression and the 
properties of a BLUE estimator. The violation of the third assumption of Gauss 
Markov theorem has to do with the problem of heteroscedasticity. The presence of 
heteroscedasticity leads to inefficient estimates of the co-efficient(s) although they 
remain unbiased. Heteroscedasticity is more prevalent with cross-sectional data and 
could undermine the results of a study.  A number of approaches have been 
suggested for detecting and correcting this problem (see Maddala, 2001; 
Woolbridge, 2000). For example, Collier and Gregory (1996) run a regression of the 
residuals square on the predicted values of the dependent variables in order to 
detect the presence of heteroscedasticity. In this thesis, the researcher checks for 
heteroscedasticity by using the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test. This test is a 
large-sample test which detects heteroscedasticity by dividing the squared residuals 
by the regression sum of square (RSS) divided by the number of observations that 
gives the generalised residual. The generalised residuals are then regressed on all 
independent variables suspected of causing heteroscedasticity. The researcher 
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performs the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test in each of the empirical 
investigations to detect presence of this problem. The implication of this is that whilst 
the researcher‟s beta estimates are not affected, his standard error and test statistics 
are inflated. In order to correct this problem the researcher uses the Huber/White 
estimators also known as the Robust Standard Error (RSE)  estimates which 
corrects the problem by relaxing the assumptions that the errors are independent 
and identically distributed (iid). All the model regressions would be undertaken with 
the robust error which adjusts the standard error and p-value for heteroscedasticity. 
This approach is one of the common and reliable approaches to correct for 
heteroscedasticity (Maddala, 2001; Woolbridge, 2000).  
 
6.2.4 MULTI-COLLINEARITY TEST 
This is a violation of one of the classical assumptions of OLS that suggests that the 
explanatory variables are not perfectly correlated, although they could be highly 
correlated. When this happens OLS is no longer BLUE and affects the estimates of 
the co-efficient so that they are no longer stable in the degree of their statistical 
significance, magnitude and sign (Gujarati, 2006; Woolbridge, 2000). The adjusted 
R2 becomes too high and not statistically significant. Detection of multi-collinearity is 
a tricky econometric task; there are no established econometric tests that can be 
performed to detect it (Gujarati, 2006: 371). This is because multi-collinearity is a 
sample rather a population problem. Detection can be undertaken through an 
examination of the R2: if this is high but the researcher has few significant t-values 
then the researcher may have this problem in his model, so he should conduct a 
correlation matrix or use Variance Inflation Factors (VIF). To detect multi-collinearity, 
the researcher conducts correlation covariance and pairwise correlation analysis 
before regression and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) after regression for all the 
investigation in the thesis. The researcher notes that the threshold for instance of 
severe multi-collinearity is indicated by a VIF of 10 (Hair et al, 1998). Thus, 
throughout the investigations, the researcher will compare the results of the 
correlation matrix with the VIF values to determine instances of severe multi-
collinearity.  Further, because this investigation uses cross-sectional data, the 
researcher has ruled out the problem of autocorrelation or serial correlation which 




6.3 Correlation Analyses for Independent Variables  
Tables 9 and 10 below show the pairwise and correlation covariance respectively. 
Importantly it showed that BOARDSIZE and NONEXEC are highly correlated and 
this may affect the efficiency of the results from the regression. However Variance 
Inflation Factor values were 3.17 and 3.47 respectively, much below the threshold of 
10 suggested by Hair et al, (1998) for evidence of severe multi-collinearity. This 
suggests that multi-collinearity is not likely to adversely affect the regression results.   
6.3.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Variables and Firms in the Study 
Tables 11 and 12 below show the descriptive statistics for both dependent and 
independent variables. The average number of committee meetings was 4 with a 
maximum of 13 meetings in a year and a minimum of 1. The average board size was 
9 with a maximum of 18 members and a minimum of 5. Most of the FTSE350 boards 
have four non-executives with a standard deviation of approximately 2. Most of the 
Audit Committees of companies in the FTSE 350 have an average of 3 members 
with a little over 50% having at least one member with financial expertise on the 
board. Most companies have at least four substantial investors who own 3% or more 
of the shares in the company.  
 
Table 9:  PAIRWISE CORRELATION BETWEEN ALL THE EXPLANATORY   
VARIABLES (sig at 5%) 
 
VAR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 1.000            
2 0.808 1.000           
3 -0.014 -0.026 1.000          
4 0.456 0.477 0.197 1.000         
5 -0.005 -0.055 0.097 0.056 1.000        
6 0.101 0.089 0.054 0.048 0.104 1.000       
7 -0.270 -0.353 0.039 -0.173 0.130 -0.005 1.000      
8 0.215 0.230 -0.027 0.141 -0.093 0.057 -0.075 1.000     
9 0.314 0.335 0.287 0.321 0.041 0.069 -0.279 0.142 1.000    
10 0.232 0.212 0.176 0.178 0.194 0.149 -0.125 0.058 0.391 1.000   
11 0.432 0.500 0.216 0.387 -0.014 0.110 -0.369 0.171 0.787 0.402 1.000  









Table 10:  CORRELATION COVARIANCE OF THE EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
VAR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 1.000            
2 0.819 1.000           
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3 -0.014 -0.004 1.000          
4 0.450 0.479 0.198 1.000         
5 0.003 -0.036 0.102 0.051 1.000        
6 0.106 0.064 0.105 0.063 0.111 1.000       
7 -0.273 -0.370 0.025 -0.201 0.139 0.014 1.000      
8 0.212 0.219 -0.008 0.137 -0.085 0.038 -0.070 1.000     
9 0.316 0.358 0.280 0.331 0.041 0.018 -0.275 0.1529 1.000    
10 0.226 0.205 0.197 0.172 0.191 0.131 -0.123 0.050 0.404 1.000   
11 0.430 0.507 0.217 0.393 -0.008 0.107 0.367 0.169 0.782 0.397 1.000  




1 BOSIZE 7 INVESTOR 
2 NONEXEC 8 MGTOWNER 
3 BOARDMET 9 LNNOEMPLOY 
4 AUSIZ 10 LNSUB 
5 AUCHAT 11 LNTOVER 
6 AUEXP 12 ROA 
 
 











AUACT 4.169 1.58 1 13 
 




Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
BOSIZE 9.481 2.26 5 18 
NONEXEC 0.511 0.11 0.25 0.8 
BOARDMET 8.270 2.88 1 21 
INVESTOR 4.364 2.57 0 12 
MGTOWNER 0.633 0.47 0 1 
AUEXP 0.503 0.50 0 1 
AUSIZ 3.762 0.98 2 8 
AUCHAT 0.815 0.44 0 1 
LNNOEMPLOY 8.598 2.01 1 13 
LNTOVER 13.88 1.59 10 19 
LNSUB 3.836 1.33 0 6 





The first regression was run with the number of Audit Committee meetings as the 
dependent variable (Collier and Gregory, 1996; Song and Windram, 2004). This is 
based on the view that the frequency of meetings is one of few and reliable 
observable measure of committee activity.  Although it is not a perfect measure of all 
the dimension of the committees‟ activity, it gives a sense of the commitments and 
responsibility of the committee to its functions. 
 
6.4     Hypotheses Testing.   
Table 13 below presents the results of the first regression using OLS in multiple 
regressions.  






t-stat p-values VIF 
      
Constant  0.745 1.152 0.65 0.519  
BOSIZE 0.041 0.075 0.55 0.582 3.17 
NONEXEC 0.246 0.098 2.49 0.013*** 3.47 
BOARDMET 0.178 0.039 4.55 0.000*** 1.18 
INVESTOR -0.069 0.042 -1.67 0.096* 1.25 
MGTOWNER 0.033 0.175 0.19 0.847 1.07 
AUEXP -0.114 0.182 -0.63 0.531 1.04 
AUSIZ 0.055 0.109 0.50 0.618 1.42 
AUCHAT -0.329 0.219 -1.50 0.136 1.09 
LNNOEMPLOY -0.118 0.070 -1.68 0.094* 1.49 
LNSUB -0.039 0.112 -0.35 0.726 1.30 
LNTOVER 0.138 0.107 1.29 0.198 3.25 





    
F-statistics  5.29 0.000    
n=245      




6.5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
The Co-efficient of Determination (R2) and F- Statistics 
The regression result shows an R2 of approximately 27% and an adjusted R2 of 23%. 
Both measures are used to determine the explanatory power of the model. This 
result indicates that the model specified above (equation 3) explained 27% of the 
variation in the meeting frequency. The adjusted R2 is usually lower than the R2 and 
this is because it penalises the introduction of additional variables into the model. 
The F-statistic is significant with a value of 5.29 and significant at the 1% level. While 
the t-statistic is used in testing individual parameters in the model for their 
significance, the F-test is a model test statistic that investigates the significance of 
the model as a whole. These results show that the model has a reasonable 
explanatory power of the relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables.  
 
Board Size (BOSIZE)  
The governance variables are the variables of concern. The variable that measures 
the board size (BOSIZE) showed a positive sign between Audit Committee activity 
and board size although it is not statistically significant. The regression produced a 
co-efficient value of 0.41 and a t-value of 0.55. These results show that an increase 
in board size may produce an increase in Audit Committee activity. Put another way, 
Audit Committees tend to be more active the larger the board size. But this result is 
weak statistically as it may be totally due to chance. It has been reported for 
completeness only.  
 
Independent Non-Executive Directors (NONEXEC)  
The study also found a significant positive relationship between the proportion of 
non-executive directors and measures of Audit Committee activity. It implies that the 
H1 alternative hypothesis, which states that the higher the number of independent 
non executive directors there are on the board the higher the activity of the Audit 
Committee, should be accepted as against the null hypothesis. NONEXEC produced 
a co-efficient of 0.25 and a t-value of 2.49, which is higher than the 1.96 critical 
region thresholds for a 95% confidence level, giving a p-value of 0.013. This allows 
us to reject the H1 null hypothesis which states that there are no relationships 
between the proportion of non-executive directors and Audit Committee activity. This 
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result is very important as it confirms the crucial role of the number of non-executives 
in increasing the activity levels of the Audit Committee. Similar findings have been 
documented by Collier and Gregory (1996) and Abbot et al (2003a). This indicates 
that increasing the number of independent non-executive directors on the main 
board improves the activity of the Audit Committee.  
 
 
Board Meeting (BOARDMET) 
Another variable used to proxy for the board activity was the frequency of the board 
meetings (BOARDMET). This variable showed a significant positive relationship with 
the measure of Audit Committee activity. It produced a co-efficient of 0.18 and is 
significant at the 1% level with a t-statistic of 4.55. These findings indicate that the 
activity levels of the Audit Committee are enhanced by the frequency of the meetings 
of the main board itself. This could also be interpreted to mean that more meetings 
of the Audit Committee invoke more meetings of the main board or vice versa.   
 
The plausible explanation for this could be that, because the Audit Committee is a 
sub-set of the main board, it would be expected that an active board should impact 
positively on the activity of the Audit Committee. Especially in view of the fact that 
the main board has delegated its financial and auditing reporting oversight functions 
to the Audit Committee, it could be that more frequent meetings of the main board 
generate issues that need further consideration and deliberation by the Audit 
Committee, which could explain the fact that main board meetings drive Audit 
Committee meetings. Furthermore, Audit Committee meeting frequency could also 
be due to fulfilling their reporting functions to the main board, which could also 
explain the fact that the main board meetings drive the number of Audit Committee 
meetings in the year. The result that suggests that the frequency of the main board‟s 
meetings determines Audit Committee activity does not in any way imply that the 
independence of the Audit Committee is impaired or compromised. 
 
Ownership Structure (INVESTOR and MGTOWNER) 
H2a and H2b measure the relationship between Audit Committee activity and 
ownership structure in a firm. This was measured using two variables in the model. 
These are, first, management ownership (MGTOWNER) and, secondly, substantial 
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outside ownership (INVESTOR). With respect to managerial ownership, theoretically, 
the researcher was unable to decide upon the expected direction of the relationship. 
This is because chapter 2, section 2.2.5 of the thesis presents evidence from the 
literature which suggests that managerial ownership could constrain consumption of 
perquisites, thereby aligning the interests of the shareholders with those of 
management. As a result, there is a tendency for managerial ownership to substitute 
for Corporate Governance functions of the Audit Committee, hence the potentially 
negative relationship between these variables. However, a positive relationship may 
indicate that, despite managerial ownership, the Audit Committee still performs an 
important monitoring function in order to protect the interests of other stakeholders. 
These show that it was not possible to be definite about the actual direction of the 
relationship between managerial ownership and Audit Committee activity. The 
regression result in this respect produced an insignificant positive relationship 
between this variable and Audit Committee activity, with a co-efficient of 0.037 and a 
t-value of 0.19. This result is similar to that obtained by Collier and Gregory (1999) 
who failed to document any significant relationship between Audit Committee activity 
and management shareholding. Similar results were found by Bradbury (1990) and 
Collier and Gregory (1993). 
 
In respect of INVESTOR, the researcher tested a two tailed null hypothesis which 
suggest that Audit Committee activity is not related to ownership structure i.e. 
substantial outside shareholders holding more than 3% of a company‟s shares. This 
is because chapter 2 section 2.2.4 of this thesis suggests that substantial 
shareholders could play both active and passive monitoring roles within the 
corporation. Thus, if the active hypothesis holds, a positive relationship could be 
expected. On the other hand, if substantial investors are passive, a negative 
relationship would subsist between Audit Committee activity and substantial 
shareholdings. However, the regression produced a result that showed a significant 
negative relationship at the 10% level two tail between these variables, which implies 
that Audit Committee activity is not enhanced by the presence of more substantial 
shareholdings. The co-efficient was -0.069 and a t-statistics of -1.67.  
 
However, a possible explanation of the researcher‟s finding could be that there is a 
form of substitution taking place between the Audit Committee and Institutional 
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investors. A more active Audit Committee may elicit less attention from institutional 
investors, who might not consider it necessary to duplicate intervention roles being 
played by the Audit Committee. This interpretation favours the institutional investors‟ 
passive hypothesis. Further, the documented negative relationship between Audit 
Committee activity and substantial investors can also be explained on the basis that 
some substantial shareholders consider intervention and monitoring roles as 
counter-productive and costly. Black (1990) and Admati et al (1994) suggested that 
substantial investors weigh the cost of intervention against its benefits. They tend to 
be passive if the marginal cost of intervention is greater than its marginal benefits. A 
face off between major investors and the management would most probably result in 
bringing negative publicity for the company and may drive down the net worth of the 
company as its share price falls. Equally, if substitution is assumed between control 
mechanisms, it could be that Audit Committee activity substitutes for substantial 
investors‟ monitoring. Mitra and Hossain (2007) examined the relationship between 
ownership structure and their monitoring activity with respect to auditing. They found 
that when institutional investors are active in monitoring, this exerts a downward 
pressure on firms‟ agency costs of operation, specifically the cost of auditing. 
 
Financial Expertise (AUEXP) 
H3 tested the relationship between committee expertise (AUEXP) and levels of Audit 
Committee activity. The results of the regression showed an insignificant negative 
relationship between the presence of at least one member with financial expertise 
and increased levels of committee activity. The co-efficient value is -0.114 and a t-
statistic of -0.63. The result showed a negative beta sign which suggests that an 
increase in Audit Committee activity could be partly explained by a fall in the number 
of experts on the Audit Committee. The researcher would have expected that in line 
with the provisions of the Combined Code (2003) and BRC (1999), more financial 
expertise on the board would increase the activity levels of the Audit Committee. 
This would be because the Audit Committee is responsible for the auditing and 
financial reporting oversight functions of the board; therefore more experts on the 
Audit Committee should have bolstered the monitoring and oversight functions of the 
committee in terms of quality and scope.  Abbot et al (2003) find a negative 
relationship between Audit Committees that have financial experts and restatements, 
Abbot et al (2004) and Bedard et al (2004) also documented a negative relationship 
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between Audit Committee expertise and earnings management. These studies 
suggest that the presence of financial experts on the Audit Committee constrains 
restatements and earnings management. 
 
On the other hand, this result may be indicative of the inconsistency and lack of 
clarity in Corporate Governance guidelines on the definition of what constitutes a 
financial expert. It could be that the availability of more precise guidance on, for 
example, what criteria fulfil the definition of financial literacy and how many years of 
financial expertise qualifies for financial literacy will enhance the use of appropriate 
variables to proxy for committee expertise and thereby improve research findings on 
the importance of financial expertise in enhancing Corporate Governance in general 
and the Audit Committee in particular. 
 
 
Audit Committee Charter (AUCHAT) 
With respect to H4, the researcher tested a null hypothesis that there is no 
relationship between Audit Committee activity and the presence of an Audit 
Committee charter. It may be expected that Audit Committee activity is enhanced by 
the availability of a well defined Audit Committee charter and terms of reference, so 
that a positive relationship between the existence of a charter and the frequency of 
Audit Committee meetings could be envisaged. However, the regression result 
produced a negative but insignificant relationship between these variables. The co-
efficient was -0.329 and t-value of -1.50. The t-statistic falls within the acceptance 
ratio for the null hypothesis indicating that we cannot accept the alternative 
hypothesis which suggests that Audit Committee activity is enhanced by having a 
well defined Audit Committee charter and terms of reference. The result is similar to 
the findings from the exploratory study by Carcello et al, (2002) who found that what 
the Audit Committee members say they are doing is different from what their charter 
expects them to be doing. 
 
Firm Size and Complexity (LNNOEMPLOY and LNSUB) 
H5a measures the relationship between Audit Committee activity and firm complexity 
while H5b measures the relationship between Audit Committee activity and firm size. 
These hypotheses were tested on the basis of a two tail test. Although Agency 
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Theoretical expectations suggest that the bigger the firm the higher the associated 
agency costs of monitoring and control, thus, bigger organisations could exercise the 
Audit Committee more. But, it might also be the case that smaller firms pose greater 
challenges to the Audit Committee giving rise to greater activity in both situations. 
However, the regression result suggests that a significant negative relationship 
exists between firm size and Audit Committee activity. The co-efficient was -0.118 
with a t-statistic of -1.68. These results indicate a significant negative relationship 
between these variables at the 10% level. The results show that an increase in Audit 
Committee activity is explained by a reduction in the size of the firm, or that the 
smaller the organisation the more active the Audit Committee. However, another 
variable that proxy for firm size was natural log of total assets. Although this showed 
a positive relationship with Audit Committee activity, it was statistically insignificant. 
Collier and Gregory (1999) also found an insignificant positive relationship between 
Audit Committee activity (they used total meeting hours as their proxy for activity) 
and firm size.  
 
H5b examines the relationship between firm complexity and Audit Committee 
activity. The regression result produced a co-efficient of -0.039 and a t-value of -
0.35, once again showing a negative relationship between firm complexity and Audit 
Committee activity. These results indicate that we cannot accept the alternative 
hypotheses, that firm complexity affects Audit Committee activity in a statistically 
significant way. This finding is similar to the findings in Collier and Gregory (1996).  
 
These results are unanticipated, as it would be expected that bigger organisations 
should exercise the Audit Committee more frequently; equally, complex 
organisations should require greater monitoring and therefore should increase Audit 
Committee activity. A negative relationship, though statistically insignificant, 
suggests that smaller organisations drive Audit Committee activity. A plausible 
explanation from this finding could be that Audit Committees in smaller firms have to 
do more in order to achieve their corporate objectives. It could also be that such 
organisations would need to show more transparency and quality in their financial 
and audit reports compared to larger, more established and, possibly, older 
organisations who could have built a reputation for corporate transparency and 
quality reporting. This result conflicts with the findings in Menon and Williams (1994) 
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Comparison with Other Studies  
Overall, relative to previous studies, the model did a fairly good job in explaining the 
activity of the Audit Committee measured by the frequency of their meetings in a 
year. The explanatory power of the researcher‟s model is significantly better than 
previous studies examining the activity of the Audit Committee. For instance, Collier 
and Gregory (1996) reported a 13% (R2) correlation compared to the researcher‟s 
model that generated an R2 of 27%. Collier and Gregory (1999) tested seven 
hypotheses out of which only two alternative hypotheses were accepted compared to 
this study which accepted three of its six alternative hypotheses. However, some of 
the results reported are not expected and these may be due to problems with the 
data or the model used. Two issues are of concern here, very high correlation 
between the variables (multicollinearity) and variations in variance 
(heteroskedasticity). Although preliminary checks suggest absence of 
multicollinearity, the researcher chooses to correct for this problem. 
Heteroscedasticity has been resolved as the t-statistics are based on robust 
standard errors (Maddala, 2001). The Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for 
heteroscedasticity which compares the null hypothesis of a constant variance with 
the alternative that the variances are not constant was performed for this purpose. 
The null hypothesis was accepted and it indicates significance at the 1% level. This 
means that the researcher‟s model is free from this problem. Furthermore, 
transforming some variables through log transformation also solves this problem. 
Heteroskedasticity test results are reported in appendix 3 of the thesis.  
 
Additional analyses.  
Multicollinearity  
The researcher was concerned over the high correlation between measures of board 
size (BOSIZE) and independence non-executive directors (NONEXEC), and 
LNTOVER and LNNOEMPLOY. Thus further analyses were undertaken. One of the 
ways to handle multicollinearity is to identify variables that are likely to be highly 
correlated base on theory; one of these variables could then be removed from the 
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model allowing an appreciation of its impacts on other variable and on the model as 
a whole. In table 14 below, the researcher checked for the effects of correcting for 
high correlations between these variables. Model1 represents the regression of all 
the variables without BOSIZE. In model2, only one measure of firm size 
(LNNOEMPLOY) was used in the model leaving out LNTOVER, while in model3, 
LNNOEMPLOY is replaced with LNTOVER to understand its effect on the regression 
results. The results are very similar in each case except in model2 where AUCHAT 
showed significance at 10% level. Also compare to the result of the main model in 
table 13 LNNOEMPLOY is no longer statistically significant; this is also true of 
LNTOVER in all the three models. These suggest that size may not be a determinant 
of Audit Committee activity. Next the researcher tested for the effect of adding new 
variables into the model, this is discussed below. 
 
Table 14: Multicollinearity Checks 
 Model 1  Model2  Model 3  
Variable  Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value  
       
Constant  0.879 0.392 2.007 0.001*** 1.487 0.119 
BOSIZE       
NONEXEC 0.285 0.000*** 0.311 0.000*** 0.295 0.000*** 
BOARDMET 0.177 0.000*** 0.178 0.000*** 0.169 0.000*** 
INVESTOR -0.069 0.074* -0.077 0.045** -0.068 0.081* 
MGTOWNER 0.038 0.845 0.041 0.833 0.021 0.911 
AUEXP -0.108 0.545 -0.095 0.597 -0.097 0.589 
AUSIZ 0.059 0.572 0.071 0.503 0.054 0.606 
AUCHAT -0.327 0.113 -0.343 0.096* -0.337 0.103 
LNNOEMPLOY -0.115 0.120 -0.045 0.398   
LNSUB -0.038 0.621 -0.024 0.750 -0.053 0.488 
LNTOVER 0.138 0.170   0.031 0.677 
ROC 2.5e-4 0.965 7.5e-4  6.1e-4 0.914 
R2  
 
0.2720   0.2661  0.2644 
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Four additional variables that measures firms‟ complexity (PENSION), performance 
(LOSS) and special situations (ACQUI; EXTRA) were introduced into the model to 
improve its robustness. It is possible that introducing more variables may impact on 
the reported results and improve our understandings of the determinants of AC 
activities. These additional variables have their theoretical underpinning in Agency 
theory (see section 4.4-4.6). Table 15 presents the results of the partial correlation of 
the independent variables with the dependent variables.  Correlation covariance 
matrix and heteroskedasticity test results are presented as appendices while the 
regression results with additional independent variables is presented in table 16 
below. The decision to include more variables screened off 35 companies with 
missing data for the new variables introduced.  This leaves 210 companies in the 


















Table 15:  Partial correlation of Independent Variables with AUACT  
   
Variable  Corr sig 
   
NONEXEC 0.26 0.000 
BOARDMET 0.3 0.000 
INVESTOR -0.1 0.088 
MGTOWNER 0.1 0.676 
AUEXP -0.0 0.966 
AUSIZ 0.1 0.211 
AUCHAT -0.2 0.018 
LNNOEMPLOY -0.1 0.065 
LNSUB 0.2 0.019 
LOSS 0.2 0.017 
EXTRA 0.0 0.925 
PENSION 0.1 0.724 
ACQUI 0.1 0.452 
ROC -0.0 0.679 
 
The regression results in table16 below showed some improvements over the 
reported results in tables above. For example, the model had more explanatory 
power with R2 of 30%, NONEXEC and BOARDMET maintained their statistically 
significant positive relationship with AUACT at 1% level. INVESTOR continues to be 
negatively related to AUACT, LNSUB showed a statistically positive relationship with 












Table 16: Regression result with additional variables and AUACT as dependent 
variable 
    
Variable  Coeff t-stat p-value  
Const 1.261 1.43 0.155 
NONEXEC 0.273 3.69 0.000*** 
BOARDMET 0.209 5.09 0.000*** 
INVESTOR -0.071 -1.71 0.088* 
MGTOWNER 0.088 0.42 0.676 
AUEXP -0.008 -0.04 0.966 
AUSIZ 0.153 1.25 0.211 
AUCHAT -0.520 -2.39 0.018** 
LNNOEMPLOY -0.111 -1.85 0.065* 
LNSUB 0.187 2.37 0.019** 
LOSS 1.13e-07 2.40 0.017 
EXTRA -0.023 -0.09 0.925 
PENSION 0.178 0.35 0.724 
ACQUI 0.204 0.75 0.452 
ROC -0.003 -0.41 0.679 
R2 0.3035   
AdjR2 0.2535   
 
6.6 ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS  
The researcher also examined the sensitivity of the findings reported in table 13 
above to the alternative definition of Audit Committee activity, by using a composite 
definition discussed earlier in this chapter (section 5.3). This is the basis for the 
second regression performed in this thesis. The model is stated in equation 3a 
below. Table 17 below presents the descriptive statistics while table 18 presents the 








Table 17:  Descriptive Statistics for Diligence 
Variable 
Description  
Mean  Std Deviation  Minimum  Maximum  




6.7 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Although defining committee activity as a composite measure of committee size, 
expertise and the presence of a charter/terms of reference does not show a great 
deal of increased statistical benefit over the frequency of meeting measure, it 
reinforces some of the findings in the initial measure. For example, the regression 
result shows a positive and significant relationship between the presence of 
independent non executive directors (NONEXEC) and diligence. It produces a co-
efficient of 0.215 and a t- statistic of 2.05. This is well above the 1.96 critical values 
for the acceptance of the null hypothesis. This is consistent with the result in the 


























Variable  OLS Std Error  t-stat p-values VIF 
      
Constant  0.936 1.126 0.83 0.407  
BOSIZE 0.074 0.073 1.01 0.314 3.15 
NONEXEC 0.215 0.105 2.05 0.041** 3.61 
BOARDMET 0.195 0.036 5.44 0.000*** 1.17 
INVESTOR -0.046 0.041 -1.10 0.271 1.25 
MGTOWNER -0.004 0.207 -0.02 0.985 1.06 
AUSIZ 0.072 0.115 0.63 0.530 1.42 
LNNOEMPLOY -0.124 0.079 -1.55 0.122 2.74 
LNSUB 0.035 0.082 0.43 0.671 1.28 
ROC -0.002 
 
0.006 -0.27 0.790 1.08 
R2  0.2654     





F-statistics  8.45 0.000  
      
 
  
 This result reinforces the initial findings (H1) that allude to the importance of the 
non-executive directors in enhancing Audit Committee activity. Improvement in Audit 
Committee activity is a necessary requirement towards achieving an effective Audit 
Committee. Since effectiveness may not be possible without being Active (Collier 
and Zaman, 2005).  
 
Equally, BOARDMET maintains its positive sign and statistical significance under the 
researcher‟s alternative definition of Audit Committee activity. The co-efficient was 
0.195 and the t-statistic was 5.44. Variables that proxy for ownership structure and 
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the control variables remain statistically insignificant. The model explains 26% of the 
variation in the dependent variable and the F-statistic is significant at the 1% level 
with a value of 8.45.  
 
Table 19 below presents the results of the model with the additional variables. It 
showed some improvement in its explanatory power compare to the original model 
with a R2 of 29% compare to 26% for the original model. Furthermore, LNSUB and 
LOSS both showed significant positive relationship with Diligence at 5%. These 
findings have been reported for completeness and do not significantly affect the 
analyses above. 
 
Table 19: Regression Result with Diligence and additional Independent 
Variables 
    
Variable  Coeff t-stat p-value  
Const 1.625 1.71 0.088* 
NONEXEC 0.315 3.97 0.000*** 
BOARDMET 0.227 5.14 0.000*** 
INVESTOR -0.035 -0.80 0.424 
MGTOWNER 0.077 0.34 0.737 
AUSIZ 0.136 1.04 0.301 
LNNOEMPLOY -0.097 -1.51 0.134 
LNSUB 0.209 2.46 0.015** 
LOSS 1.26e-07 2.50 0.013** 
EXTRA 6.7e-4 -0.00 0.998 
PENSION 0.123 0.23 0.821 
ACQUI 0.098 0.34 0.736 
ROC -0.001 -0.93 0.356 
R2 0.2925   







6.8 Chapter Summary  
This is the first empirical chapter of this thesis and five main hypotheses were tested.  
Essentially, these hypotheses have been used to examine the determinants of the 
activity of the Audit Committees in UK‟s largest companies in the reporting period 
2005-2006. Importantly, the study found a significant positive relationship between 
Audit Committee activity measured as the number of meetings in the year and the 
proportion of independent non-executive directors on the board. In addition, it also 
found a positive relationship between the main board meeting frequency and the 
activity of the Audit Committee. Audit Committees were found to be less active in 
companies that have substantial outside investors, owning more than 3% of ordinary 
shares in the company. It indicates that the higher the numbers of this type of 
investor in a firm, the lower the activity of the Audit Committee. This result may 
indicate a likely substitution between these control mechanisms. Size and firm 
complexities were not found to be important determinants of Audit Committee 
activities. Although these results find backing in the literature they were unexpected, 
as was the negative relationship found between the presence of a financial expert on 
the Audit Committee and its apparently reduced levels of activity.  
 
The alternative definition of Audit Committee activity also confirmed the strong 
positive relationship between board independence, as measured by the proportion of 
non-executive directors to executive directors on the board, and Audit Committee 
activity. This is interpreted to be indicative of the importance attached to the 
presence of more independent non-executive directors on the board which could 
impact on the independence of the Audit Committee, since there is an inextricable 
link between presence of independent non-executive directors on the board and 
Audit Committee independence, which ultimately could enhance their activity. 
Recent Corporate Governance discourse and guidelines have envisioned important 
monitoring and oversight functions for the non-executives on the board of directors 
as the representatives of the interests of the shareholders. Frequency of meetings 
could be indicative of Audit Committee activity and a higher number of non-executive 
directors on the board have been found to increase Audit Committee activity. The 
Audit Committee is the part of the board that has the remit to ensure auditing and 
reporting quality; therefore this result is very important in indicating that an increased 
[211] 
 
number of non-executive directors enhance Audit Committee activity which may 
enhance auditing and reporting quality in firms. Table 20 below shows the null 





Table 20: List of Null Hypotheses Rejected and Not Rejected 
No  Null hypotheses  Rejected Not 
Rejected  
H1 There are no relationship between Audit Committee 
activity and the proportion of Independent Non-
Executive Directors on the board 
X  
H2 There are no relationship between ownership structure 










H3 Audit committee activity is not related to Committee 
expertise 
 X 
H4 Audit Committee activity is not related to Committee 
charter   
 X 
H5 a) Audit Committee activity is not related to firm 
complexity  
b) Audit Committee activity is not related to firm 






In the next chapter, the researcher presents the second empirical chapter of the 
thesis. This leads on from the investigation in this chapter by examining the 
relationship between Audit Committee activity and different measures of the 
economic bonding between the auditors and their client. This is then analysed in the 








 The Relationship between Corporate Governance and Auditor Independence 
 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the second empirical chapter of the thesis. The focus of the 
chapter is on the relationship between Corporate Governance, proxy by Audit 
Committee activity, and Auditor Independence (external auditors‟ fee). One of the 
expectations of the Cadbury Report was that an improvement in Corporate 
Governance would impact upon auditor independence and indeed upon the 
communication between the external auditor and management by opening up 
another route for the auditor to be able to express concerns via the Audit Committee 
(Page and Spira, 2005). In chapter 6, the researcher enumerated the expected 
functions of the Audit Committee, most of which centre on providing oversight 
functions on the management. Initially, this oversight was concentrated mainly in the 
area of financial reporting and auditing but as Rezaee (2009) and Mallin (2006) 
showed, these roles have increased tremendously to include firms‟ internal control 
and risk management oversight functions. Indeed, the Audit Committee now plays an 
important role in the appointment, determination of the remuneration, scope of 
activities and review of the independence of the external auditors (Combined Code, 
2003; SOX, 2002). This reiterates the importance of empirically studying the nature 
of the relationship that exists between the Audit Committee and external auditors. 
This is the focus of this chapter.  The rest of the chapter proceed as follows: 
Section7.1 enumerates the link between external auditors‟ fees and auditor 
independence while section 7.2 deals with methodology and data issues in this part 
of the thesis. In section 7.3, the researcher reports the pre-estimation diagnostic test. 
Sections 7.4-7.7 present regression results, explanations and discussions of the 
results. Section 6.9 summarises the chapter.  
 




As showed in chapter three sections 3.7-3.11 pages 118-128, of this thesis, different 
measures of perception of auditor independence has been explored by researchers. 
These approaches used the economic bonding argument (DeAngelo, 1981; Simunic, 
1984) as its basis, „capturing‟ independence by reference to the fees paid to the 
auditors. With the debate on auditors‟ provision of non-audit services (NAS) to their 
client ongoing, albeit low- keyed now, the ratio of  NAS to audit fee (Frankel et al, 
2002) has been used to proxy for independence, so also has the ratio of non-audit 
fee to total fees been used (Ashbaugh et al, 2003). Association between these 
measures and surrogate for client‟s auditing or reporting qualities are then examined. 
Measures such as frequency of litigation against the auditor  (Palmrose, 1999), 
propensity to qualify audit report (Lennox, 1999; DeFond et al, 2002), earnings 
restatements (Raghunandan et al , 2003), earnings management using abnormal 
accrual (Frankel et al, 2002; Ferguson et al, 2004) have been used as surrogates. 
Another approach has been to use event studies by examining the effects of proxy 
for auditor independence on share prices (Frankel et al, 2002) and bond prices 
(Brandon et al, 2004). These methods have produced largely conflicting results with 
most finding lack of relationship or insignificant relationship between proxy for auditor 
independence and surrogate variables (Beattie and Fearnley, 2002; Ruddock et al, 
2006).   
 
However, the researcher contends that the concern should be more on the 
interactions between auditors and Audit Committees, rather than on surrogate for 
compromised independence. Focus needs to be more on the effects of the Audit 
Committee on auditing and how these impact on auditor independence. What are the 
effects of Audit Committee activity on auditing and on auditor independence? These 
deserve empirical investigation. Spira (2003) reinforced this perception when she 
observed that the relationship between audit and Audit Committees is assumed 
rather than proved, and that very little evidence are available outside North America 
that proves or supports the value of the Audit Committee. Equally, Turley and Zaman 
(2007) observed that the impact of Audit Committee on external audit is under 
researched. This part of the thesis addresses this concern.  
 
Building on the findings from the first empirical study in this thesis, the researcher 
uses frequency of meetings to proxy for Audit Committee activity and a number of 
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alternative specifications of external auditors‟ fees to proxy for the economic bonding 
between the auditor and the auditee. The researcher adopts Reynolds et al, (2002) 
and Ashbaugh et al‟s (2003) arguments that the total fee rather than the ratio of NAS 
to audit fee is a more realistic measure of the economic bonding between the auditor 
and their client. However, in addition to this, the researcher also examined the effect 
of using client importance, measured as the ratio of the total fee from a client to the 
total income of the auditor, as another proxy for the level of economic bonding 
between the auditor and their clients. This is referred to as the Total Relative Income 
(TRI) in this thesis. This measure has its basis in the Economic bonding of auditors 
and their clients (DeAngelo 1981). Thereafter, and to test the consistency of the 
results from using the methods above, the researcher also uses audit fee, non-audit 
fees and fee ratios as proxies for economic bonding between the auditor and 
auditee.  These measures are summarised below.  
 
Alternative Definitions of External Auditors’ Fee  
 Natural log of total fees paid to the auditor (LNTOTFEE) 
 Total Relative Income of the auditors (TRI) 
 Natural log of non-audit fee (LNNOAUFEE) 
 Natural log of audit fee (LNAUFEE) 
 Fee ratios 
7.2 Methodology and Data  
This cross-sectional study of a sample of the FTSE 350 companies listed on the 
London Stock Exchange will involve the use of the multiple regression method to test 
the hypotheses formulated above. The study dependent variable is the external 
auditors‟ fees measured by five different specifications of the external auditors‟ fees. 
This study also interprets these fees as measures of economic bonding between the 
auditor and the auditee (Francis and Reynolds, 2002; Ashbaugh et al, 2003). In 
order to normalise this variable the study takes the natural logarithms of fees. The 
natural log is also taken to reduce skewness in distribution of this variable. This is 
capable of affecting the extent of statistical inferences and relationships which could 
lead to variations in variances technically known as heteroscedasticity (Smith and 
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Watts, 1992; Gaver and Gaver, 1993; 1995) Furthermore, normalising this variable 
brings all the variables to the same measurement basis. The explanatory variables 
were divided into three, the governance variables, the control variable and the error 
term. The model below is estimated using OLS:  
 
ixxxxy niniii ...........................3322111 --------------------------- (4) 








ln .................................................................... (5)  
Where: 
feeln  = total fees paid to the auditors. Alternative definitions used include the ratio of 
audit fee to total fee and the ratio of total fee paid to the auditor to the total relative 
income of the audit firm. All these are used to proxy for the extent of economic 










= measures the control variables identified in the literature  
i  
= measures the intercept  
 = measures the error term, the random variable 
7.2.1 Data 
This part of the thesis will be based on a total sample size of 244 rather than 245 
companies which are nonfinancial, non-utility companies draw from the FTSE 350 for 
the year end 2005/2006. This is because one of the companies had a missing value 
for audit fees.  Secondary data were used to test these hypotheses using the above 
model. In addition to the variables used in the first empirical chapter, the researcher 
collected additional information in respect of fees paid to auditors for audit and non-
audit fees for the financial year 2005/6 for FTSE 350 companies. The relevant data 
were hand collected from the annual reports of companies and from the FAME 
database. Further, Accountancy Age Magazine publishes the audit and non-audit 
fees paid by listed companies annually and this was also used as a source of data 
for the fees variables. Tables 21 and 22 below show the descriptive statistics for the 
dependent and independent variables respectively. The fees variables were 
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transformed using natural logarithm transformation. This is used to scale the 
variables and to prevent heteroscedasticity. This approach has been used in 
previous studies (Collier and Gregory, 1996; O‟Sullivan, 1999; Lee and Mande, 
2004; Abbot et al, 2003). 
Table 21: DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Variable 
Description 
Mean  Std Deviation Minimum  Maximum  
LNTOTFEE 12.959 2.559 4 22 
LNAUDFE 6.596 1.236 3 11 
LNNOAUDFEE 6.412 1.477 1 12 
TRI 1.865 4.617 .01 56.5 
 
For the year and sample under consideration, the lowest fees in the sampled FTSE 
350 companies were approximately £1.6 million for audit fees and £1.9 million for 
non-audit fees. The average turnover for the companies in this sample was £4.05bn. 
The average number of employees for the companies in the sample was 
approximately 21,000 and the average number of subsidiaries was 88 companies.   
 
Table 22: INDEPENDENT VARIABLES  
Variable 
Description  
Mean  Standard 
Deviation  
Minimum  Maximum  
     
BOSIZE  9.481 2.26 5 18 
NONEXEC 0.511 0.11 0.25 0.80 
BOARDMET 8.270 2.88 1 21 
AUSIZ 3.762 0.98 2 8 
AUACT 4.169 1.58 1 13 
AUCHAT 0.815 0.44 0 1 
AUEXP 0.502 0.50 0 1 
INVESTOR 4.364 2.57 0 12 
MGTOWNER 0.663 0.47 0 1 
LNNOEMPLOY 8.598 2.01 1 13 
LNSUB 3.836 1.33 0 6 
LNTOVER 13.880 1.59 10 19 
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ROC 15.840 17.10 -35.31 106.74 
 
7.3 PRE-ESTIMATION DIAGNOSTICS.  
Table 23 (column - VIF) checked for the incidence of high correlations between the 
independent variables. None of the variables are highly correlated. No cases of 
outliers were present in the data either, as most of the data converges round the 
mean. Using log transformation normalises some of the variables including turnover, 
number of employees and the dependent variables. 
 
 
7.4 REGRESSION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The natural log of total fee was the dependent variable explained by all other 
variables as detailed in 7.2 above. The regression result is presented in table 23 
below. 
Table 23: Natural Log of Total Fees as the Dependent Variable  
Variable  OLS Std Error  t-stat p-values VIF 
      
Constant  1.658 1.221 1.36 0.176  
BOSIZE 0.084 0.079 1.08 0.291 3.18 
NONEXEC 0.224 0.114 1.96 0.050** 3.72 
BOARDMET -0.094 0.041 -2.30 0.023** 1.32 
AUSIZ 0.096 0.124 0.78 0.436 1.43 
AUACT 0.210 0.663 3.16 0.002*** 1.45 
AUCHAT 0.149 0.239 0.62 0.534 1.11 
AUEXP -0.119 0.209 -0.57 0.568 1.05 
INVESTOR -0.059 0.045 -1.31 0.191 1.29 
MGTOWNER -0.389 0.224 -1.74 0.083* 1.07 
LNNOEMPLOY 0.428 0.086 4.98 0.000*** 2.78 
LNSUB 0.277 0.135 2.06 0.041** 1.28 
LNTOVER 0.363 0.117 3.1 0.002*** 3.25 




















n =244    
 
The main regression used the natural log of total fees (LNTOTFEE) paid to the 
auditor by a firm. This represents the sum of both audit and non-audit fees, where 
non-audit fees implies all fees for non-audit engagements. The natural log of total fee 
was used as the dependent variable in line with previous studies which have used 
the natural log of total fee (Ashbaugh et al, 2003; Francis and Reynolds, 2004). They 
argued that this measure is more indicative of the economic bonding between the 
auditor and the auditee than ratio of non-audit service.    
 
Co-Efficient of Determination (R2) and F-Statistics 
The regression results are presented in table 23 above. The model appears to have 
good explanatory power, with an R2 of 0.6434, an adjusted R2 of 0.6232 and a 
significant F-statistic of 31.92 which measures the explanatory power of the model 
as well as its statistical significance in testing all the hypotheses in the model.   
 
Board Composition and External Auditors’ Fees  
Hypothesis H6 examines the relationship between external auditors‟ fees and board 
composition. The study established a significant positive relationship between the 
proportion of non-executive directors (NONEXEC), a measure of board composition, 
and total fees paid to auditors. The regression produced a co-efficient for NONEXEC 
of 0.224 and a t-statistic of 1.96. This is significant at the 5% level. This result 
indicates that the higher the number of independent non-executive directors there 
are on the board, the higher the total fees (both audit and non-audit) that are earned 
by the auditor from their client.  This result is statistically significant, indicating that 
the null hypothesis will be rejected and the alternative hypothesis, which suggests a 
positive relationship between these variables, will be accepted.  
This result is quite important and interesting. Its importance relates to the expected 
role of the independent non executive directors in protecting the interests of the 
shareholders. The need to have more independent non executive directors on the 
board is to ensure that management pursue to a greater extent the interests and 
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objectives of the shareholders. This is achieved by reducing or constraining agency 
costs associated with management expropriation of the shareholders‟ wealth by 
improved monitoring and control mechanisms. The result is interesting in the sense 
that it could provide some explanations of the likely behavioural patterns of the 
independent non executive directors. Such explanations can be found in theories 
such as the signalling, reputation and human capital theories.    
In line with theoretical expectations, the result is consistent with the underlying 
reasoning of Signalling Theory (Spence, 2002) as well as the human capital 
preservation concepts of the human capital theory (Fleischhauer, 2007). This thesis 
did not empirically prove these theories. The result suggests that rather than reduce 
the value of services purchased from the external auditors, non-executive directors 
will signal preferences for auditing and reporting quality and for auditing coverage by 
buying more services from the auditors in order to signal transparency to the market 
and boost market confidence in the reports of the firm. Furthermore, maintaining or 
buying more services from the auditors may help non-executive directors to preserve 
their jobs and consequently their human capital worth. This is because more 
services bought from the external auditors may aid early detection of financial 
misstatements and errors or fraud and so prevent corporate misbehaviours. Serving 
on the board of a distressed or misbehaving company has adverse effects on the 
human capital worth and reputations of the directors associated with such a 
company. The effects of such reputational damage could be seen in the reduced 
appointments such independent non executive directors will be awarded 
subsequently, as other companies become cautious in associating their firms with 
such independent non executive directors. Similar findings were documented in 
O‟Sullivan (1999) and Mitra et al (2007) in terms of finding a positive relationship 
between the proportion of non-executive directors and auditors‟ fees although they 
reported statistically insignificant positive relationships. Carcello et al (2002) also 
found a positive relationship between board characteristics and higher audit fees. On 
the other hand the result conflicts with the findings in Tsui et al (2001) who found a 
negative relationship between board independence and audit fees    
The result could also be explained in the context of its effect on auditor 
independence and the auditing process. Given that there is an inextricable link 
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between the presence of non-executive directors on the board and the Audit 
Committee (Collier, 1993), the researcher contends that the presence of more 
independent non executive directors on the board in the current Corporate 
Governance climate, notwithstanding recent corporate lapses, could increase 
auditors‟ independence by  encouraging auditors to increase their audit work and 
coverage and also that such increase in audit efforts could be encouraged by the 
independent non executive directors NONEXEC in an attempt  to minimise the risk of 
future financial problems or frauds. This consequently leads to increased total fees 
accruing to the auditors for both auditing and non-auditing services. In the meantime, 
total fees paid to the auditor will reflect the extensive work performed by the auditor 
without much reliance on the work of internal personnel such as the internal auditors 
or indeed the effectiveness of the Audit Committee. Thus the null hypothesis of no 
relationship is rejected and the alternative hypothesis of a positive relationship 
between board composition, measured as the proportion of non-executive directors 
on the board, and external auditors‟ fee is accepted.  
 
Board Meeting Frequency and External Auditors’ Fees 
Another indicator of the main board‟s activities is the variable measuring the 
relationship between board meeting frequency (BOARDMET) and external auditors‟ 
total fees. The regression result shows a negative and statistically significant 
relationship with a co-efficient of -0.094, a p-value of 0.023 and a t-statistic of -2.30. 
The result indicates that frequent board meetings are associated with a fall in total 
fees paid to the auditors. Thus it shows that if all other variables are held constant, 
an increase in board meeting frequency has a negative effect on the total fees paid 
to the auditor. This could also be interpreted to mean that the main board constrains 
the scope and volume of services bought from the auditors. It could be argued that 
the result reinforces the perception that the main board has delegated its audit and 
financial oversight functions to the Audit Committee. It will be unlikely that the main 
board would require more audit coverage or additional testing or indeed adjustment 
to the scope of the audit. These requirements are more the preserve of the Audit 
Committee. Thus this result supports the opinion that the main board focuses more 
on the general monitoring oversight function and also that more board meetings and 
size of the board could translate into more effective monitoring which could be 
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responsible for the negative relationship found between these variables. This result 
conflicts with findings from Carcello et al (2002) who found a positive relationship 
between board Independence, diligence and expertise  and audit fees.  
 
Audit Committee Meeting Frequency and External Auditors’ Fees 
H7 examines the relationship between Audit Committee activity (proxy by meeting 
frequency) and external auditors‟ fee. This study found a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between the measures of Audit Committee activity (AUACT) 
and external auditors‟ total fee. This indicates that the higher the level of Audit 
Committee activity, all other things being equal, the higher the total fee earned by the 
auditor from their client. The beta co-efficient for the Audit Committee meeting 
frequency showed a value of 0.21, a t-value of 3.16 and p-value of 0.002: these 
show that this result is significant at the 1% level. This mean that the null hypothesis 
is rejected and the alternative hypothesis of a positive relationship between Audit 
Committee activity and total fees paid to the external auditor is accepted. 
A positive relationship could indicate that the Audit Committee supports buying more 
services or will not allow the value of services bought from the auditors to fall. This 
could be because Audit Committee members are keen to signal their desire to 
maintain or ensure improvement in auditing and reporting quality (Collier and 
Gregory, 1996). It could also be because Audit Committee members are conscious 
of the effect of poor reporting quality on their human capital worth (Stewart and Kent, 
2006) and subsequent board appointments (Fama, 1983; Coughlan and Schmidt, 
1985; Denis and Denis, 1995; Franks et al, 2001). All these could mean more 
meetings for the Audit Committee which could in effect mean more oversight function 
being carried out by the Audit Committee. It is expected that improved oversight 
activities by the Audit Committee could actually lead to more being expected from 
the external auditors in the form of auditing and other assurance services. There 
could be increases in compliance and due diligence engagements for the auditors. 
These additional services requested would have an impact on the overall fees paid 
to the auditor. Equally, expectations placed on the performance of the enlarged roles 
of the Audit Committee may mean that members of the Audit Committee need to be 
aware of these expectations and their consequences for their reputation, personal 
liability and reporting quality. The researcher‟s findings are in line with Abbot et al 
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(2003a), who argued that the presence of an Audit Committee could improve 
external auditors‟ bargaining power with the client, especially now that Corporate 
Governance guidelines require that auditors‟ remuneration and engagements should 
no longer be at the mercy of the management. Most Corporate Governance 
guidelines require the Audit Committee to be responsible for making 
recommendations on the scope and appointment of the external auditors and an 
assessment of their independence (Combined Code, 2003; SOX, 2002) although the 
final approval of auditor choice still vests in the shareholders exercising this power at 
the annual general meeting.  
Stewart and Munro (2007) also found a similar result. They suggested an 
explanation for the positive relationship between Audit Committee meeting frequency 
and external auditors‟ fees in Australian companies. They argued that the increase in 
external auditors‟ fees may be due to additional time spent by auditors in preparing 
for and attending meetings with Audit Committee members and not necessarily as a 
result of any increase in core audit work. The frequency of committee meetings and 
attendance at those meetings by auditors could build up auditors‟ hours worked and 
consequently be reflected in the fees paid to the auditor (although it has to be noted 
that most guidelines do not require auditors to attend all meetings of the Audit 
Committee but rather by invitation of the committee only). This explanation is open to 
criticism. For instance, it could be argued that attendance at such meetings is crucial 
to transparent reporting and has an impact upon improving audit and reporting 
quality. It could also be argued that auditors‟ meetings and engagements with Audit 
Committee members are an integral part of the audit process and should count in the 
determination of the independence of the auditors. The rationality and importance of 
such interactions can be better appreciated considering that one of the anticipated 
benefits of having an Audit Committee in organisations is the provision of an 
alternative medium of communication to the auditors especially in cases of conflict 
between the auditors and management. Improvements in the communication 
process between the external auditors and those charged with governance in 
organisations should impact positively on auditors‟ independence, this is because 
auditors could now enjoy more support from Audit Committee members and not be 
under pressure or intimidation from seeking re-appointment from management. 
Therefore suggesting that an increase in audit fees could be down to attendance at 
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the meetings is true, but suggesting that this is not part of the core audit function 
may not be correct in the context of the required level of interaction between the 
auditors and the Audit Committee and the increased Audit Committee oversight  
function.  
The positive relationship could also be explained in the context of the expected 
negative relationship between the measure of perception of auditor independence 
and Audit Committee activity. Increases in total fees paid to the auditor, all other 
things being equal, should lead to increases in the perception of compromised 
auditor independence and consequently lead to increases in Audit Committee 
activity as they are exercised to ensure that perceptions of compromised auditor 
independence arising from increased total fees paid to the auditor are contained by 
the increase in Audit Committee activity.  
 
Abbott and Parker (2000) argue that better performing Audit Committees will 
demand higher audit quality in order to avoid personal monetary or reputational 
losses. Also it has been suggested that the risk of litigation could be higher now than 
ever before towards board members (Black et al, 2005; Klausner et al, 2005) so that, 
in order to avoid litigation and its overarching adverse effects, Audit Committee 
members would rather prefer to invest more to ensure auditing and reporting quality 
than suffer reputational damage and depletion in human capital.  
 
This result is consistent with the findings in Stewart and Kent (2006) who found a 
strong positive relationship between audit fees and Audit Committee meeting 
frequency, but conflicts with Abbot et al (2003a) who found no significant relationship 
between these variables. Collier and Gregory (1996) using data from the period prior 
to Cadbury and Goddard and Masters (2000) are the only two UK studies that have 
examined this relationship and they also found a positive relationship between Audit 
Committee meeting frequency and audit fees. Although the current researcher found 
similar results, our finding is more robust because this study used a measure that 





Ownership Structure and External Auditors’ Fees 
H8 examines the relationship between ownership structure and external auditors‟ 
fees. Two variables were used to proxy for this in the model. The number of 
substantial investors owning more than 3% of a company‟s ordinary shares 
(INVESTOR) and an indicator variable equal to 1 if management have a 
shareholding of up to 3% in the company‟s ordinary shares (MGTOWNER) and 0 if 
otherwise. While INVESTOR showed a co-efficient of -0.059, a t-statistic of -1.31, 
MGTOWNER showed a co-efficient of -0.39, t-statistics of-1.74 indicating that it is 
statistically significant at 10%.  
A significant negative relationship between managerial ownership and external 
auditors‟ fees is consistent with previous findings such as Jensen and Meckling 
(1976). It has generally been documented that increase in managerial ownership 
reduces agency costs (McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Short and Keasey, 1999). 
Thus, management share ownership plays corporate governance mechanism and 
may in fact substitute for other form of control such as Audit Committee. A negative 
relationship between number of substantial outside investor and external auditors‟ 
fees shows that, presence of more substantial outside investors constrain external 
auditors‟ fees.  This is because it is likely that such substantial investors would be 
able to monitor management action in ensuring auditing and reporting quality, 
thereby exerting a downward pressure on external auditors‟ fees. Chapter 6 section 
6.5 presented literature evidence that showed that it is more economical and cost 
effective for substantial investors to monitor management action than individual 
shareholders. Therefore, to the extent that substantial investors are active in 
monitoring management action, this could translate into improvement in the client‟s 
control environment and may lead to a reduction in audit risk with one of the 
consequences being a reduction in audit fees. This result is similar to the findings in 
Mitra et al (2007) who found a negative relationship between concentrated 
institutional ownership and audit fees. They explained that concentrated institutional 
investors are more effective in monitoring management action which may reduce 
audit risk and consequently reduce the audit fees. Mitra and Hossain (2007) found 
that in the presence of firm specific control variables, and board and Audit 
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Committee governance variables, institutional stock ownership is negatively related 
to the ratio of non-audit services fees to total client fees. The researcher reports a 
negative association between ownership structure and total fees earned by the 
auditor from their client. Thus the researcher rejects the null hypothesis of no 
relationship between ownership structure and external auditors‟ fees and accepts the 
alternative hypothesis that the presence of substantial outside investors owning at 
least 3% of the firms‟ share is negatively related to total fees paid to the external 
auditors. This indicates that the presence of substantial outside investors leads to a 
reduction in the total fees paid to the external auditors. This is a support for a form 
substitution between the control mechanisms.  This is an important finding as it can 
better inform our understanding of the control mechanisms. It may be important to 
think of a combination of control mechanism with a view to finding an optimal mix 
among them that can assure the achievements of Corporate Governance objectives.  
 
Profitability, Complexity, Firm Size and External Auditors’ Fees  
H9, H10 and H11 examine the relationship between the control variables and 
external auditors‟ fees. Apart from H9 which showed a significant negative 
relationship between measures of firm profitability and external auditors‟ fees, all 
other control variables showed the researcher‟s anticipated sign and significance. 
For example, H10 tests the relationship between firm complexity (LNSUB) and 
external auditors‟ fees and showed a significant positive relationship with a co-
efficient value of 0.277, a t-statistic of 2.06 and a p-value of 0.041 showing 
significance at the 5% level. This finding indicates that the more risky the client the 
higher the total fee that would be earned by the auditor from such a risky client. This 
is because the auditor will evaluate the inherent risk of such clients to be high and 
this will increase the audit risk. This will require the auditor to undertake more 
substantive activities in order to gather sufficient audit evidence and thereby 
increase the fee. This may be the case with respect to non-audit services too.  
 
With respect to H11, two variables (LNNOEMPLOY AND LNTOVER) were used as 
proxies for firm size and both showed a significant positive relationship with the 
external auditors‟ fee. LNNOEMPLOY showed a co-efficient value of 0.428, a t-
statistic of 4.24 and a p-value of 0.000, while LNTOVER showed a co-efficient value 
of 0.363, a t- statistic of 2.65 and a p-value of 0.009 which indicate statistical 
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significance at the 1% level. These results indicate that it costs more to audit larger 
clients than smaller ones, just as it may cost more to provide non-audit services to 
larger clients compared to smaller clients, where size is measured with respect to the 
number of employees and total assets. In other words, the bigger the client, all things 
being equal, the higher the total fees earned from such a client.  
H9 suggests that there are no relationships between a firm‟s profitability and external 
auditors‟ fees. The researcher found a statistically significant negative relationship 
between a firm‟s profitability and the external auditor‟s fee. Return on total assets 
was used to proxy for profitability and it was defined as the ratio of net income to 
total assets. The regression produced a co-efficient value of -0.023 and a t-statistic 
of -3.91, indicating significance at the 1% level. A negative relationship between a 
measure of profitability and audit fees is explainable from the perspective of auditors‟ 
exposure to audit risk. Loss making organisations potent going concern danger and 
may require more audit efforts in order to minimise audit risk and this may 
consequently lead to more fees being paid by such companies. This explanation 
may also be tenable in the case of non-audit services.  Similar result was found by 
Reynolds et al, (2004) and Griffin et al, (2008).   
These results are similar to findings documented by other studies including Mitra et 
al (2007), Goddard and Masters (2000), O‟Sullivan (1999), Collier and Gregory 
(1999) and Simunic (1984). Goddard and Masters (2000), O‟Sullivan (1999) and 
Collier and Gregory (1999) are all UK studies and they all reported a significant 
positive relationship between measures of firm size, risk and complexity and fees 
paid to the external auditors. They explained that these factors continue to be the 
major determinants of external auditors‟ fees.  
Generally, the results from the model are largely consistent with expectations from 
the literature and lend strong support to the proposition that there is an important 
relationship between Audit Committee activity and external auditors‟ fees. This 
importance has also been highlighted in a number of Corporate Governance 
provisions such as the Combined Code in the UK and the SOX in the US. This study 
has shown that the Audit Committee compliments the external auditors, evidenced 
by a positive relationship between Audit Committee activity and total fees earned by 
the auditors. The presence of the Audit Committee could therefore be argued to 
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have enhanced the position of the external auditors, for the fact that the Audit 
Committee members are likely to encourage broader audit coverage. Increase 
coverage should reduce audit risk. This is because better coverage could improve 
the quantity and quality of audit evidence upon which audit opinions are formed. 
These have the tendency to reduce auditors‟ exposure to professional liability arising 
from wrong audit opinion. Thus although the common wisdom is that increase in the 
amount of economic bonding between the auditor and auditee are deemed to have 
the potential to compromises auditor independence, this study has found that the 
Audit Committees are willing to increase audit coverage notwithstanding the 
likelihood of a compromised auditor independence associated with increase in total 
fees paid to the auditor.  
This result is particularly true of the situation in 2005/2006 when most of the listed 
companies in the UK would be complying with the convergence of reporting 
standards. Conversion from UK Generally Accepted Accounting Practice to 
International reporting standards would require additional audit and non-audit efforts 
with consequences being increase in total fees paid to auditors for both services.  
 
Additional Variables  
Table 24 below reports the regression result with additional explanatory variables. 
The expanded model showed better explanatory power with R2 of 69% compare to 
62% from the main model. Furthermore, all the additional variables except ACQUI 
showed expected significant positive relationship with audit fees, their co-efficient 
and t-stat are respectively as follows:  LOSS (1.3e-07, 2.55), EXTRA (0.62, 2.37), 
PENSION (1.08, 2.07), ACQUI (-0.08, -0.24) and ROC (-0.023, -3.26). This result 
closely resembles the outcome from the main model in respect of the relationship 








Table 24: Regression Results with Additional Variables  
   
Variable  Coeff t-stat 
Const 4.868 5.25*** 
NONEXEC 0.453 4.66*** 
BOARDMET -0.097 -2.03** 
INVESTOR -0.112 -2.15** 
MGTOWNER -0.359 -1.59 
AUEXP 0.016 0.07 
AUSIZ 0.156 1.18 
AUACT 0.172 2.44** 
AUCHAT -0.033 -0.15 
LNNOEMPLOY 0.628 8.36*** 
LNSUB -0.021 -0.24 
LOSS 1.3e-7 2.55** 
EXTRA 0.620 2.37** 
PENSION 1.075 2.07** 
ACQUI -0.075 -0.24 
ROC -0.023 -3.26*** 
R2 0.6915  
   
 
7.5 ALTERNATIVE MODEL SPECIFICATIONS.  
7.5 Total Relative Income (TRI)  
Using the total fee paid to the auditor as a measure of perception of auditor 
independence may be criticised for being tenuous. For example, it could be argued 
that a stronger measure would be to measure the total fee an auditor earns from a 
firm as a proportion of the auditors‟ total national fee. Thus the researcher explored 
alternative definitions of external auditors‟ fees (as a proxy for perceptions of 
independence). First the researcher uses the Total Relative Income of the auditor. 
This is defined as the total income paid to the auditor as a ratio of the auditor‟s total 
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national income. Specifically in this study, TRI relates to the auditor‟s total income 
earned from the top 350 companies listed on the London Stock Exchange which is 
the main focus of the thesis. The formula below is used to generate the Total 
Relative Income: 








   
Where: 
xi = audit fees for firm i 





 = represents the total fees earned by the auditors from all its clients in 
the FTSE 350 firms in the sample (where n = 1, 2, 3………244) 
To achieve this, the researcher collected information about audit and non-audit fees 
paid to their auditors by each of the 244 companies in the sample. From this he 
found the sum of the total fees paid to the auditors. He then calculated how much 
each of the five auditors auditing the 244 FTSE 350 companies earned from all their 
clients in the sample; this information is presented in table 25 below. The next step 
was to express the total fees paid by each company in the sample as a ratio of the 
total fees earned by the auditing firm that audits each company. This is done for all 
the companies in the sample to find the total relative Income earned by each audit 
firm from a particular company in the sample.  
 Descriptive statistics of the data collected for this study showed that for the sample 
investigated, an average of 1.48% of the auditor‟s total national fee is earned from 
one client. Average total audit fees paid by companies in the sample were between 
£1.6 for audit fee and £1.9 million for non-audit fees. 99% of companies in the FTSE 
100 are audited by the big 4 audit firms with just one non-big4 audit firm (BDO). In 
the FTSE 350, around 97% of companies are audited by the big 4. One of the 
big4(PricewaterhouseCoopers) has more than 35% of the market share with over 
110 out of the 314 companies in the FTSE 350 brackets. The only non-big4 audit 
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firm audits 7 out of a possible 314 companies in the FTSE 350. Table 25 below 
shows the breakdown of these companies and the spreads of the companies they 
audit. There were audit data for 313 of the 314 (see table 7) companies and not all 
companies had non-audit fee data. The investigation was based on non-financial 
non-utility companies with all the required financial and governance information (see 
table 7 for sample selection). The regression result is presented in table 26 below. 
This is the fourth regression in the thesis and it is based on the model in section 6.3 
above. The dependent variable is the Total Relative Income (TRI) for companies in 
the sample. 
 
Table 25:  FTSE 350 by Auditors 











FTSE 250  
companies 











945 181.8 16 35 51 16.2 
KPMG 1281 228.7 21 47 68 21.7 
PWC 1780 394.8 44 67 111 35.3 
Deloitte & 
Touché 
1550 180.6 18 58 76 24.2 
BDO Stoy 
Hayward 
275 6.9 1 6 7 2.3 
 
Table 26: Dependent Variable: Total Relative Income.  
Variables OLS Std error  T-statistics p-values  
Constant  -12.080 3.401 -3.55 0.000*** 
BOSIZE 0.189 0.221 0.86 0.392 
NONEXEC 0.270 0.318 0.85 0.396 
BOARDMET -0.251 0.114 -2.20 0.029** 
AUSIZ -0.148 0.346 -0.43 0.670 
AUACT 0.578 0.211 2.75 0.007** 
AUCHAT -0.499 0.666 -0.75 0.454 
AUEXP 0.071 0.583 0.12 0.903 
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INVESTOR 0.087 0.125 0.70 0.485 
MGTOWNER -0.322 0.626 -0.51 0.607 
LNNOEMPLOY -0.213 0.239 -0.89 0.375 
LNSUB 0.051 0.249 0.21 0.837 
LNTOVER 0.929 0.327 2.85 0.005** 
ROC 0.001 3.401 0.03 0.975 
R2  0.1932    
Adj R2 0.1476 F-statistics 
4.24 
0.000  
n= 244     
 
7.5.1 REGRESSION RESULT AND DISCUSSIONS  
Co-Efficient of Determination and F-Statistics 
The model produced a co-efficient of determination of 0.1932, indicating that the 
model explained 19.32% of the variation in the TRI. The adjusted R2 was 14.76% 
which could mean that some of the variables were not really useful in explaining the 
variation in the dependent variable. The adjusted R2 shows the actual proportion of 
the variation in the dependent variables that is explained by the explanatory 
variables. Additional variables tend to lead to lower R2 due to a loss of degree of 
freedom with every successive variable introduced into the model. The F-statistic is 
significantly different from zero with a value of 4.24. This shows that the model as a 
whole is significant in measuring the phenomenon under consideration. 
 
TRI and Audit Committee Meeting Frequency   
The result showed a significant positive relationship between the TRI and the 
measure of Audit Committee activity (meeting frequency). The results indicate that 
the more active the Audit Committee in a client‟s firm is, the more important the client 
is likely to be to the auditors in terms of TRI. This is because active Audit 
Committees buy more services from their auditors and this drives client importance.  
This reiterates earlier findings with total fees as the dependent variable and could be 
explained to mean that Audit Committee members seek audit and reporting quality 
and enhanced financial oversight functions and therefore buy more services from the 
external auditors. This could be because allowing for more audits and related 
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services could enhance risk management and reduce the likelihood of litigation as a 
result of poor reporting and fraud. It also shows that firms with active Audit 
Committees buy more services from their auditors than firms with less active Audit 
Committees. However, it also implies that external auditors are more economically 
dependent on their clients with active Audit Committees than those with less active 
ones. This result is consistent with the findings reported by Stewart and Munro 
(2007). The value of the beta co-efficient is 0.58; the t-statistic and p-value are 2.75 
and 0.007 respectively. These indicate a significant result meaning that it is not due 
to chance and it is true 95 out of every 100 times. 
 
TRI and Board Meetings  
Board meeting maintains its negative and significant relationship with this alternative 
measure of perception of auditor independence. An increase in main board meetings 
is associated with a decrease in total relative income of the auditors. This is reflected 
in a co-efficient of -0.251 and a t-statistic of -2.20. Thus, while increased Audit 
Committee activity leads to more services being bought from the auditors, the main 
board‟s activity does not enhance the purchase of services from the auditors. The 
explanation provided earlier regarding the fact that the Audit Committee rather than 
the main board of directors has the primary remit for auditing and reporting quality in 
the organisation and is charged with this oversight function would also explain this 
result.  
 
TRI and Auditee Size 
In addition, the researcher also found that auditee size is positively related to the 
TRI. The larger the size of the firm the higher the proportion of the auditors‟ income 
from a particular client relative to the total income of the auditor from their entire 
client in the sample on which this study is based. The model found a significant 
positive relationship with the measure of economic bonding between the auditee and 
the auditor. It also shows that size is one of the main determinants of the value of 
fees earned by the auditor from their clients. The regression produced a high co-
efficient of 0.929 and a t-statistic of 2.85 which shows a statistical significance at 1%.  
 
Generally, the result from this regression is surprising, not only is the explanatory 
power of the model weaker, some of the variables that were significant in measuring 
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total fees became insignificant. For instance, NONEXEC was no longer significant, 
same apply to ownership structure, control variables such as LNSUB, 
LNNOEMPLOY and ROC which measure firm complexity, size and profitability.  
7.6 Natural Logarithms of Audit Fees and Non-Audit Fees  
The researcher redefined his dependent variables and used both natural logarithm of 
audit fees and non-audit fees. This is decoupling the total fees into their individual 
components and thus affords the examination of the effects of the Audit Committee 
on both components in order to appreciate the dynamics of each of the fees in the 
presence of governance and firm specific variables. This afforded the researcher the 
opportunity of understanding the behaviour of external auditors‟ fees and the 
sensitivity of his result to alternative definitions of economic bonding between the 
external auditors and their clients. Using total fees does not allow an in depth 
appreciation of the individual effect of the explanatory variables on each of the fee 
variables. Examining individual fee variables against the explanatory variables have 
the tendency to improve our understanding of the impact of governance variables 
especially the Audit Committee on external auditors‟ fees. The results of these 
regressions are presented in table 27 below along with the related discussions. First 
the researcher used the natural log of non-audit fees and then natural log of audit 
fees.  
The natural log of non-audit fee as the dependent variable is used here to test the 
sensitivity of the model to alternative definitions of the perception of auditors‟ 
independence. The researcher found that the model still has considerable power in 
explaining changes in non-audit fees as a result of the changes in the explanatory 
variables with an R2 of 51%. Audit committee meetings (AUACT) showed a positive 
and significance relationship with natural log of non-audit fees at 5% with a p-value 
of 0.014 and a t-stat of 2.49. This result is surprising because the researcher would 
have expected that a negative relationship should exist between AUACT and non-
audit fees given the fact that quite a number of governance code cautioned against 
auditors provision of non-audit services to their audit client. However, as pointed out 
earlier, this study focuses on the situation in 2005-2006 year end. This is the period 
when companies were complying with the conversion to International Accounting 
Standards (IAS). This must have pushed up the volume of non-audit services bought 
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during this period.  The control variables showed the expected signs and were 
generally significant at the 1% level. For example, the natural log of turnover 
(LNTOVER) and the natural log of number of employees (LNNOEMPLOY) were both 
used to proxy for auditee size and showed a significant positive relationship with the 
value of non-audit services bought from the auditors. The measure of auditee 
complexity (LNSUB) was positive but statistically insignificant. However, ROC, which 
is a measure of profitability and performance showed a significant negative 
relationship with the level of non-audit services bought and indicates that apparently 
less profitable companies tend to buy more audit and related services 
Also, table 27 below showed the regression result using the natural log of audit fee 
as a measure of the economic bonding between the auditor and their clients. The 
result of this regression is very similar to the outcome of the total fees regression. 
The model explained 65% of the variation in the dependent variable. BOARDMET 
and AUACT are statistically significant at the 1% level. BOARDMET maintained a 
consistent significant negative relationship with different definitions of perception of 














Table 27: Natural Log of Non-Audit Fee and Audit Fee as the Dependent 
Variable 
Variable    Non-Audit 
fee 
        t-stat Audit fee        t-stat 
Constant  0.128 0.15 1.170 1.99** 
BOSIZE 0.075 1.34 -0.002 -0.05 
NONEXEC 0.076 0.95 0.127 2.41** 
BOARDMET -0.056 -2.3** -0.054 -3.12*** 
AUSIZ -0.017 -0.21 0.099 1.93* 
AUACT 0.125 2.49** 0.095     2.90*** 
AUCHAT 0.047 0.30 0.134 1.25 
AUEXP -0.009 -0.06 -0.077 -0.76 
INVESTOR -0.012 -0.38 -0.032 -1.60* 
MGTOWNER -0.207 -1.44 -0.125 -1.24 
LNNOEMPLO
Y 
0.188 2.85** 0.201 4.47*** 
LNSUB 0.134 1.64 0.155 2.53** 
LNTOVER 0.250 2.85** 0.179 2.90*** 
ROC -0.016 -3.45*** -0.009 4.15*** 
R2 0.5157  0.6527  
Adj. R2 0.4884  0.6332  
F-stat 25.49 0.000 33.40 0.000 
N 244  244  
 
the auditor and their client. AUSIZ showed a positive and statistically significance 
with audit fees. All the control variables showed the expected sign and are 
statistically significant.  Interestingly, INVESTOR showed a negative and statistically 
significant relationship with natural log of audit fees at 10% level. Confirming that 
substantial outside investors have a tendency to monitoring auditing and reporting 
activity of the firm such monitoring could improve the control environment and 
internal control of the firm  thereby exerting a downward effect on the audit fees paid 




Table 28: Regression Results with Additional Variables  
 Non-Audit fee  Audit fee  
Variable  Coeff t-stat p-value  t-stat 
Const 2.681 3.91*** 2.089 4.93*** 
NONEXEC 0.260 3.74*** 0.192 5.01*** 
BOARDMET -0.059 -1.72* -0.035 -1.75* 
INVESTOR -0.045 -1.27 -0.069 -3.34*** 
MGTOWNER -0.275 -1.73* -0.057 -0.58 
AUEXP 0.041 0.26 -0.009 -0.09 
AUSIZ 0.017 0.17 0.127 2.40** 
AUACT 0.120 2.41** 0.045 1.48 
AUCHAT -0.062 -0.42 0.011 0.12 
LNNOEMPLO
Y 
0.317 5.84*** 0.324 10.45*** 
LNSUB -0.058 -0.87 0.045 1.24 
LOSS 6.13e-08 1.82* 7.78e-8 3.47*** 
EXTRA 0.372 2.07** 0.247 2.09** 
PENSION 0.457 1.33 0.616 2.15** 
ACQUI -0.016 -0.07 -0.058 -0.46 
ROC -0.014 -2.54** -0.009 -3.38*** 
R2 0.5419  0.7445  
     
 
Compare to Non-Audit fee and Audit fees as the dependent variables, table 29 below 
showed the regression results when ratio of Non-Audit fees to Audit fees and ratio of 
Non- Audit fees to Total fees were used as measures of economic bonding between 
the client and their auditors. Most of the variables were not statistically significant, 
the explanatory powers of the model are also considerably lower compare to the 
result reported in table 27 above. Only complexity and Audit Committee size showed 
significant negative relationship with ratio of Non-Audit fees to Audit fees 10 %, while 
management share ownership showed significant negative relationship with ratio of 






Table 29: Regression with ratio of Non-Audit to Audit fees and Non-Audit fee to    
Total fees  
 RN-A  RN-T  
Variable  Coeff t-stat Coeff  t-stat 
Const 2.343 2.56 0.489 10.93*** 
NONEXEC 0.099 1.14 0.003 1.19 
BOARDMET -0.040 -0.83 -0.000 -0.59 
INVESTOR -0.008 -0.01 0.001 0.96 
MGTOWNER -0.106 -0.57 -0.012 -1.72* 
AUEXP 0.097 0.51 -0.001 -0.18 
AUSIZ -0.245 -1.71* -0.004 -1.07 
AUACT 0.076 1.08 0.002 1.22 
AUCHAT 0.032 0.18 -0.001 -0.22 
LNNOEMPLO
Y 
0.015 0.21 0.001 0.60 
LNSUB -0.164 -1.92* -0.003 -1.16 
LOSS -3.60e-08 -1.41 -6.13e-11 -0.09 
EXTRA 0.017 0.09 0.002 0.31 
PENSION -0.126 -0.23 0.010 0.35 
ACQUI 0.126 0.40 0.005 0.56 
ROC 0.000 0.00 -0.000 -1.33 
R2 0.0688  0.0842  
     
 
 
7.7 Chapter Summary   
This chapter examined the relationship between Audit Committee and external 
auditors‟ independence, proxy by its fees. The topics of auditor independence and 
the economic bonding of the auditor to their clients have enjoyed a considerable 
amount of attention in the academic literature over the last 35 years. Although 
independence in mind is not measurable, independence in appearance has been 
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proxy by a number of variables of which the measure of the level of economic 
bonding between the auditor and the auditee has been used. Precisely, audit and 
non-audit fees have been used in previous studies. The researcher explored these 
measures creatively in the presence of governance and other control variables for a 
sample of UK listed companies. This particular investigation is unique in that these 
relationships have not been previously explored in the context of Corporate 
Governance in the UK except in the study by Collier and Gregory (1999). Other than 
this, the relationship has been assumed and not empirically established. The 
researcher was keen to examine the impact of governance mechanisms and 
especially that of the Audit Committee on perceptions of auditor independence.  
 
The researcher found evidence that show that when Audit Committees are active, 
they buy more services from their auditors for both audit and non-audit services. 
Furthermore, when economic bonding is measured by reference to client 
importance, the study also found that firms with active Audit Committees tend to be 
more important to the auditors than firms with less active Audit Committees. 
Surprisingly, the study did not find any significant relationship between the ratio of 
non-audit fees to audit fee and Audit Committee Activity. This shows that Audit 
Committee activity does not influence this measure of perception of auditor 
independence. Even when the ratio of non-audit fee to total fees was used as a 
measure of economic bonding between the auditor and their client, the relationship 
was found to be statistically insignificant. These findings show that these measures 
are not appropriate proxy for perception of auditors‟ economic bonding to their 
clients. This study has shown that increase in Audit Committee activity increases 
total fees and total relative income of the auditors for listed companies in UK for the 
financial year 2005-2006. However, this was the year when listed companies were to 
start to report their performance in line with the International Accounting Standard 
rather than the UK national reporting standard. This will necessarily lead to more 
auditing and non-auditing services being bought by the clients. 
 
All the measures showed a positive relationship between all the definitions of fees 
used in this study (total fees, total relative fees, audit fees, non-audit fees, and the 
ratio of non-audit fee to total fees) and frequency of committee meetings. The 
researcher interprets this to mean that the presence of the Audit Committee implied 
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additional purchasing of services from the auditors. The researcher contends that 
this is explainable in the context of Audit Committee members being more vigilant 
and signalling a preference for a higher level of reporting and auditing quality. 
Furthermore, the researcher maintained that Audit Committee members have an 
interest in buying more services from the auditor primarily to ensure auditing and 
reporting quality in view of their enhanced remit, being charged with performing 
financial oversight functions on management. Further, the researcher reiterates 
concern over reputational damage and the effects on human capital as additional 
incentives for Audit Committees to buy additional services from the external auditors. 
 
The study documents a consistent negative relationship between the variable 
measuring the main board‟s meeting frequency and all definitions of perceived 
auditor independence except when the measure of audit fee was used. The 
researcher interpreted this finding to mean that the board meeting focuses more on 
other areas of monitoring while delegating auditing and financial reporting oversight 
functions to the Audit Committee. Further, the researcher contends that the result 
supports previous studies in showing that more effective boards reduce companies‟ 
operating agency costs which include the cost of monitoring and control.  
 
The study has established that auditee size and complexity are important 
determinants of external auditors‟ fees. The larger the company and the more 
complex it is, the higher the fees paid to the auditor are likely to be and the higher 
the perception of a compromised independence. However this is not the case when 
the ratio of non-audit fee to audit fees was used as a measure of perception of 
auditor independence.  Size and firm complexity were found to be negatively related 
to fee ratios. This is a surprising result and is not consistent with theoretical 
expectation that suggest that size and clients‟ complexity drives external auditors‟ 
fees. Even when ratio of non-audit fee to total fee was used as a measure of 
perception of economic bonding between auditor and their client, the negative 
relationship between size, complexity and external auditors‟ fees were consistent. 
These deserve further investigation. Table 30 below shows a summary of significant 
results and their signs. Table 31 presents a summary of the null hypotheses rejected 
and accepted. The issue of auditor independence has also been discussed around 
the threat to independence arising from the auditors‟ provision of non-audit services 
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to their audit client. This has generated substantial debate and findings are 
inconclusive (Beattie and Fearnley, 2002). In the next chapter, the researcher 
examines the relationship between audit and non-audit fees in the presence of Audit 
Committee. This is with a view to understanding the interaction between these 
important variables. The researcher also contributes to the debate on whether there 





Table 30: Summary of Significant Findings 
 






     
BOSIZE +VE +VE +VE -VE 
NONEXEC +VE +VE +VE +VE 
BOARDMET -VE -VE -VE +VE 
AUACT +VE +VE +VE +VE 
LNSUB +VE +VE +VE +VE 
LNTOVER +VE +VE +VE +VE 
ROC -VE -VE -VE -VE 














Table 31: List of Null hypotheses Rejected and Not Rejected 
No  Null hypotheses  Rejected Not 
Rejected  
H6 There are no relationship between external auditors 









H8 External Auditors‟ fees are not related to ownership 











H9 External auditors‟ fee is not related to firms‟ profitability  X  
H10 External auditors‟ fee is not related to firms‟ complexity  X  



























The previous chapter focused on the relationship between Audit Committee activity 
and external auditors‟ fees. This was examined using a single fee equation model. 
However, against the backdrop of the Corporate Governance guidelines that require 
the Audit Committee to predetermine the nature, type and value of non-audit 
services that can be purchased from the auditors and the concern that auditors use 
auditing services as a loss leader to gain more lucrative non-audit services, 
researchers have examined the relationship between audit and non-audit fees to see 
whether knowledge spill-over actually take place between  audit and non-audit fees 
and in what direction(Lee and Mande, 2005; Whisenant et al, 2003; Antle et al, 
2002). Positive relationships between the two have been interpreted to mean that 
knowledge spill-over takes place from one to the other. If this is true then economies 
of scope benefits may accrue to the auditors as well as their clients for a number of 
reasons. The benefit to the auditors may arise in the sense that resources in terms of 
manpower could be better utilised. For the client, it might be economical and could 
lead to cost savings in terms of cost of contract negotiations to engage a new auditor 
compared to the incumbent auditor who would most probably have knowledge of the 
client‟s business and associated risks through the initial auditing engagement. Thus, 
knowledge and skills from auditing could be transferred to non-auditing contracts and 
that may enhance the auditing and reporting quality of the auditors to the benefit of 
their clients in terms of users‟ confidence and cost reductions for future audit and 
related services (Lee and Mande, 2005; Beattie and Fearnley, 2002).  
 
However, previous studies have also raised concerns over endogeneity between the 
two services (Lee and Mande, 2005; Whisenant et al, 2003; Antle et al, 2002).  A 
situation where the purchase of audit services from an auditor affects the purchase 
of non-audit services and vice versa. But apart from Lee and Mande (2005) no other 
study has examined how endogeneity issues between audit and non-audit fees are 
affected by Audit Committee activity. This is the focus of this chapter. The rest of the 
chapter is structured as follows; in section 8.1, the researcher presents and justifies 
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the model to be used. Data sources are discussed in section 8.2. In section 8.3, the 
researcher presents the single equation model results. Section 8.4 focuses on 
endogeneity test while section 8.5-8.6 present simultaneous equation model results 
and discussions. Section 8.7 summarises the chapter.  
 
8.1 Methodology and Data 
This part of the thesis extends the investigation in chapter 7. While the second main 
research question examines the relationship between Audit Committee activity and 
external auditors‟ fee using a single equation model with the fee variables as the 
dependent variable, the investigation in this chapter involves the use of simultaneous 
equation model (SEM) of fees and Audit Committee activity. The study modelled 
audit and non-audit fees endogenously because of anticipated feedback effects 
between the two variables. This is because single equation models have been found 
to suffer from simultaneous equation bias and produce inconsistent and biased 
estimates for the variable and standard errors when used to estimate variables that 
are known to have feedbacks and where the relationships are bi-directional 
(Maddala, 2001). The researcher model the relationship as stated below.  
 
To test these hypotheses, the study uses two different models and methods of 
estimation. These are Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Simultaneous Equation 
Model (SEM).  
 













= all the independent variables and their co-efficient  
= the error term 
It is assumed that the Gauss Markov model assumptions are maintained for the OLS 
to be BLUE (Best Linear Unbiased Estimator). 
 
The Simultaneous Equation Model of the fee relationships: 




)7....(..................................................11 ijjijjj CVCGAudfeenoAudfee                          
)8....(..................................................22 ijjijjj CVCGnoAudfeeAudfee
  
 noAudfee =  defines non-audit fees paid to the external auditor by the firm 
     Audfee =  defines audit fees paid to the external auditors   
     ∑βj CGij = defines all the Corporate Governance variables and their co-efficient  
      ∑βjCVij = defines all the control variables and their co-efficient  
                εi =    error terms 
                αi  =   constant term. 
 
The use of OLS becomes questionable if there is a violation of assumption three of 
the Gauss Markov theorem. This relates to the presence of direct correlation 
between the explanatory variables and the error terms as a result of the joint 
determination of the dependent variables. In equations 7 and 8, if the determination 
of noAudfee is dependent on the behaviour of Audfee and vice versa then OLS will 
be inadequate for estimation (i.e. if the dependent variable in one of the equations is 
one of the explanatory variables in another equation in a system of equations, then 
an endogeneity problem is involved). In this case, OLS will be inappropriate as it will 
give a wrong estimate of the co-efficient, the error terms will be overblown and the t-
statistics will be affected adversely. The implication of this for the researcher‟s test is 
that he may end up rejecting hypotheses that should have been accepted and vice 
versa (Wooldridge, 2009; Maddala; 2001). The best option then will be to use a 
Simultaneous Equation Model (SEM).  
 
However, using SEMs bring up a number of challenges as well. The equations need 
to be identified in order to present unique estimates for the parameters and to solve 
the system of equations. The researcher can use the Reduced Form or the 
Instrumental Variable approach to solve the SEM. To get a solution, the equations 
need to pass the rank and order conditions for identification. While the rank condition 
is necessary it does not offer a sufficient condition for the solution of the parameter 
but the order condition is both necessary and sufficient for a solution to the SEM. In 
order to meet the order condition, the researcher‟s system of equations cannot have 
exactly the same type of explanatory variable apart from the endogenous variables. 
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For this reason, the researcher needs to have at least one explanatory variable that 
is unique in explaining the Audfee but which is not related to noAudfee and another 
explanatory variable that is unique in explaining noAudfee but not related with 
Audfee. These enable us to identify each of the equations (Wooldridge, 2000). In the 
non-audit fee equation, ACQUISI and EXTRAORD are used as the unique variables 
and for the audit fee model; PENSION is used as the unique variable. This is 
because acquisition and disposal of a business, or part of a business, as well as 
extraordinary incomes are special events and do not form part of the normal course 
of a firms‟ day to day activities. It is likely that firms would engage auditors to 
undertake assurance and due diligence services for these purposes. On the other 
hand it is more likely that a client‟s pension scheme would affect the audit services 
than non-auditing services provided to a client.  
 
8.2 Data   
For the purpose of testing these hypotheses, the researcher decided to use a more 
detailed model compared to the model used in testing the hypotheses in the first and 
second empirical chapters, in order to allow more variables that have been 
documented to affect both audit and non-audit fees. While the sample selection 
criteria are the same as shown in Chapter 6 and 7, more variables will be used in 
testing the hypotheses in this part of the thesis. These are variables that have been 
used in previous studies that have examined the relationship between audit and non-
audit fees and that have recognised the endogeneity problem in the fees (Mitra and 
Hossain, 2007; Mitra et al, 2007; Stewart and Kent, 2006; Lee and Mande 2005; 
Whisenant et al, 2003; Antle et al, 2002).  Table 32 below defines the variables to be 
used in testing the stated null hypotheses. The decision to use more variables 
implies that some observations will be deleted for non-availability of required 
variables. 40 companies of the 244 used in earlier testing do not meet the additional 









Table 32: Definition of Variables  
Variables                    Definitions  
AUACT Audit Committee activity, measured as the frequency of Audit 
Committee meetings  
BOSIZE  Defined as  the number of directors (both executive and 
Independent non-executive directors) 
NONEXEC Defined as the proportion of the Independent Non-Executive 
Directors on the board 
BOARDMET Defined as the number of board meetings in a year 
OWNSTRUC This is comprised of two measures:  
 1) INVESTOR: defined as the number of shareholders holding  
more than  a 3% shareholding in the company   
 2) MGTOWNER : a binary variable, equal to 1 if management 
hold up to 3% shareholding in the company‟s share and 0 if 
otherwise 
AUEXP A binary variable measuring financial expertise. Equal to 1 if at 
least one member of the board is a financial expert and 0 if 
otherwise.  
AUSIZ Total number of Independent Non-Executive Directors on the Audit 
Committee 
AUCHAT Equal to 1 if Audit Committee has a charter or term of reference, 
and 0 if otherwise 
LNNOEMPLOY Natural log of number of employees. Used to proxy for firm size.  
 
LNASSET Natural log of total assets, used to proxy for firm size  
LNTOVER Natural log of turnover, used to proxy for  firm size  
LNDEBTORS Receivables plus inventory divide by total assets, used to proxy for 
audit risk and complexity  
PENSION An indicator variable equal to 1 if firm has a pension scheme and 0 
otherwise. Used to measure audit risk and complexity  
ACQUISI An indicator variable, equal to 1 if firm was involved in acquisition 
and disposal and 0 if otherwise  
ROA  Defined as net income divide by total assets in the period. Used to 
measure firm‟s profitability  
[247] 
 
LOSS An indicator variable, equal to 1 if firm makes profit in the period 
and 0 if otherwise.  
EXTRA An indicator variable equal to 1 if firm reported extraordinary item 
in the period and 0 if otherwise 
 
The following steps would be followed to test these hypotheses:  
1) Regress audit fees on non-audit fees, governance variables and other firm 
specific control variables  
2) Regress non-audit fees on audit fee, governance variables and other firm 
specific control variables 
3) Test for endogeneity in the relationship between audit and non-audit fees 
4) If there is support for endogeneity, estimate a simultaneous equation of audit 
and non-audit fees, in the presence of governance variables and other firm 
specific control variables in the model.  
If there is no support for endogeneity, the results of the single equation fee model 
holds.  















8.2.1 Correlation Analyses 
Tables 33 and 34 below show the correlation between all the dependent variables. 
Apart from the control variables none of the other explanatory variables are highly 
correlated. The correlation between the controls variables are not thought to be 
capable of adversely influencing the results of the investigation. This is because the 
variance Inflation factor is much lower than the threshold of 10 which indicate 
instance of severe correlation and could be an indication of severe multi-collinearity.  
 
 





    MGTOWNER     0.0508  -0.0404   1.0000 
    INVESTOR     0.0416   1.0000 
       AUEXP     1.0000 
                                         
                  AUEXP INVESTOR MGTOWNER
    MGTOWNER     0.0855   0.1797*  0.2115* -0.0551   0.1222   0.0663  -0.0720 
    INVESTOR    -0.3719* -0.2959* -0.3659*  0.0187  -0.1834* -0.2534*  0.1367*
       AUEXP     0.0939   0.1029   0.0946   0.0661   0.0276   0.0221   0.1286*
      AUCHAT    -0.0020   0.0272  -0.0299   0.1019   0.0455  -0.0807   1.0000 
       AUACT     0.3086*  0.2898*  0.3525*  0.2743*  0.2823*  1.0000 
       AUSIZ     0.3298*  0.4554*  0.4979*  0.1584*  1.0000 
    BOARDMET     0.1065  -0.0191  -0.0172   1.0000 
     NONEXEC     0.5142*  0.8006*  1.0000 
   BOARDSIZE     0.4768*  1.0000 
     LNASSET     1.0000 
                                                                             
                LNASSET BOARDS~E  NONEXEC BOARDMET    AUSIZ    AUACT   AUCHAT
    MGTOWNER     0.0224   0.0074   0.1032   0.0333  -0.0240   0.1733*  0.1077 
    INVESTOR    -0.0776   0.0295   0.0205  -0.0871  -0.0466  -0.2455* -0.3471*
       AUEXP     0.0622   0.0492  -0.0799  -0.0091  -0.1018   0.0765   0.0524 
      AUCHAT     0.0635   0.0602   0.0409   0.1141  -0.0830   0.0631  -0.0669 
       AUACT     0.0736   0.0634   0.0246   0.1879* -0.0368   0.1687*  0.3282*
       AUSIZ     0.0271  -0.0338   0.0277   0.1116  -0.0864   0.3601*  0.3605*
    BOARDMET     0.1724*  0.0669  -0.0547  -0.0043  -0.1265   0.3026*  0.1350*
     NONEXEC     0.0872  -0.0305   0.0889   0.1630* -0.1106   0.3920*  0.4831*
   BOARDSIZE     0.1074   0.0096   0.0539   0.1512* -0.1409*  0.3122*  0.4253*
     LNASSET     0.1340*  0.1695*  0.0171   0.2063* -0.3028*  0.5033*  0.6541*
   LNDEBTORS     0.1676*  0.2167*  0.0120   0.1802* -0.0963   0.6256*  1.0000 
  LNNOEMPLOY     0.2309*  0.0588   0.0732   0.1182  -0.0860   1.0000 
         ROA    -0.0977  -0.1669*  0.0786   0.1419*  1.0000 
        LOSS     0.0346   0.0136  -0.0102   1.0000 
     ACQUISI    -0.1869*  0.0121   1.0000 
     PENSION     0.1127   1.0000 
    EXTRAORD     1.0000 
                                                                             





















    MGTOWNER    -0.0826   0.0066  -0.0706   1.0000
    INVESTOR     0.1579   0.0541   1.0000
       AUEXP     0.1082   1.0000
      AUCHAT     1.0000
                                                  
                 AUCHAT    AUEXP INVESTOR MGTOWNER
    MGTOWNER     0.0972   0.1719   0.1945   0.2076  -0.0964   0.1207   0.0566
    INVESTOR    -0.3484  -0.3903  -0.2745  -0.3534  -0.0226  -0.1666  -0.2463
       AUEXP     0.0336   0.0696   0.0828   0.0438   0.0771   0.0080  -0.0010
      AUCHAT    -0.0620  -0.0866  -0.0089  -0.0424   0.0836   0.0116  -0.1200
       AUACT     0.3085   0.3201   0.2962   0.3577   0.2899   0.2708   1.0000
       AUSIZ     0.3505   0.3749   0.4411   0.4864   0.1379   1.0000
    BOARDMET     0.1491   0.1877  -0.0308  -0.0242   1.0000
     NONEXEC     0.4714   0.6212   0.8182   1.0000
   BOARDSIZE     0.4259   0.5735   1.0000
     LNASSET     0.6722   1.0000
   LNDEBTORS     1.0000
                                                                             
               LNDEBT~S  LNASSET BOARDS~E  NONEXEC BOARDMET    AUSIZ    AUACT
    MGTOWNER    -0.0110  -0.0289   0.0662   0.0413  -0.0331   0.1762   0.1498
    INVESTOR    -0.0533   0.0719  -0.0061  -0.0800  -0.0048  -0.3768  -0.2363
       AUEXP     0.0513   0.0519  -0.1061  -0.0108  -0.1087   0.1019   0.0853
      AUCHAT     0.0595   0.0792   0.0254   0.1125  -0.0758   0.0016   0.0350
       AUACT     0.0565   0.0360   0.0168   0.1855  -0.0625   0.3163   0.1594
       AUSIZ     0.0052  -0.0587   0.0390   0.1120  -0.1154   0.4261   0.3463
    BOARDMET     0.1733   0.1119  -0.0662  -0.0091  -0.1672   0.2710   0.2883
     NONEXEC     0.0781  -0.0085   0.1134   0.1664  -0.1512   0.5481   0.3872
   BOARDSIZE     0.0955   0.0142   0.0674   0.1573  -0.1662   0.4823   0.3318
     LNASSET     0.1334   0.1197   0.0201   0.1892  -0.3402   0.7864   0.5572
   LNDEBTORS     0.1400   0.1392  -0.0100   0.1976  -0.1818   0.7402   0.6380
  LNNOEMPLOY     0.1961   0.0022   0.0982   0.1166  -0.1601   0.8422   1.0000
     LNTOVER     0.1459   0.0605   0.0960   0.2317  -0.1331   1.0000
         ROA    -0.1282  -0.3367   0.1236   0.1689   1.0000
        LOSS     0.0276   0.0029  -0.0057   1.0000
     ACQUISI    -0.2240  -0.1067   1.0000
     PENSION     0.0521   1.0000
    EXTRAORD     1.0000
                                                                             




8.3 Single Equation Regression Result 
8.3.1 Audit and Non-Audit Fees 
H12 examines the relationship between audit and non-audit fees in a single equation 
fee model. Table 35 below presents the regression results for the single equation fee 
model. The explanatory variables in the audit fee model explained 82% of the 
variation in audit fee. The variables of interest are the non-audit fee and the variable 
representing Audit Committee activity. The result shows a strong positive 
relationship between audit and non-audit fee with a co-efficient of 0.216 and a t-
statistic of 6.11 indicating a significant positive relationship at the 1% level. This 
implies that an increase in the audit fee could also be explained by auditors‟ 
provision of non-audit fees. The explanatory variables in the non-audit fee equation 
explained approximately 65% of the variation in the non-audit fees. The result also 
showed a significant positive relationship between audit and non-audit fees with a 
co-efficient value of 0.657 and t-statistic of 4.71, indicating a statistically significant 
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relationship.  These results are similar to the findings in Lee and Mande (2005), 
Antle et al (2004) and Whisenant et al (2003) in terms of finding a significant positive 
relationship between audit and non-audit fees in a single equation fee model. Thus 
the researcher rejects the null hypothesis and accepts the alternative hypothesis 
which states that there is a positive relationship between audit and non-audit fees. 
This basically suggests that there are economies of scope benefit that accrue by 
auditors providing non-audit services to their audit client and vice versa. This shows 
that knowledge spill-over from non-audit services to auditing and from auditing 
services to non-auditing services is proved when modelled using single equation. 
Thus the null hypothesis is rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis. 
 
Although the variables of interest are the audit and non-audit fees, there a number of 
interesting and surprising results from these regressions. Firstly, while there is no 
significant positive relationship between audit fee and Audit Committee activity in the 
audit fee model, the non-audit fee model showed a significant positive relationship 
between non-audit fee and Audit Committee activity. This result is consistent with the 
perception that during this period, purchase of non-audit services by the client is 
likely to be higher due to conversion from national accounting standards to the 
International Accounting Standards. Furthermore, both measures of ownership 
structure maintained consistent negative relationship with audit fees, with 
INVESTOR showing a strong and statistically significant relationship, while 
MGTOWNER is statistically insignificant although it maintained a negative sign. 
These suggest that ownership structures as measured above, and especially 
substantial outside shareholders, play active monitoring roles in firms which exert 
downward pressure on audit fees.  In the non-audit fee model, both ownership 
structure measures were statistically insignificant, while INVESTOR turned positive, 






Table 35: Single Equation Regression Results 
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 Audit fees  Non-Audit 
fees 
 
Variables Co-effi R.t-stat Co-eff R.t-stat 
     
Constant -0.388 -0.28 -3.105 -1.49 
LNAUDFEE   0.657 4.71*** 
LNNAUDFEE 0.216 6.11***   
AUACT 0.017 0.57 0.082 1.88* 
BOSIZE -0.013 -0.11 0.283 1.34 
NONEXEC 0.007 0.00 4.710 1.46 
BOARDMET -0.013 -0.87 -0.229 -0.83 
INVESTOR -0.037 -2.31** 0.008 0.28 
MGTOWNER -0.018 -0.23 -0.151 -1.03 
AUEXP -0.004 -0.05 0.014 0.11 
AUSIZ 0.119 2.72*** -0.107 -1.17 
AUCHAT 0.130 1.59 0.083 0.66 
LNNOEMPLOY 0.209 4.46*** 0.082 0.97 
LNASSET 0.199 3.63*** 0.152 1.44 
LNTOVER -0.117 -1.55 -0.024 -0.16 
LNDEBTOR 0.131 3.65*** 0.036 -0.16 
PENSION 0.561 2.52** --- ---- 
ACQUISI ---- ---- 0.061 0.31 
ROA 0.002 0.87 -0.025 -0.52 
LOSS -0.172 -0.63 -0.427 -1.38 
EXTRA ---- --- 0.103 0.63 
R2 0.8243  0.6498  
ADJ R2     
F-statistics 41.05 0.000 22.97 0.000 
N 204  204  
 
 
Surprisingly, AUSIZ which measures the committee size showed a strong positive 
relationship with audit fees at 1% level. This indicates that the higher the size of the 
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Audit Committees the more the demand for auditing and reporting coverage. All the 
firm specific control variables (LNNOEMPLOY, LNASSET, LNTOVER and 
LNDEBTOR) showed the expected positive relationship with audit fees and are all 
significant at 1% level.  Interestingly, our unique audit fee model variable PENSION, 
showed a positive relationship with audit fees at 5% level.  On the other hand, none 
of the other variables in the non-audit fees showed any statistically significant 
relationship with non-audit fees. This is rather surprising, not even the control 
variables were significant in explaining the variations in the non-audit fees. The non-
audit fee regression result with a R2 of 65% but just two variable showing 
significance suggests that there could either be problem with multicollinearity or 
heteroscedasticity. The researcher therefore conducted post estimation diagnostics 
which showed high collinearity among a number of the variables. Table 36 below 
reports the variance inflation factors. This shows that NONEXEC, BOARDSIZE are 
highly affected by multi-collinearity. The researcher decides to remove these 
variables from the model (Maddala, 2001) and run another regression with non-audit 
fees as the dependent variable. Table 37 below reports the rerun regression on non-
audit fees. The result improves slightly with LNASSET showing significant positive 
relationship at 10% level.  Audit Committee activity also shows a stronger positive 
relationship with non-audit fees.  This again may be due to possibly high volume of 
non-audit services companies would have bought for compliance and consultancy on 
the conversion to International Accounting Standard.  
 
8.4 Tests for Endogeneity  
In order to test for endogeneity between the fee variables, the researcher adopted 
the instrumental variable approach. To do this, the researcher obtained the predicted 
value of the fees variable LNAUDFEE^ (LNNAUDFEE^) by regressing each of the 
fee variables LNAUDFEE (LNNAUDFEE) on its set of exogenous variables in 
equations 9 and 10 above respectively. The researcher then saved the residual from 
this regression; these were then used in a regression that uses the fee variables and 
the residual from the predicted values of the fee variables along with other 
exogenous variables. 
 
Table 36: Variable Inflation Factor 
[253] 
 




















This is because the closer the p-values of the fee variables‟ residuals to zero, the 
stronger the indication of endogeneity between the fee variables. The researcher 
found that the fee variables dropped out of the regression which may indicate a case 
of perfect correlation between the fee variables and their residuals. This also shows 
the presence of endogeneity between the variables. The predicted variables 
LNAUDFEE^ and LNNAUDFEE^ are now used in the main regression instead of the 






Table 37: Rerun of Regression with Non-Audit Fee Model  
[254] 
 
 Non-Audit fees  
Variables Co-effi R.t-stat 
   
Constant -1.225 -1.33 
LNAUDFEE 0.717 5.91*** 
AUACT 0.104 2.17** 
BOARDMET -0.036 -1.25 
INVESTOR 0.014 0.35 
MGTOWNER -0.153 -1.05 
AUEXP 0.037 0.28 
AUSIZ -0.070 -0.86 
AUCHAT 0.067 0.45 
LNNOEMPLOY 0.077 0.95 
LNASSET 0.160 1.72* 
LNTOVER -0.016 -0.08 
LNDEBTOR 0.020 0.35 
ACQUISI 0.091 0.49 
ROA -0.003 -0.84 
LOSS -0.000 -0.43 
EXTRAORD 0.131 0.78 
R2 0.6441  
ADJ R2 0.6136  
F-statistics 21.15 0.000 
N 204  
 
8.5 Simultaneous Equation Model 
The researcher ran the simultaneous equation model of fees specified above 
(equations 9 and 10) with the predicted values of the fee variables. The result of the 




8.5.1  Audit and Non-Audit Fees 
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The pseudo R2 showed that the audit fee model explains 80% of the variation while 
the non-audit fee model falls in its explanatory power from 65% in the single 
equation model to 59%. Both are still relatively reasonable results. 
 
H13 examines the relationship between audit and non-audit fees in a simultaneous 
equation model. The variables of concern are the audit and non-audit fees. In the 
audit fee equation of the two equations SEM, the result showed a strong positive 
relationship between audit and non-audit fees with a co-efficient of 1.021 and a t-
statistic of 3.22 showing significance at the 1% level. This shows that an increase in 
the provision of non-audit fees drives an increase in the audit fees. On the other 
hand, the non-audit fee model showed an insignificant positive relationship between 
audit and non-audit fees with a co-efficient of 5.275 and a t-statistics of 1.60. This is 
not statistically significant at conventional level of 10%, 5 % or 1% level.  
 
A positive relationship between non-audit fee and audit fee is consistent with findings 
in studies such as Davis et al (1993), Ezzamel et al (1996) and Bell et al (2001) all of 
whom have found that non-audit fees significantly influence audit fees in a single 
equation model. A similar finding has also been documented by Antle et al (2004) in 
a simultaneous equation model that also involved abnormal accruals; this was a UK 
study.  This result conflicts with the findings in Whisenant et al (2003) who found that 
non-audit services do not directly influence audit services when modelled jointly. In 
terms of whether auditing directly influences non-audit services, the researcher 
found that, contrary to Antle et al (2004), the positive relationship between audit and 
non-audit services is statistically insignificant when modelled jointly.  
 
This finding is consistent with Lee and Mande (2005), who found that the association 
between audit and non-audit fees only hold when the model is not modelled jointly. If 
the result is taken together, the researcher found that while knowledge spill-over 
flows from non-audit to audit services, similar knowledge spill over is not statistically 




Table 38: Result of the Simultaneous Equation Fee Model 
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 Audit fees  Non-Audit 
fees 
 
     
Variables Co-effi R.t-stat Co-eff R.t-stat 
Constant 2.747 1.64 0.319 0.28 
LNAUDFEE_hat   5.275 1.60 
LNNAUDFEE_hat 1.021 3.22***   
AUACT -0.069 -1.58 -0.079 -0.63 
BOSIZE -0.281 -1.90* 0.077 1.14 
NONEXEC -4.572 -1.79* -0.437 -1.26 
BOARDMET 0.008 0.43 0.058 0.87 
INVESTOR -0.029 -1.65* 0.191 1.47 
MGTOWNER 0.130 1.28 0.087 0.37 
AUEXP -0.018 -0.24 -0.442 -0.31 
AUSIZ 0.161 3.22*** -0.509 -1.61 
AUCHAT -0.046 -0.43 -0.751 -1.27 
LNNOEMPLOY 0.003 0.04 -1.096 -1.31 
LNASSET -0.082 -0.68 -1.079 -1.23 
LNTOVER -0.016 0.65 0.544 1.29 
LNDEBTOR 0.008 0.15 -0.807 1.29 
PENSION 0.561 2.88***   
ACQUISI   0.066 0.37 
ROA 0.002 0.65 -0.001 -0.22 
LOSS 0.384 1.25 1.007 0.93 
EXTRAORD   0.294 1.77* 
R2 0.8040  0.5940  
ADJ R2     
N 204  204  
 
This result questions the claim that auditors use auditing as a loss leader. The result 
from this investigation show that non-audit services drive audit services rather than 
the auditor using audit services as bait to supply more lucrative non-audit services.  
This finding is consistent with perception that auditing services is a more stable 
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source of income to the auditor and they would rather prefer a more stable and 
reliable source of income than rely on unpredictable source of income like the non-
audit services. These results also show that the claim that economies of scope result 
from an auditor providing non-audit services to its audit client is at best an 
inconclusive debate.  
 
8.6 Audit fee, Non-Audit fee and Audit Committee Activity    
H14 and H15 examine the relationship between the fee variables and Audit 
Committee activity. The regression results in table 38 support the null hypotheses in 
H14 and H15. These indicate that there are no significant statistical relationships 
between the fees and Audit Committee activity when modelled jointly. The 
regression results in table 35 also show that Audit Committee activity is not 
statistically related to audit fee in the audit fee model with a co-efficient of 0.017 and 
a t-statistic of 0.57, but it shows a weakly significant positive relationship with non 
audit fees with a co-efficient value of 0.082 and t-statistic of 1.88, significant at the 
10% level. Thus in terms of the sign of the relationship they both show the 
anticipated positive signs but weak in terms of their statistical significance. This 
result is not consistent with the findings in Abbot et al (2003a) who found a strong 
positive relationship between audit fees and Audit Committee activity. Table 39 

















Table 39: List of Null hypotheses Rejected and Not Rejected  
No  Null hypotheses Rejected  Not 
Rejected   
H12 There are no relationships between audit and non-




H13 There are no relationships between audit and non-





H14 Audit Committee activity is not related to audit fees 





H15 Audit Committee activity is not related to non-audit 






8.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter examined the relationship between Audit Committee activity, audit and 
non-audit fees. It makes important contribution to the debate on the whether or not 
auditors use auditing as a loss leader and whether or not knowledge spill-over from 
one service to the other. The researcher found that non-audit services directly affect 
auditing and not the other way round. This provides evidence that auditing is not 
used as a loss leader. Also the researcher found that knowledge spill from the 
services when the relationship is modelled in a single equation but when 
endogeneity is controlled, the relationship becomes inconsistent. In the next chapter, 
the researcher provides a summary of the major findings. He then identifies 










Conclusion and Recommendations 
Introduction  
This part of the thesis concludes the study by synthesising the previous chapters, 
bringing out their major aspects and how they have helped to achieve the stated 
objectives of the study. The major findings of the thesis are then discussed in the 
context of the immediate investigation, then in the context of a broader picture and 
overview of the subject matter of the thesis. The theoretical implications of the 
findings are examined. The researcher then provides personal reflections on the 
process and highlights some of the challenges and limitations encountered in the 
study. Finally, the researcher provides a pathway for future research and presents 
some policy recommendations.   
9.1 The Research Objectives and Anticipated Outcomes  
At the start of this study, the researcher provided a number of research objectives 
and anticipated outcomes from the investigation. These are reviewed below to see 
how well the objectives and the anticipated outcomes have been achieved.  
The study‟s main objectives were stated as:  
1) Establish the type of relationship that currently exists between the Audit 
Committee as a tool of Corporate Governance and auditor independence 
2) Review the developments in the roles and responsibilities of the audit 
committee as a Corporate Governance mechanism 
3) Examine the determinants of Audit Committee activity and diligence  
4) Analyse the impact of an effective Audit Committee on auditor independence 
5) Establish  the relationship between audit and non-audit fees 
 
The researcher also anticipated the following outcomes from the study:  
1) It is anticipated that the study will result in an enhanced understanding of the 
concept of Corporate Governance and auditor independence and the various 
ways in which it could be threatened, especially as it affects confidence in the 
market system in which the auditor plays a very crucial role 
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2) The study will expound the importance of the Audit Committee as a Corporate 
Governance mechanism 
3) The study will enhance our understanding of the relationships between the 
Audit Committee and External Auditors‟ Fees and the perception of auditor 
independence 
4) The study will improve our understanding of the relationship between audit 
and non-audit fees 
In order to achieve the stated objectives and anticipated outcomes, the research 
objectives were expressed in three main research questions as stated below:  
What are the determinants of Audit Committee activity? 
What is the relationship between the Audit Committee and perceptions of 
auditor independence? 
What is the relationship between audit and non-audit fees and Audit 
Committees? 
These three main research questions formed the bases for three empirical chapters 
in the thesis. The research questions were analysed into fifteen testable null 
hypotheses as stated below. These hypotheses were based on the agency 
theoretical assumptions and models.  
 
The Determinants of Audit Committee Activity: 
H1:  There are no relationships between Audit Committee activity and the 
proportion of non executive directors on the board 
 
H2a:  There are no relationships between managerial ownership and Audit 
Committee activity 
 
H2b:  There are no relationships between substantial outside shareholding and 
Audit Committee Activity 





H4:  There are no relationships between Audit Committee activity and Committee 
charter   
 
H5a:  There are no relationships between Audit Committee activity and firm 
complexity  
 
H5b: There are no relationship between Audit Committee activity and firm size   
 
 
The Relationship between the Audit Committee and Auditor Independence: 
H6:  There are no relationships between the external auditors‟ fees and board 
composition 
 
H7:  There are no relationships between external auditors‟ fees and Audit 
Committee activity  
 
H8a:  There are no relationships between external Auditors‟ fees and managerial 
share ownership in firms. 
 
H8b:  There are no relationships between external Auditors‟ fees and substantial 
outside shareholders‟  
 
H9:   There are no relationship between external auditors‟ fee and firms‟ profitability  
 
H10:   There are no relationships between external auditors‟ fee and firms‟ 
complexity 
  
H11: There are no relationships between external auditors‟ fees and firms‟ size 
 
The Relationship between Audit and Non-Audit Fees: 
 
H12:  There are no relationships between audit and non-audit fees when estimated 
in a single equation model 
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H13:  There are no relationships between audit and non-audit fees when estimated 
in a simultaneous equation model 
 
H14:  There are no relationships between Audit Committee activity and audit fees 
when estimated in a simultaneous equation fee model  
 
H15:  There are no relationships between Audit Committee activity and non-audit 
fees when estimated in a simultaneous equation fee model   
 
9.2 The Research Process 
The research process involved a series of interrelated and coordinated activities. 
These correspond to the first seven chapters of the thesis. These are now 
summarised below with the activities and processes involved in each stage.  
 
Chapter One 
This chapter was used by the researcher to present his research objective, 
anticipated outcomes and likely limitations. The majority of the materials in this 




This chapter provides the researcher with the opportunity to set the stage for the 
study by providing a background and framework for the study. It helped the 
researcher to locate a context for the study. This is achieved by reviewing various 
definitions of Corporate Governance. Furthermore, the chapter also allowed the 
researcher to provide a historical context for the study by reviewing the history and 
development of Corporate Governance in the UK and Audit Committee generally. 
Apart from providing a context for the study, another important outcome of this 
chapter was the development of an integrated definition of Corporate Governance 








This followed on from the second chapter by reviewing the key literature on the 
subject matter of the investigation. The focus was on studies that were undertaken in 
the UK and then elsewhere. The review was undertaken into two main areas of the 
investigation i.e. the Audit Committee and auditor independence. A thematic 
approach whereby literature that addressed similar themes is put together was 
adopted. The review showed that there is a preponderance of US based studies and 
a dearth of UK based studies on the subject matter of this investigation. One 
important outcome from this chapter was that it enabled the researcher to identify 
gaps in the existing stock of knowledge on the subject matter of the investigation. 
This then enhanced the evaluation of the gaps and consequently areas in which the 
researcher could contribute to knowledge. For instance, in terms of Audit Committee 
activities in the UK, the researcher realised that only Collier and Gregory (1999), 
Spira (1998, 1999, 2002, 2003), Mangena and Pike (2005), Collier and Zaman 
(2005) and Turley and Zaman (2007) are the major research outputs in this regard. 
In respect of Audit Committee activity and auditor independence, the researcher 
could only review a limited number of studies from the UK. One other benefit of this 
chapter was that it enabled the researcher to appreciate possible methods through 




The chapter enabled the researcher to analyse the various theoretical underpinnings 
that are influential in the subject matter of the investigation. Agency Theory was 
found to be the dominant theoretical paradigm in this field of enquiry. The chapter 
was also used to develop relevant hypotheses for the study. Fifteen hypotheses 
were developed, five for the first empirical study, six for the second empirical study 
and four for the third empirical study. All the hypotheses were underpinned by 









This chapter provided an opportunity for the researcher to formulate a method for 
achieving the research objectives. The chapter explains the ontological and 
epistemological issues that may affect the research and also enabled the researcher 
to locate a space for the study in the positivist epistemological divide. The researcher 
used this chapter to evaluate other possible methods and justify his choices. An 
important outcome from this chapter was the appreciation of the diverse nature of 
social science research and the importance of keeping broad perspectives on the 
issues of ontological and epistemological divides in social science investigations. 
Thus the nature of the research is what matters rather than being fixated with a 
particular ontological and epistemological orientation.   
 
Chapter Six  
This chapter presents the first empirical study of the thesis. It examines the 
determinants of Audit Committee activity. The chapter justifies the hypotheses to be 
tested, enumerates the methods and data to be used. Findings from the regressions 
were discussed.  
 
Chapter Seven 
This chapter reports the second empirical study of the thesis. It examines the 
relationship between external auditors‟ fees and Audit Committee activity. Alternative 
measures of economic bonding between the auditor and the auditee are examined. 
Regression results were discussed and diagnostic tests reported.  
 
Chapter Eight  
This chapter reports the findings of the investigation into the relationship between 
Audit Committee activity, audit and non-audit fees. Model specification issues were 
examined. Important results relating to knowledge spill-over and the auditing process 
were reported. One important outcome from this chapter was the need for the 
researcher to attend classes on statistical modelling and the need to acquire new 
skills to facilitate the use of new software such as STATA that would aid in the data 
analyses and interpretation stages of the research process. In the next section, the 






9.3 OUTCOMES OF THE STUDY 
1) The study resulted in an enhanced understanding of the concept of Corporate 
Governance and auditor independence and the various ways in which it could 
be threatened, especially as it affects confidence in the market system in 
which the auditor plays a very crucial role 
2) The study expounded the importance of the Audit Committee as a Corporate 
Governance mechanism 
3) The study enhanced our understanding of the impact of the Audit Committee 
on auditor independence 




9.4  Major Findings from the Study  
This is discussed based on the three main research questions of the study.  
 
9.4.1 Determinants of Audit Committees’ Activity 
This study tested some of the assertions regarding the determinants of the activity or 
diligence of the Audit Committee in discharging its oversight functions. For example, 
some committees‟ reports and organisations (Combined Code, 2003; SOX, 2003; 
BRC, 1999; OECD, 2004; EU‟s Fifth directive, 2004; Treadway, 1987) have all 
suggested that Audit Committee activity or diligence is a function of the committee‟s 
independence, composition and structure, the presence of an expert on the 
committee and the definition of the terms of reference of the committee. Agency 
theorists have argued that firm complexities and size are important control variables 
in examining the determinants of Audit Committee activity.  
 
Audit Committee Activity and Board Composition  
First, this study found evidence that shows that Audit Committee activity is directly 
related to the proportion of non-executive directors on the board. The implication 
being that the more non-executive directors on the board of directors, all things being 
equal, the more active the Audit Committee will be. The practical implication of this 
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for Corporate Governance is that greater presence of independent non-executive 
directors on the board may mean better protection of the interests of the 
shareholders, if the researcher assumes the monotonist‟s view, and of all 
stakeholders if the researcher assumes the pluralist‟s view. Although governance 
codes in the UK fall short of recommending the number of non-executive directors on 
the board, the codes initially suggested that the board should be balanced so that no 
single individual or group of related individuals is able to unduly influence the board‟s 
decisions. This is so that the board is able to discharge its oversight function in 
respect of monitoring, compliance with regulation and management control. 
Governance codes are now more categorical in suggesting that the board should be 
comprised of more independent non-executive directors. This is because the greater 
presence of independent non-executive directors on the board is expected to 
constrain conflicts of interest thereby reducing agency cost and preventing the 
exploitation of the shareholders.  
 
This finding corroborates the various governance provisions that suggest that the 
board of directors should be more independent of management and accountable. If 
these attributes are achieved it has the potential to increase confidence in the market 
system and could facilitate investing and financing activities in the economy. 
Improvements in investing and financing activities within an economy are an 
important prerequisite to sustained economic growth and development with its 
attendant effects on quality of life and well being of the population.  
 
Second, the study documents evidence that shows that increases in board activity 
provides part of the explanation for the increase in Audit Committee activity. This 
finding reinforces the earlier mentioned result, that board independence improves 
Audit Committee activity. This is because an independent board, all things being 
equal, is more likely to be active and it is thus more likely to enhance the activity of 
the Audit Committee. An active Audit Committee is more likely to ensure reporting 
quality. If reporting quality is improved, investors are more likely to have a clear 
picture of the performance of an enterprise and can therefore make much more 





Audit Committee Activity and Ownership Structure  
Third, the study also documents evidence that is consistent with governance 
mechanisms substitution hypotheses. The study found a statistically significant 
negative relationship between the presence of managerial shareholdings of more 
than 3% in the shares of a company and the level of activity of the Audit Committee 
at a 10% level. This implies that the more active the Audit Committee is, the less 
important is the role of management shareholders in reducing agency costs of 
operation. It also indicates that managerial share ownership may substitute for the 
Audit Committee‟s governance activities. The studies also found that substantial 
outside investors are also likely to substitute for corporate governance roles played 
by the Audit Committee.  
 
Developments in the Roles of the Audit Committee   
Fourth, in terms of the activity of the Audit Committees, the study found that there 
have been significant changes in the content and scope of the responsibilities of the 
Audit Committee, from the traditional role of monitoring financial reporting to a more 
complex role of ensuring auditing and reporting quality, enhancing the firm‟s internal 
control procedures and risk management as well as assessing the scope of the work 
and independence of the external auditors. The study also found that the status of 
the Audit Committee has improved tremendously from a voluntary sub-committee 
which was set up to signify „class‟, enjoy legitimacy and not really because of their 
intrinsic value nor because management really relied on them, to a more crucial and 
one of the most important mechanisms of Corporate Governances in organisations. 
Although the approach in the UK favours the comply-or-explain approach, the 
majority of listed companies now have Audit Committees and provide reports of their 
activities in their annual reports. This is not to suggest that all is well with the level of 
Audit Committee activities and disclosure in the UK, as there are still opportunities 
for improvement. Evidence of the increase in the scope and nature of the 
responsibilities of the Audit Committee was presented. 
 
9.4.2 Audit Committees’ Activity and Auditor Independence 
This part of the thesis was based on the premise that there are important 
relationships between Audit Committee activity and external auditor Independence. 
This is because the Audit Committee is the only board committee directly charged 
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with ensuring auditing and reporting quality in the organisation at board level. The 
importance of this responsibility cannot be overemphasised especially in ensuring 
and sustaining market confidence. The importance of the need to sustain market 
confidence can be appreciated in the unfortunate scenario of Northern Rock where 
investors had to endure long queues and wait to withdraw their savings with dire 
consequences for investing and financing activities in the market simply because 
they feared the worse could happen to their savings and these actions directly relate 
to the loss of confidence in the ability of the management of the company to safely 
invest their funds and ensure returns. Lack of confidence in the market means that 
surplus funds in the investing end of the economic spectrum could not be channelled 
to the financing end of the spectrum. Investors become wary of the information and 
signals coming from the market and possibly fear the worst. One way of boosting 
confidence in the market system has been through certifications by the auditors. The 
auditor‟s report provides an opinion on the truth and fairness of the information in the 
financial statements about the performance and going concern situation of the 
auditee. This information is important for investment and financing decisions. The 
roles of the Audit Committee in respect of enhancing reporting quality have a direct 
impact on the issues of market confidence as well. The interactions between these 
two mechanisms with respect to ensuring reporting quality is therefore important for 
market confidence, sustainability of the free market system, economic growth and 
development. It is against these backgrounds that the following findings from the 
second empirical chapter of this thesis are reported.   
 
Board Structure and External Auditors’ Fees  
Fifth, the study found that independent boards buy more services from their external 
auditors. This is unexpected. Independent boards are expected to be more effective 
in monitoring and therefore this increased internal oversight should have a 
downward effect on external auditors‟ fees. However, this finding is interpreted to 
mean that the higher the proportion of independent non-executive directors on the 
board, the higher the likelihood of buying more services from the external auditors for 
both audit and non-audit purposes. The implication of this finding is that independent 
boards favour more audit and reporting coverage which, all things being equal, may 
improve auditor independence. Although an increase in the total fees paid to the 
auditor may indicate a higher level of economic bonding between the auditor and 
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their client, to the extent that the auditor is highly dependent on the client by virtue of 
a substantial part of their income being earned from a client or group of related 
clients, then independence may be compromised. However, in order to ensure 
reporting quality an independent board would want a better coverage and wider 
scope in respect of auditing and compliance functions from the auditor which should 
enhance reporting quality and ultimately improve market confidence in the corporate 
system.  
 
The results from this study show that the average total relative income from each 
client is just 1.48% of the auditors‟ total income. This is a lot lower than the threshold 
of 10% for listed companies and 15% for other companies. 
 
Audit Committee Activity and External Auditors’ Fees  
Sixth, the study documents a surprisingly strong and consistently positive 
relationship between different measures of external auditors‟ fees and measures of 
Audit Committee activity. This indicates that increases in the activity of the Audit 
Committee, all things being equal, would lead to an increase in the total fees being 
paid to the external auditors for audit and non-audit services. This is counter intuitive. 
Agency cost theory suggests that introducing monitoring and control mechanisms 
should alleviate firms‟ exposure to agency costs. Especially in view of the fact that 
increases in measures of external auditors‟ fees have the tendency to give an 
impression of compromised auditor independence. The finding is consistent even 
when alternative measures of economic relationship with the auditor were used. 
However, this finding is consistent with the perception that Audit Committees favour 
auditing and reporting quality and coverage. Such coverage is reflected in a positive 
relationship between fees and Audit Committee activity. Interpreting the increase in 
the fees paid to the auditor to indicate increases in the amount of work performed by 
auditors for auditing and non-audit services supports the thesis that the Audit 
Committee encourages additional purchases of auditing and non-auditing services 
from the external auditors.  
 
Audit Committee members also have three incentives to buy more services from the 
auditors in order to ensure auditing and reporting quality.  Firstly, human capital and 
the financial consequences of poor reporting quality could explain why Audit 
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Committee members may favour the purchase of more services from the auditor, if 
such purchases are made to indicate auditing and reporting quality. Human capital 
effects suggest that members of the Audit Committees of firms with poor reporting 
records suffer depletion in their human capital worth. Secondly, reputational 
concerns could also explain why Audit Committee members will favour buying more 
services from the external auditors. Thirdly, litigation risk could also provide 
incentives for members of Audit Committees to buy more services from the external 
auditors so long as it protects them from the risk of litigation and it could also serve 
as evidence of their taking due care in the discharge of their responsibilities.  
 
Seventh, the study found that control variables such as firm complexities and size 
continue to be key determinants of the level of economic bonding between the 
auditor and their auditee. However, firm complexity, measured by the natural log of 
number of subsidiaries, was not found to determine non-audit fees. Surprisingly, less 
profitable companies were found to be paying more to their auditors for both audit 
and non-auditing services. Furthermore, in line with the audit risk framework, firms 
with poor profitability performance seem to buy more audit and non-audit services 
from their external auditors. The increase in total fee may result from the additional 
audit work and analytical review and evidence gathering in order to reach a safe 
opinion on the firm‟s reports.  
 
9.4.3 The Relationship Between Audit and Non-Audit Fees and Audit 
Committee Activity  
This part of the thesis followed on from the second research question. It addressed 
three main issues. First, what is the relationship between audit and non-audit fees?  
Secondly, how should we examine this relationship? And, thirdly, what is the effect of 
different modelling approaches on the relationship between the fees and Audit 
Committee activity?  The importance of understanding the nature of the relationship 
between the fees is underscored by its impact on the perception of auditor 
independence. An increase in the proportion of non-audit fees to audit fees has the 
tendency to impair perceptions of independence, although there are conflicting views 
which posit that the provision of non-audit services to audit clients should enhance 
auditor independence since they may be able to deliver better services at a cheaper 
rate for their audit client due to knowledge spill-over. The facts about knowledge 
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spill-over from one service to the other continue to be inconclusive. The view that 
auditing is used as a loss leader for more lucrative non-audit services is also 
unresolved and the interaction of these (audit and non-audit services) with Audit 
Committee activity has been under researched. All these were the focus of the third 
empirical study of this thesis in chapter seven. The findings of this investigation are 
discussed below.  
 
Relationship Between Audit and Non-Audit Fees  
Eighth, the study documents a stable and statistically significant positive relationship 
between audit fee and non-audit fees in a single equation fee model. This shows that 
the provision of audit services positively influences the provision of non-audit 
services to the same client. This indicates that clients who currently buy audit 
services from an external auditor are likely to buy their non-audit services from the 
same auditor. This may be because it is more economical for the client since they 
would not have to incur another round of contracting costs. It may also be 
economical to the auditor who may benefit from economies of scope. The economies 
may be in terms of resources management especially human resources.  
 
Ninth, the study documents evidence of endogeneity between audit and non-audit 
fees. This shows that the findings in the single equation model suffer from 
simultaneous equation bias and the model results may be spurious. As a result, the 
relationship was examined with a simultaneous equation model.  
 
Tenth, the study did not find evidence that auditors use auditing services as a loss 
leader for a more „lucrative‟ non-audit service. This is because while a statistically 
significant positive relationship was maintained between audit and non-audit 
services, indicating that non-audit services directly influence audit services, an 
insignificant positive relationship was found between non-audit and audit services. 
This indicates that audit services do not directly influence non-audit services thus 
suggesting that although a positive relationship exists between non-audit and audit 
services this could be due to chance and therefore not reliable. However, the 
findings support the notion that providing non-audit services to a client could facilitate 
the provision of audit services to the same client and that knowledge spill-over flows 




Relationship Between Audit and Non-Audit Fees and Audit Committee Activity  
Eleventh, the study documents evidence that show that the effects of Audit 
Committee activity are sensitive to model specifications. This is because Audit 
Committee activity drives external auditors‟ fees when the model does not have fee 
variables as one of the explanatory variables, thereby showing a positive 
relationship. But when the independent variables include audit or non-audit fees, in 
either single or simultaneous equations, the positive relationship becomes negative. 
Surprisingly, all the control variables that would normally matter in determining audit 
and non-audit fees become insignificant.  
 
9.5 Major Findings and Implications for Theory 
In chapter 4 the researcher enumerates the major theoretical underpinnings of the 
investigation. Agency Theory was found to be the dominant theoretical framework 
and this has been used widely in other studies. Basically, this section examines how 
well the theoretical underpinnings have been explained by the findings from the 
thesis. Here, the focus is between the independent non-executive directors, Audit 
Committee activities and auditor independence (proxy by external auditors‟ fees).   
 
Agency Theory vs. Audit Committee Activity, Board Independence and Auditor 
Independence. 
Chapter 4, section 4.1.1 explains the main assumptions and implications of Agency 
Theory. In summary, firms reduce information asymmetry by instituting control and 
monitoring mechanisms within the organisation. This control mechanism such as the 
board of directors and Audit Committee of the board are supposed to reduce 
conflicts of interest as well between the shareholders and management by protecting 
the interests of the shareholders. These control mechanisms undertake decision 
control and supervisory roles in the organisation. For instance, it is part of the 
responsibilities of the Audit Committee to review compliance with the internal control 
procedures in organisations, to review the risk management procedures in the firm 
and to review the independence of the external auditors. These are with the view 
that it should reduce the agency cost of operation incurred by the organisation. 





Thus from an agency theoretical background, Audit Committees and independent 
boards of director should enhance internal monitoring and control of the firm and this 
should translate into reduced agency costs, including the costs of auditing and 
related services. Therefore, on the basis of the agency theoretical expectation an 
increase in Audit Committee activity as well as the presence of more independent 
non-executive directors on the board should lead to a reduction in the total fees paid 





Figure 9: Agency Theory, Corporate Governance and External Auditors’ Fees 
Framework  
However, findings from this investigation in respect of Corporate Governance and 
external auditors‟ fees do not confirm this theoretical framework. A positive 
relationship between Audit Committee activity, independent boards and external 
auditor‟s fees appear more consistent with Stakeholder Theory. This is now explored 
below.  
 




The Stakeholder Theory was explained in section 4.2 of chapter 4. The theory 
suggests that the primary purpose of the firm is not the protection of the interests of 
the shareholders alone, but also the interests of all the stakeholders which include 
the shareholders. It was also shown in the section that firms need to optimise their 
performance by taking care of all their stakeholders. Thus to assume that the interest 
of the shareholders is the primary objective of the firm may be too simplistic, when 
the reality suggests that other stakeholders matter. A positive relationship between 
Audit Committee activity, board independence and external auditors‟ fees found in 
this study may be an indication of the appreciation of the complexities involved in 
managing modern businesses. Therefore, in order to ensure reporting quality and 
discharge their oversight functions effectively, members of the Audit Committee and 
indeed the independent non-executive directors need to consider the interests of 
other stakeholders too. Thus the consideration would be beyond just agency cost 
reduction objectives, as Agency Theory may suggest, to a broader objective of 
transparent and responsible reporting that addresses the interests of all 
stakeholders. This includes the interests of the shareholders, society and members 
of the Audit Committees too. The framework figure 10 explains how this result fits 
into Stakeholder Theory. The demand for reporting quality, transparency and 
accountability of the management to all stakeholders places additional pressures on 
the members of the Audit Committee and independent non-executive directors 
leading to demands for additional coverage and consequently increases in external 
auditors‟ fees. This seems to be a more realistic representation of the corporate 





Figure 10: Stakeholder Theory, Corporate Governance and External Auditors’ 
Fees Framework  
 
 
9.6 Limitations and Future Studies  
As with most empirical studies, this research is not perfect and has various 
limitations; therefore findings from the study should be used with caution to the 
extent of the following limitations.  
 
First, the sample size in this study may be adjudged to be small, this is because the 
study is based on the FTSE 350 using the version that excludes investment 
companies. In addition companies in the financial and regulated sectors were 
removed as well as companies that did not meet the sample selection criteria. These 
left the researcher with just 245 companies for the first two investigations and 204 
companies for the third empirical study. To this extent the results from the study may 
suffer from small sample bias. Future studies should use a larger sample and they 




Second, the study used a number of proxy variables such as frequency of meetings 
as a measure of Audit Committee activity, external auditors‟ fees as a proxy for their 
economic bonding between them and their clients and a reflection of their 
independence. These are proxies and are not the actual measures of these 
phenomena. To this extent, they may contain bias and may therefore affect the 
findings. For instance, the proxy for Audit Committee activity has not taken care of 
the process dimension of the committee‟s activity. Equally, the proxy for economic 
bonding has not taken the magnitude of fees into consideration. Future research 
should design better proxies that can lead to improved understanding of these 
phenomena.  
 
Third, this study is essentially a cross sectional study that examines a phenomenon 
at a particular point in time. This may not give a complete picture of the phenomenon 
studied. For instance, the increase in non-audit fees relative to audit fees in 2005 
may be temporary and not a continued occurrence. Thus a longitudinal study would 
have better captured the changes in the investigated phenomena over a longer 
period of time. In this light, future studies should be conducted that examine the 
relationship between the Audit Committee and the external auditor on a longitudinal 
basis. It will certainly be worthwhile to examine whether the increase in the non-audit 
relative to audit fees in 2005-2006 continues beyond 2008-2009 when the 
implementation of the conversion from national accounting standards to International 
Accounting Standards for all listed companies would have been completed. Using a 
panel data approach can also capture other omitted variables that matter in the 
relationship between audit and non-audit fees as well as these relationships and 
Audit Committee activity.  
 
Fourth, some of the variable definitions and specifications may be problematic. For 
instance, the use of a binary variable as a measure of whether a company has a 
pension scheme or not may not be a true reflection of the different types of pension 
scheme and their respective risks and complexity, which may have an impact on the 
outcomes of the study in the third empirical chapter.  Future studies should improve 




Fifth, most of the governance data used in this investigation have been manually 
collected. Although the researcher took all necessary care to be accurate, he is, 
however, susceptible to human error in the process. Furthermore, some of the 
variables have been defined based on the researcher‟s decision and on previous 
studies. These may be sources of bias.  A likely solution that future researchers may 
avail themselves of is the provision of corporate governance information by some 
private organisations such as Manifest and the International Shareholders Service 
(ISS). This should enable more accurate studies and more interesting results.  
 
Sixth, in chapter 8, the researcher tested for and documented the presence of 
endogeneity between audit and non-audit fees. But it is quite possible that other 
governance variables are also jointly determined with audit and non-audit fees. 
Future studies should consider this fact in their design and this should lead to 
improved findings and enhanced understanding of the relationship between these 
variables.   
 
Seventh, in chapter 8, the single equation fee model for non-audit fees produced 
surprising results in that, although the R2 was high at 65%, only two variables 
showed significance. The researcher checked and confirmed the presence of multi-
collinearity which was corrected by removing two variables that appeared to be 
highly affected. These were NONEXEC and BOARDSIZE. Although the results 
improved as a result of this modification, this may not have solved this problem 
completely. Future studies should be aware of this fact when designing studies that 
use similar models to the researcher‟s.  
 
Finally, the researcher would be happy to undertake a follow up qualitative study that 
can use the current outcome as the basis for its investigation. Such a study may be 
entitled: “The interface between Audit Committees and External Auditors: between 
qualitative design and quantitative outcomes”. Such a study could use focus group 
and muti-level interviews with various players in the corporate environment including, 
for instance, board level individuals, financial analysts and auditors. This should 
improve our understanding of the actual processes in boardrooms, reality in the 
corporate environment as opposed to just the academic perspectives, and allow us 
to have a broader understanding of the issues of Corporate Governance as it affects 
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auditors, investors and Audit Committees. This may also uncover the implications of 
organizational culture and norms for perceptions about auditor independence. The 
only likely hindrance to this may be access to these individuals.  
 
9.7 Contribution to Theory and Practice and Recommendations  
The researcher conducted a detailed and comprehensive study on the Audit 
Committee and its interface with external auditors through an examination of the 
activity of the Audit Committee, its impact on external auditing and the relationship 
with audit and non-audit fees. The research contributes to literature in a number of 
ways including those enumerated below.  
 
First, in chapter 2, the researcher developed an integrated definition of Corporate 
Governance that incorporates both the system and process dimensions of the 
subject. He proposed that Corporate Governance should be perceived as an 
economic system that facilitates value creation, as a social system that enhances the 
sharing of values and enables interaction among individuals in the organisation and 
as an ethical system that seeks to take care of the concerns of all stakeholders. 
Furthermore, the researcher also proposed that Corporate Governance should be 
seen as a process phenomenon that evolves over time (i.e. an evolutionary process) 
and involves a communicative process as well as a control process so that corporate 
objectives can be achieved. This contribution should be helpful to academic and 
practitioners who often find it difficult to define Corporate Governance.  
 
Second, in chapter 2, the research detailed a chronological and historical 
development of Corporate Governance in the UK tracing it as far back as the 1970s. 
Analysing the impact of politics, international treaties and the national economic 
situation on the evolution of Corporate Governance in the UK and how these have 
impacted on how we see Corporate Governance in the current corporate 
environments. This is important to academics and practitioners as it helps to put the 
discourse on Corporate Governance into an appropriate historical perspective and 
context.  
 
Third, in chapter 6, the researcher presented evidence that is consistent with the 
views that Corporate Governance mechanisms may substitute for one another. The 
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negative relationship between managerial ownership and Audit Committee activity 
confirms this suggestion. Similarly, the negative relationship documented between 
substantial outside investors and Audit Committee activity further confirms this. This 
finding is important to regulators who may want to enhance the roles of institutional 
investors. Furthermore, the chapter also shows the lack of a relationship between 
the presence of financial experts and Audit Committee activity. This finding is not 
encouraging and may be indicative of the need for greater clarity on what counts as 
a financial expert. Regulators need to be more specific about this. They also need to 
be careful to avoid the Audit Committee and the main board being dominated by 
financial experts so that this does not stifle the presence of non-financial experts who 
have business acumen and other skills that could be of immense benefit to 
businesses.  
  
Fourth, in chapter 7, the researcher documents a positive relationship between a 
number of measures of economic bonding between the auditor and their client and 
that Audit Committees appear to favour such increases. Despite the counter intuitive 
nature of this finding and its potential threat to the appearance of independence, the 
researcher‟s finding is consistent with a growing number of studies that have 
documented similar positive relationships between the Audit Committee and external 
auditors‟ fees. The analyses by the researcher show that this rise in 2005-2006 may 
be due to conversion by listed companies from national accounting standards to 
International Accounting Standards (IAS). This finding is important to investors, 
academics and regulators, because it shows that Audit Committee members do have 
incentives to ensure reporting qualities through greater coverage by the external 
auditors. This may inevitably mean increased total fees being paid to the auditors. It 
is therefore important that the regulatory framework is flexible enough to 
accommodate contingencies.  
 
Fifth, in chapter 7, while other measures of economic bonding between auditors and 
their clients such as total fees, audit fees, non-audit fees and total relative income 
show some interesting results, measures such as ratio of non-audit fee to audit fee, 
and ratio of non-audit fees to total fees do not show any meaningful results. While 
not doubting previous studies that have used these measures, it is important that 
such studies are re-examined for their specification, statistical power and perhaps 
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the data used. When these two measures were used, they produced an R2 that was 
less than 5% with no significant relationship whatsoever.  
 
Sixth, in chapter 8, some of the findings challenged common wisdom in respect of 
Agency Theoretical expectations. For example, variables such as the log of number 
of employees, log of turnover, receivables plus stock as a function of total assets etc 
which have been used to proxy for size and risk do not seem to matter when 
endogeneity was controlled for. This may indicate that the relationship between 
these variables and external auditors‟ fees is not as straightforward as it seems. This 
is an important message that could be useful to academics whose researches make 
use of some of these variables to consider alternative measures of size and risk as 
well as alternative model specifications. They could try polynomial specifications and 
market value could be used as a measure of size.  
 
Seventh, in chapter 8, the researcher found evidence consistent with knowledge 
spill-over from both audit services and non-audit services. But he did not find any 
evidence that supports the proposition that auditors‟ use auditing as a loss leader for 
non-auditing services. The researcher also documents evidence that suggests that 
model specifications matter in the investigation of the relationship between audit and 
non-audit fees. These are important findings that will benefit businesses, academics, 
practitioners and regulators. Businesses may look at the synergistic advantages of  
knowledge spill-over, while academics should be aware that when modelling the 
determinants of audit fees, they should not include non-audit fees as an explanatory 
variable because the result may become spurious and professional auditors should 
be aware that they need to consider the benefit of joint provision of services to their 
client in the light of the regulatory framework, that it may not be true that they use 
auditing as a loss leader and that there could be economies of scope benefits in 
providing both audit and non audit services to clients.  The same messages need to 
be appreciated by regulators in regulating joint provision of both auditing and non-
audit services.  
 
Finally, the general public and investors need to have a better understanding of the 
roles of the auditors in providing certification of the truth and fairness of the financial 
statements prepared by the management and that not all increases in the non-audit 
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fees relative to audit fees compromise auditor independence. There could be 
genuine instances when clients would need to buy more non-audit services from 
their auditor. This is certainly the case with the conversion to International 
Accounting Standards in 2005/2006.  
 
In the light of all these contributions, the researcher would be happy to disseminate 
some of the findings of the research using media such as relevant academic 
journals, the British Accounting Association (BAA) organised events such as the 
annual conference, BAA‟s Corporate Governance Special Interest Group, the BAA‟s 
Auditing Special Interest Group, attending international academic and practitioner 
conferences and possibly the print and electronic media.  
 
 
9.8 Policy Recommendations: a summary 
The design of the study enhanced contributions to both knowledge and practice and 
its findings have important relevance to regulators and the general public. In this 
section, the researcher outlines suggestions for the development of the regulatory 
and practitioners fields to facilitate the effective implementation of the outcomes of 
the study.  
 
First, the study has implication for company‟s board composition. The importance of 
independence in board activity cannot be overemphasised. It is the key to an 
effective and efficient board and indeed to corporate governance in organisations. 
An independent board will be able to discharge its oversight functions without undue 
dependence and pressure from a single dominant directorial position. This is 
particularly important in the current economic climate where public opinion and 
shareholders‟ perceptions are against „city‟s‟ compensation and bonus culture. A 
desire to limit compensation and so reduce the number of director and/or to 
subsume the chair and CEO into one may result. This should be resisted by 
regulators in order to enhance corporate transparency and accountability.  
  
The study identified the changing roles of the Audit Committees, these have to be 
recognised and incorporated in the regulatory framework for corporate governance in 
organisations. This also implies that Audit Committee members require a greater 
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understanding of their roles, need to acquire appropriate type and level of skills and 
expertise to make them function independently. They will need to have access to 
appropriate training and expert advice when needed for the discharge of their 
responsibilities. These pose significant financial challenge to organisations but will 
be immensely beneficial to all stakeholders in the corporate environment.  
 
There is an urgent need to create sufficient awareness of these issues; this should 
be championed by the regulators and the accounting profession if there is to be 
greater understanding of the importance of a strong AC, a strengthening of the 
independence of the auditor and the financial implications of these.  This is also the 
responsibility of those who represent directors, accountants and the regulators of 
Corporate Governance, so that the stakeholders understand that better governance 
involves different aspects of the organisation and those who have a relationship with 
it.  Shareholders, too, need to be aware that current business activity is mindful not 
only of their interest but a much wider range of stakeholders.  Shareholders are likely 
always to be the primary consideration of management and auditors, but it may be 
envisaged that a broader responsibility to all stakeholders will be developed. 
 
These policy directions represent significant challenge to policy makers but are 
important steps that have to be taken in order to ensure that corporate governance 
developments and policies are adequate and relevant to current needs and address 
important concerns of all stakeholders. Sustaining market confidence on a long term 
basis requires the establishment of a corporate governance practices and 
procedures that delivers the benefits of a transparent and responsible corporate 
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